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Book Description
This publication reproduces presentations made at a workshop hosted by the Por- 
tuguese National Defense Institute (IDN), under the framework of  the project Geo4GER 
– Geopolitics of  Gas and the Future of  Euro-Russian Relations. This project, funded by the 
Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) and developed by the Por- 
tuguese Institute of  International Relations of  Nova University of  Lisbon (IPRI-UNL) 
in partnership with IDN, aims to analyse the complex and multidimensional relationship 
geopolitics of  Euro-Russian gas, and develop alternative scenarios possible on the 
horizon of  the next twenty years. Starting from the idea that there is an multidirectional 
interaction between international policy, security environment, and energy, the Geo4GER 
aims to: (1) identify the political, economic and geopolitical trends that in the coming 
decades can commit or facilitate the increased consumption and production of  gas in 
Europe and in Russia; (2) predict the impact of  these geopolitical changes, their impli- 
cations for gas production and consumption in Europe and Russia, and their consequences 
for the gas market; and (3) assess how changes in the gas market could affect the future 
of  Euro-Russian relations.
Given the complexity of  the vectors to consider in the analyses of  this complex 
issue, the editors invited specialists to treat, in a rigorous and synthetic way, some of  the 
aspects which they believe to represent the basic points the project aims to develop. 
These authors, with very different origins, experiences and academic backgrounds, 
brought greater diversity and richness to the “ways of  seeing” this reality. In a context of  
rapid changes, we believe their contribution will assure greater and more informed 
information about one major challenge in the coming decades, that energy security and 
Euro-Russian relations will bring to European societies, namely in what refers to natural 
gas. 
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Introduction
“Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone”
Winston Churchill (1946)
This book brings forth the main conclusions reached at the workshop Geopolitics 
of  Energy and Energy Security held on the 12nd January 2017 at the Portuguese National 
Defense Institute (IDN). It was a closed-door event, integrated in the planned activities 
of  the FCT project Geopolitics of  Gas and the Future of  the Euro-Russian Relations (Geo4GER)1.
The project (funded by the FCT and developed at IPRI-UNL in partnership with 
IDN), main purpose is to analyse the complex and geopolitical multidimensional rela-
tionship of  Euro-Russian gas, as the basis for expected future scenarios of  this relation-
ship in the next twenty years. Relying on the assumption that the interaction between 
international politics, security and energy is multidirectional, the aim of  the current 
research is structured in three main topics: (1) to identify the political, economic and 
geopolitical trends that in the coming decades can compromise or facilitate the increased 
consumption and production of  gas in Europe and Russia; (2) to predict the impact of  
these geopolitical realities, their implications for gas production and consumption in 
Europe and Russia, and their consequences in the gas market; and finally; (3) to assess 
how changes in the gas market may affect the Euro-Russian relationship until to 2030. A 
preview of  this relationship and the concomitant exercise in scenario building require a 
thorough understanding of  how the dynamics and the fundamentals of  energy security 
are regulated. In fact, the concept of  energy security brings together two terms, and dis-
closes the need to think about security and energy as a whole, although both dimensions 
have specific features.
Energy security consists mostly of  the articulation of  three dynamics: (1) technologic 
(energy has been, since the dawn of  mankind, an element associated with technology, as 
only technology can ensure the multiplication of  force to expand human energy capacity 
– see the case of  fire. Since the Industrial Revolution, the relationship between energy 
and technology has obviously grown exponentially); (2) economic (energy resource needs 
and their feed streams, which involves a degree of  commitment with economic dynamics; 
the flow of  material goods and products, which implies the existence of  funds and, as a 
consequence, of  prices); (3) strategic (energy influences the dynamics of  a society and its 
potential to move towards the future; a society without energy slips rapidly into inertia. 
1 FCT-PTDC/IVC-CPO/1295/2014. For additional information contact us at geo4ger@gmail.com and/or 
check the Geo4ger website: http://geo4ger.wixsite.com/projetogeo4ger. 
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Thus, to ensure the endurance of  a given society, it is essential to ensure enough energy 
flows, at reasonable prices, and turn the issue of  energy into a security issue). We must 
regard these three dimensions as a whole interacting in a given society to achieve a main 
purpose: to assure enough energy supply at affordable prices. 
As a starting point for the development of  the research project on the Euro-Russian 
energy relationship, we believe it is essential to analyse and dichotomise the concept of  
energy security, as well as energy’s global geopolitical dynamics. Those were the goals of  
the Workshop Geopolitics of  Energy and Energy Security. Thus, the first objective of  this Semi- 
nar was to clarify the concept of  energy security, which is probably the main operational 
definition of  the research, while the second was to outline the geopolitical dynamics that 
characterise and shape global energy security issues that may affect the Euro-Russian 
relationship in this field, now and in the near future.
The Workshop was structured into two panels. The first, focused on the Geopolitics of  
Energy and Energy Security, analysed and discussed the concept of  energy security in a 
comprehensive perspective; the second, titled The Geopolitics of  Gas in Europe-Russia Rela- 
tionship, considered the dynamics of  global geopolitics, which affect or may affect the 
Euro-Russian relationship, in what concerns energy security issues.
In addition to the nine team members of  the project and the invited speakers, the 
Workshop had the participation of  about 45 invited specialists with different academic 
backgrounds, political perspectives, and professional activities (diplomats, intelligence, 
security forces, army, business, teachers and researchers).
The first panel included three presentations about energy concepts, international 
landscape and main player’s analysis: Major-General Filipe Arnaut Moreira, Professor 
António Costa Silva and Professor Carla Fernandes. The authors focused their presen- 
tations on the geopolitics of  energy and the multiple concept of  energy security. 
The second panel was focused on past, present and future possible trend scenarios 
for the geopolitics of  gas, taking the Euro-Russian relationship as a case study: researcher 
Aleksei Grivach, Professor Licínia Simão and Professor J. M. Félix Ribeiro.
The present book is divided into two parts, each of  them with four chapters, and 
ends with some final remarks and global conclusions. The first part (chapters 1 to 4) is 
entitled The Geopolitics of  Energy and Energy Security and includes a contribution to the theo- 
retic analysis of  the geopolitics of  energy (by Ana Campos and Carla Fernandes), the 
analysis of  energy as a social, strategic and geopolitical equation (by Felipe Arnault Mo- 
reira), an assessment and analysis of  geopolitics and energy security (by António Costa 
Silva), and ends with a theoretic discussion about the multiple definitions and significance 
of  energy security (by Carla Fernandes).
Part II (chapters 5 to 8) is focused on the Geopolitics of  gas in Europe-Russian Ana- 
lysis of  Energy Security, and goes beyond the presented papers, which the editors thought 
to be of  added value to provide a comprehensive and more holistic view of  the general 
dynamics and specific characteristics of  the Euro-Russian gas relation. It includes a 
Russian perspective on the Russia-EU Gas Relations (by Aleksei Grivatch), discusses the 
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possibility of  irreconcilable EU and Russian approaches (by Licinia Simão), works out 
the relation between oil energy and arms (by José Félix Ribeiro), and ends with the Rus- 
sian foreign policy approach to Europe (by Franco Tomassini).
The ensemble of  articles, whose guidelines we just described, does not mean to 
exhaust a subject as important and consequential, but only to offer the general public a 
more comprehensive, detailed and rigorous perspective, opening the doors of  scientific 
curiosity and the search for knowledge.
Convinced that there are gains in this exercise of  knowledge systematisation, which 
includes different ways of  evaluating the importance and the determinism of  some of  
the threats and risks identified in the recent past to the near future, the coordinators and 
the authors feel, however, somewhat dissatisfied that perhaps more could have been 
achieved were the project to be carried out today. We nonetheless believe we have suc-
ceeded in reaching our major goals.
The text now published is, above all, the product of  the enthusiasm of  a group of  
researchers who deserve to be mentioned. We owe our special thanks to the participants 
in the workshop, to the experts and external consultants to the Geo4GER research project 
and especially to the authors of  the chapters that make up this study. Our final words 
are for them. We would like to acknowledge their availability and the zest with which they 
all embraced our challenge. The final result is a book with quality and high scientific 
standards that the coordinators are proud to bring forth.
Additional thanks to IDN, for having accepted to publish this book without cons- 
traints. We hope to somehow contribute to enrich this editorial line.
Carla Patrício Fernandes
Teresa Ferreira Rodrigues 
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The Project Geo4GER: Some Highlights
General Overview
The Geo4GER project will investigate the geopolitics of  gas under the framework of  
the complex and multi-dimensional Euro-Russian relationship, through the development 
of  prospective scenarios for the next 20 years. This two yearlong project, funded by the 
FCT and developed by IPRI in partnership with IDN, is supervised by Carla Patricio 
Fernandes and composed by an international and intergenerational team of  nine 
researchers, with different academic and institutional backgrounds.
Based on the idea that interaction between international politics, security conjuncture 
and energy is multi-directional, Geo4GER intends to: (1) identify political, economic and 
geopolitical trends that can compromise or enable the expected increase on Europe’s 
and Russia’s consumption and gas production for the in coming decades; (2) forecast 
the impact of  these geopolitical realities, their implications on gas production and 
consumption in Europe and Russia, and their consequences in the gas market; and (3) 
evaluate how changes in the gas market may affect the future of  Euro-Russian relationship. 
In order to fulfil the proposed objectives, and to ensure a more comprehensive and 
impartial analysis of  the subject, we will analyse it in accordance with energy security 
concepts for producing and consuming countries. This analysis will be enhanced by a 
multidisciplinary research team with proven experience in the scientific fields of  political 
science and security studies, energy and economy issues, including a researcher belonging 
to a Russian institution (NESF). The same concern with impartiality was present in the 
selection of  the external consultants (Portuguese, Russian and EU experts)1. Some of  the 
team members collaborated previously on common projects of  similar nature in terms 
of  thematic and adopted methodology, but without the participation of  Russian 
researchers (Fernandes and Ribeiro, 2010; Rodrigues, Ribeiro and Leal, 2010; Fernandes 
and Duarte, 2011; Eiras, 2011; Rodrigues et al., 2012; Viana, 2014). 
Currently, energy security is a key issue on the international political agenda, a 
prerequisite for political stability and economic development, and an indivisible part of  a 
State’s overall security (yergin, 2006; Vasconcelos, 2009; Sovacool, 2011; Fernandes, 
2013; Rodrigues et al., 2014; Barroso, 2014). For Europe, energy insufficiency is a major 
1 António Costa Silva, head of  the Executive Commission of  PARTEX Oil and Gas, and Associated 
Professor at IST – Instituto Superior Técnico of  Lisboa; Konstantin Simonov, Director of  NESF – 
National Energy Security Fund, and Associated Professor at Moscow State University; Rúben Eiras, head 
of  the Energy Security Program of  FLAD – Fundação Luso-Americana para o Desenvolvimento, and 
Consultant in the Office of  the Minister of  the Sea; and Jorge Vasconcelos, President of  NEWES – New 
Energy Solutions and Consultant in ACER – Agência de Cooperação dos Reguladores da Energia of  EU.
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challenge, given its dependence on external sources, especially from Russia, the lack of  
diversification of  energy sources, and the poor branch of  its transmission network 
(Constantini, et al., 2007; Wehnert, 2007; Eiras, 2011; Rodrigues et al., 2012; Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 2014; Silva, 2014; 
Viana, 2014). For Russia, energy has been a geopolitical power factor and a potential 
strategic vector to its re-emergence as a great power in the international system (Grivach 
et al., 2011; Tomassini, 2013; Freire and Simão, 2015). however, in terms of  energy, 
Russia also faces long-term challenges, given the fall of  its production and the low 
competitiveness of  its gas, in a market where competition can hardly enter and changes 
in production are occurring very fast (Simonov, 2006; Ministry of  Energy of  the Russian 
Federation, 2010; Eiras, 2011; högselius, 2012; Fânzeres, 2013; Ribeiro, 2013). 
Given this scenario, and also the increasingly important role in the political and 
strategic discussion of  energy issues between Europe and Russia, it becomes relevant to 
diagnose the past and the present, as well as forecast the medium and long term futu- 
re (2030), taking into account the expected changes in the geopolitical and energetic 
environment, and the characteristics and dynamics of  Euro-Russian relationship (includ- 
ing its energy interdependence and the energy policies and strategies outlined by Europe 
and Russia).
The Geo4GER is structured in four parts: (1) study, analysis and diagnosis of  energy 
geopolitics; (2) analysis, diagnosis and characterization of  Euro-Russian energy system 
and relations; (3) forecasting Analysis and Scenario development; and (4) project outreach 
and visibility. Being our study object located at the intersection and interconnection 
between political science and international relations, this implies inevitable methodological 
implications. 
From a methodological point of  view the general and specific objectives will deter- 
mine the choice of  the adopted methods and techniques, both deductive and inductive 
methods, as well as case studies. The tools and techniques used will be supported by 
bibliographical research and document analysis (especially in carrying out tasks 1 and 2), 
and we will combine qualitative and quantitative technical approaches (mainly in tasks 3 
and 4), in particular regarding the scenario building exercise and the final results dis- 
cussion. Overall, we believe that the Geo4GER outputs will contribute to deepen the 
knowledge of  political and academic community about the near-term relations between 
producers, transit and consumer countries, and also support policy and business decision-
making, shaping energy policies and future choices of  energy markets. 
Literature Review 
The concerns about energy security emerged in the 70s of  the 20th century, when the 
OPEC countries declared an oil embargo to the USA and Europe. Since then, the aca- 
demic literature on energy security has been mainly focused on security of  supply, espe- 
cially on oil. 
Until recently, the energy security mainstream maintained this conceptual framework, 
focused on the notions of  “accessibility”, “availability” and “affordable prices” (yergin, 
 idn cadernos 17
2006; Silva, 2007; Vasconcelos, 2009; Sovacool, 2011; Fernandes, 2013; Rodrigues et al., 
2014). Nevertheless, in the last decades, we have witnessed an extraordinary change in on 
energy security challenges, which rises the question of  concepts and of  existing energy 
strategies. In this sense, many studies support that the traditional view of  energy security 
is rather limited and should be expanded, encompassing other energy sources (such as 
natural gas) and the new security challenges (such as terrorism, the growing instability in 
some producing countries, the black out’s, price volatility and climate change) (yergin, 
2006; Silva, 2007; Sovacool, 2011; Fernandes, 2013; Rodrigues et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
they also defend the need to recognize that energy security is influenced by relationships 
and interactions between States and so, with the rise of  new security challenges, it beco- 
mes necessary to develop a new energy security concept for the 21th century (Silva, 2007; 
Eiras, 2011; Rodrigues et al., 2014). This concern was highlighted in previous publications 
of  some team members of  Geo4GER, in different analysis of  the European, Portuguese 
and Chinese energy security (Fernandes and Ribeiro, 2010; Silva, 2014; Rodrigues et al., 
2012; Viana, 2014). 
Regarding EU’s and Russia’s energy security strategies, research has been produced 
since the 70’s, oscillating in its approach from theoretical, technical, geopolitical and pros- 
pective perspectives (Constatini, 2007; Wehnert, 2007; Sovacool, 2011; högselius, 2012; 
Ribeiro, 2013; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council, 2014). Thus, a significant number of  quantitative and qualitative research 
studies on this subject exist, some of  which developed by members of  the research team 
Geo4GER. In the last decade, the number of  studies of  Euro-Russian energy relations in 
the field of  energy has been increasing, as an outcome of  the growth of  European 
energy challenges and the Russia and transit country’s crisis, in particular Russia-Ukraine 
crises of  2006 and 2009. 
The Euro-Russian relation has proven to be turbulent, shifting from moments of  
cooperation to crisis periods. Most experts, despite divergent opinions, tend to agree 
that energy is such an important issue that both strategic partners need to cooperate or, 
at least, should continue their dialogue (Constantini et al., 2007; Grivach et al., 2011; 
Tomassini, 2013; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council, 2014). Moreover, much of  the existing academic literature on the Euro-
Russian energy relationship focuses on the analysis of  policies and European energy 
strategies and the risks and threats faced by European countries due to the Russian 
natural gas dependency. This means that there is a great number of  literature whose 
analysis is mainly focused on Europe strategies for supply security (Silva, 2007; Constantini 
et al., 2007; Wehnert, 2007; Eiras, 2011; Fernandes and Duarte, 2011; Sovacool, 2011; 
Rodrigues et al., 2012; Ribeiro, 2013). Rather, it’s quite rare in academic literature the 
perspective of  the Russian Federation on the EU-Russia energy relations, taking into 
account the energy security of  demand for their oil and gas exports (Simonov, 2006; 
Viana, 2014). 
At the national level, many of  the existing studies and publications on the subject 
were developed by members of  the team or by the team in similar nature previous studies, 
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both at the IPRI and IDN. Their analysis encompasses the geopolitical and energy 
dynamics in the region of  Caucasus, Asia, Africa, Russian Federation and the Iberian 
Peninsula (Fernandes and Ribeiro, 2010; Fernandes et al., 2010; Rodrigues, Ribeiro and 
Leal, 2010; Rodrigues et al., 2012; Barata, 2013; Tomassini, 2013; Fânzeres, 2013; Barata, 
2014; Fânzeres, 2014; Viana, 2014). They evaluated the European supply security through 
forecasting scenarios of  possible supply security strategies for Europe and for Portugal, 
on the horizon 2030. Some of  these studies had more than a national diffusion, since 
they were published in international journals or developed in cooperation with researchers 
from other countries and published in those same countries (Tomassini, 2013; Rodrigues 
et al., 2014; Silva, 2014). Despite the high importance of  these studies for the EU energy 
security, its focus and thematic approach was the security of  supply. Moreover, these 
studies have not integrated or had the collaboration of  researcher’s who represented the 
producer countries. 
In this sense, Geo4GER aims to overcome some of  the delimitations of  previous 
academic research, by updating, deepening and develop new scenarios for the analysis of  
the geopolitics of  gas in the Euro-Russia relations. What mainly characterizes the research 
of  this project is the development of  future scenarios, emerging a vision capable of  
looking from the outside (the broad global context) into the inside (the strategic focus of  
the investigation: the geopolitics of  gas on the Euro-Russian relations). 
The innovative character of  this project is also reflected in the choice of  the 
researcher team and external consultants, which includes Portuguese and Russian experts 
from various scientific backgrounds, academic institutions, think tanks and energy com- 
panies. It should also be noted the work experience of  all the team members in previous 
works of  a similar nature, either in terms of  thematic and/or methodologies (Delphi 
Exercise and Global Business Network Scenario planning process) (Ribeiro, 1992; 
Ribeiro et al., 1997; Scearce and Fulton, 2004; Ribeiro, 2010; Rodrigues et al., 2012). This 
kind of  analysis has never been done in Portugal, and to differentiate the original objec-
tives proposed by Geo4GER we emphasize the theoretical perspective of  one of  the most 
recognized energy security analysts, Daniel yergin, which argues that “energy interde-
pendence and the growing scale of  energy trade require continuing collaboration among 
both producers and consumers to ensure the security of  the entire supply chain” (yergin, 
2006). Geo4GER will allow deepening the study of  energy security, outline strategies to 
promote the cooperation among the supplier, transit and consumer countries, and eva- 
luate alternative energy markets for the EU and Russia.
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The Geopolitics of  Energy
Ana Campos and Carla Patrício Fernandes
Introduction
Throughout history, geopolitics has always played an essential role in national strat-
egy. Presently, geopolitics earns a variety of  definitions depending on the factors under 
analysis and the author’s perspective. however, the geopolitical analysis usually focuses 
on the use of  natural resources and the impact of  geographic characteristics in national 
and foreign policy. The importance of  geographic conditions cannot be ignored – actors 
who are able to make use of  that may gain a decisive advantage in the international 
arena. 
Energy resources are a key element of  the States’ geography, therefore energy 
geopolitics analyses, among others, the influence of  factors such as the location of  energy 
supply and demand centres, transit routes or energy prices. It is vital understand the 
geopolitics of  energy, in such a way as to incorporate the interests of  States, as it can have 
a huge impact on the effectiveness of  the national strategy and on economic growth. 
Energy resources have been the propeller of  world economy and are essential to 
ensure national and global stability and security. Faced with the growing increase of  
global demand for energy in the last decades, and the negative effects of  excessive fossil 
energy consumption, States are committed to manage available energy resources in order 
to balance consumption and production and to create an efficient and renewable 
community. This upturn in energy demand, and the ensuing pressure on energy markets, 
appears as one of  the factors increasing geopolitical tensions and international compe- 
tition among the major world powers. At the same time, the escalation of  risks and 
threats to energy security, as well as an atmosphere of  instability in producing States, the 
vulnerability of  supply routes – maritime routes in particular, terrorism, piracy and even 
concerns about climate change, are drawing the attention of  States and Institutions for 
the need to further develop short and long-term strategies to address those challenges 
and to reduce the vulnerabilities of  energy security.
The present article aims to understand the concept of  geopolitics using a concep-
tual approach stressing its link to energy, seeing that an understanding of  energy geo-
politics has become essential to ensure the stability of  States. After a theoretical contex-
tualisation and a revision of  the joint evolution of  the concept of  geopolitics and energy 
geopolitics, the article analyses energy transitions over history, the role energy resources 
plays in political decisions, how energy rules the world and its impact on global security. 
In our conclusion, and bearing in mind that the energy market is constantly changing, 
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we present the dynamics of  the future energy scenario that will shape the geopolitics of  
energy.
Geopolitics and Geopolitics of  Energy: a Conceptual Approach
“Geopolitics” is a complex concept1 and there is a profusion of  attempts to define 
it. The geopolitics studies the way politics or ideologies can be explained by means of  
geographic variables, such as location, size, population, resources or technological deve- 
lopment (Leigh, 2014). Analysing the interaction between political decisions and the 
geography of  the States, it purports to answer the question: how are political decisions 
shaped by geographic elements?, which refers to the connection between political 
interest, power, strategic thinking, decision-making and geographic space. Thus, in order 
to understand geopolitics, it is necessary to identify the power relationship between 
geography and political interests.
The expression “geopolitics” was created by Rudolph Kjellen (1864-1922) in 18992, 
as meaning the “science of  the State”. Kjellen was interested in the geographical attributes 
of  the States and in the implications of  those features related to their spatial location had 
for the political Power. In the author’s view, the key elements in the definition of  
geopolitics are power and space; therefore, the major geopolitical challenge is how to use 
space to increase power. 
At the end of  the nineteenth century, the supremacy of  the British Empire was chal- 
lenged by other countries that sought to expand their colonial presence across the globe 
(Flint, 2017). It was after this period that the classical theories of  authors such as hal-
ford Mackinder3, Alfred Thayer Mahan4, Nicholas Spykman5 and Giulio Douhet6 were 
developed, based on land, maritime and air power, respectively (Almeida, 2012). General 
Karl Haushofer (1869-1946), whose geopolitical thoughts influenced Hitler’s strategy, 
defends that “the essence of  the regions as comprehended from the geographical point 
of  view provides the framework for geopolitics within which the course of  political 
processes must proceed if  they are to succeed in the long term. Though political leader-
ship will occasionally reach beyond this frame, the earth dependency will always eventu-
ally exert its determining influence” (O’Loughlin, 1994, p. 112). In fact, States empha-
1 See Smolén, K., 2012. Evolution of  Geopolitical Schools of  Thought. Teka Kom. Politol, Stos, Miedzymar. pp. 
5-19 [pdf] Available at: <http://www.pan-ol.lublin.pl/wydawnictwa/TPol7/Smolen.pdf> [Accessed on 
28 March 2017].
2 Inspired by the work of  Friedrich Ratzel, Politische Geographie (Political Geography – 1897), Rudolph 
Kjellen coined the expression geopolitics in his book The State as a way of  life, published in I899.
3 Sir halford Mackinder (1861-1947) was the great defender of  land power and wrote “The Geographical 
Pivot of  history” (1904). Later, he developed the “heartland Theory” in “Democratic Ideals and Reality” 
(1919). 
4 Alfred Thayer Mahan (1849-1914) wrote “The Influence of  Sea Power upon History – 1660-1783” (1890) 
where he emphasized the maritime power. 
5 Nicholas Spykman (1893-1943) wrote “American’s Strategy in World Politics” (1942) where he analyses the 
nature of  power, war and the balance of  powers. 
6 Giulio Douhet (1869-1930) wrote “Il Diminio dell Aria, saggio sul’art della Guerra aerea” (1921) in which 
he developed the thesis of  air as a powerful new weapon. 
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sise greatly the exploration of  geographical factors, such as access to resources, in the 
outline of  their domestic and foreign policies. Saul Cohen defines geopolitics as “an 
analysis of  the interaction between, on the one hand, geographical settings and perspec-
tives and, on the other, political processes. (..) Both geographical settings and political 
processes are dynamic, and each influences and is influenced by the other. Geopolitics 
addresses the consequences of  this interaction” (Cohen, 2015, p. 16). For Colin Flint, 
geopolitics is “the struggle over the control of  geographical entities with an interna-
tional and global dimension, and the use of  such geographical entities for political 
advantage” (Flint, 2017). 
Classic geopolitics, in the wake of  World War II, became tainted by a constructed 
association with the Nazi party, whereas, traditionally, geopolitics refers mainly to the 
military field. However, after 1970, Geopolitics came to be seen as a way of  studying the 
evolution of  power relations between the different political poles, considering their geo-
graphical characteristics, and finding nodes that condition them, restricting or enhancing 
their capacity of  affirmation. In this context, the multidisciplinary approach of  geopoli-
tics appears in authors such as Raymond Aron, henry Kissinger, Paul Kennedy, Samuel 
huntington and Zbigniew Brzezinski (Leal, 2011). 
Modern conceptions of  geopolitics are related to the global scale, including multiple 
dimensions such as economy, so-called Geo-economics, and even energy, since natural 
resources such as oil, coal or natural gas constitute an important variable for national and 
international strategy. Thus, energy resources are an indispensable and essential condition 
for the social and economic development of  States and for national and global security. 
And, given its importance, resources are simultaneously potential tools of  foreign policy 
and a factor that can influence State foreign policy outcomes. In the analysis, seeing that 
changes in the energy market are changing relations between producing and consuming 
countries, Brenda Shaffer (2009, p. 30) argues that “energy interests, especially under 
tight international market conditions, affect the mapping of  geostrategic interests” the 
use of  energy resources can be likely to influence politics, also politics can influence the 
use of  them. 
Ioannis Vidakis and Georgios Baltos, inspired by the Greek language, created the 
concept of  “geoenergeia” to address the effects of  energy resources in political and eco- 
nomic systems, as well as their impact on international relations. The geoenergeia is, for 
the authors, a new analytical method referring to political decision-making in both 
national and international affairs. The method’s first step examines decision-making pro-
cesses in political, economic, and even social fields in relation to geographic areas defined 
by energy resource information. The next step interprets the interaction between politi-
cal decisions and actions and the existence of  energy resources as well as the potential 
utilization of  energy resources. The study of  energy interrelationships at the interna-
tional, global or regional level makes it possible to: (1) assess the impact of  new tech-
nologies in the energy industry, mainly observing how these new technologies define 
levels of  energy resource scarcity or how they change the geostrategic importance of  
global regions; (2) collect quantitative and qualitative data regarding energy resource scar-
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city, highlighting the causative connection between energy resources scarcity and certain 
political decisions; and (3) monitor the energy security aspects of  relevant political deci-
sions to create a classification of  the world States according to the wealth of  energy 
resources they control. 
The role of  resources emerged in a number of  classical geopolitical approaches, as 
in Mahan’s analysis of  naval power and the importance of  technologies, such as steam, to 
maritime power. In the same way, the availability of  energy resources seems central to the 
Mackinder “Heartland” concept, defined as a vast fortress region in the heart of  Eurasia, 
isolated from the seas but rich in natural resources, especially fertile, vast lands and water 
resource reserves and energy resources such as wood, coal and oil, the latter mainly in 
the Caspian Sea region (Ismailov and Papava, 2010). Currently, Central Asia, as part 
of  the heartland, has been going through the so-called “New Big Game”, characterized 
by rivalry and competition between the United States, the United Kingdom and other 
NATO countries, against Russia, China and other States of  the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization. A competition whose victory will allow to control the pipelines, energy 
routes and supply contracts. Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997), a postmodern version of  the 
Mackinder geopolitical doctrine, refers to Central Asia as the “Eurasian Balkans, geo- 
politically relevant for energy reasons, socio-political instability and potential dominance” 
(İşeri, 2009, p. 36).
When the consequences of  the two oil crises of  the 1970s uncovered the degree of  
vulnerability and dependence on fossil fuels in the industrialized Western world, classical 
studies on geopolitical of  energy were initiated. One of  the representatives of  this 
school is Melvin A. Conant, who, at an early stage, made one of  the first systematic 
studies of  energy issues from a geopolitical perspective at an early stage. In 1978, Conant 
and Fern Gold published The Geopolitics of  Energy, a study which is considered to be 
central to the literature on energy geopolitical studies. According to them (1978, p. 3) 
“access to raw materials, especially access to energy is a top priority of  international 
political relations. The ability to obtain these essential commodities is no longer subject 
to the traditional colonial relations or military protection, but depends on geographical 
factors and the political decision-making of  the governments on the basis of  different 
political conditions. The country having control over the resources will control those 
who rely on the resources, which will lead to a profound transformation of  international 
relations”.
Energy geopolitics gained momentum after the 1990s, when global resources mainly 
fossil fuels, became scarce in the face of  growing world demand for energy. At the same 
time, with the end of  the Cold War, new concepts emerged and concern for energy 
security began to gain prominence in the world’s discourse. In 1996, John V. Mitchell, 
Peter Beck and Michael Grubb captured the changes of  the global energy geopolitical 
situation after the Cold War in the book The New Geopolitics of  Energy, advocating that 
energy geopolitics was “new”. According to them (Mitchell, J. et al, 1996, pp. 2-3 quoted 
in yu and Dai, 2012, p. 97), this was due to a number of  factors, including: (1) with the 
end of  the Cold War major constraints on the free action of  the United States in the 
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Middle East and other regions of  the world was lifted; (2) international energy trade was 
transformed by Russian oil and gas resources, and by the integration into the world 
system of  other former Soviet countries; (3) the importance of  natural gas increased with 
the development of  technology and it share in the energy sector.
Since 2000, the number of  analyses devoted to global energy that highlight the 
importance of  energy geopolitics have been increasing. Many researchers focus on the 
geopolitical perspective in their analyses of  energy, use geopolitics as a theoretical tool 
and examine the energy politics and energy security to construe a geopolitics of  energy 
based on geopolitics. however, only a few authors have attempted to clarify the concept 
of  Geopolitics of  Energy. One of  them was Philip Andrews-Speed (2016), who pointed 
out that “energy geopolitics refers to the study of  national security and international 
politics in the context of  the global energy scene. For this author, the key factors to the 
geopolitics of  energy embrace the “instability in oil-producing regions due to domestic, 
regional and international factors, the rise of  national oil companies, resource nationalism, 
reserve depletion among traditional suppliers, and the opening of  new sea routes, to 
name a few” (Speed, 2016). 
Luke Kerr Oliveira (2015, p. 6), in his analysis of  the energy geopolitics of  emerging 
economies, contends that the Geopolitics of  Energy can be understood as the analysis 
of  all the geopolitical and strategic elements that influence the control of  energy reserves, 
exploration technologies, energy infrastructure, transport and end use of  the energy 
resources. In Oliveira’s definition of  the concept, the variables of  the analysis of  energy 
geopolitics are: (1) the geographic location and distribution of  the main reserves of  
energy resources and of  certain types of  energy resources; (2) the geographic location of  
the exporting and importing countries and of  the large consumer and producers centres; 
(3) the role of  geopolitical and strategic disputes of  energy resources between importing 
and exporters States or disputes between large energy consumers; and (4) the strategies 
adopted by countries, group of  countries or major powers to ensure their own Energy 
security or influence other countries in the energy field. In turn, Contant and Gold (1981, 
quoted in Lorentz and Rodriguez, 2016) emphasize variables such as geographic loca- 
tion, supply lines, technology and processing facilities and factors that impact supply and 
demand, such as the analysis of  reserves, processing, new discoveries, increased consump- 
tion and research, and energy technology.
According to yu and Dai (2012, pp. 94-95), the geographic location of  the energy 
resource endowments, energy exploration, development, transportation, refining, mar-
kets, and its related technology research, economic growth, resource needs and the sus-
tainability of  specific economic systems as well as other factors concerning energy supply 
and demand, are studied in energy geopolitics. however, these authors (2012, p. 95) 
emphasise that the influence of  geographical “factors on energy security is not static”, 
and it has been changing along of  the years, with the “advances in technology, the shift-
ing demand for raw materials, the changes in domestic and international political goals, 
as well as the changing in the judging standards of  the legality of  the means to the pursuit 
of  political goals”. At the same time, the importance of  geographical factors also has 
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varied with the evolution of  the international system itself  and with the emergence of  
new international actors.
One of  the biggest challenges for consuming countries, according to the geopolitics 
of  energy, is access to and control of  external energy resources and energy corridors. This 
challenge is integrated in the security of  supply of  the States and has implications in the 
relations among the diverse actors in the energy scenario. While in classical energy 
geopolitics, the actors were basically the States and their armies, today they are multiple 
and varied, encompassing governments, international and national companies (public and 
private). Some energy markets are also characterised by the formation of  cartels, mono- 
polies and oligopolies, which still retain much of  the global energy system away from 
perfect competition and/or subject to strict regulation (Escribano, 2011, p. 12). All these 
actors are involved in the entire complex energy system, from prospecting, extraction and 
production, processing, transportation, marketing and distribution of  energy.
We can identify three common interests in the objective of  importing countries in 
accessing external energy resources. The first is that energy must be sufficient to satisfy 
domestic demand, maintain national security and economic development. Secondly, the 
supply of  energy must be abundant and uninterrupted since supply disruptions, such as 
those experienced in the 1970s, have serious implications for the national and international 
economy and politics. Thirdly, there is the question of  the prices of  energy imports, 
which must be reasonable. These three interests shared by consuming countries are part 
of  the concept of  security of  supply. On the other hand, there are also common interests 
behind the concerns shared by producing countries, such as “stable demand”, “reasonable 
prices” and “long-term buyers”, to ensure not only the return of  the investment in the 
exploitation of  their energy but also the economic development of  their economies.
Central to the study of  energy geopolitics is the concept of  energy security. There is 
no universal concept of  energy security. In fact, there is a multiplicity of  concepts. The 
International Energy Agency (IEA), the pioneer institution in energy security issues, 
defines energy security as “the uninterrupted availability of  energy sources at an affor-
dable price” (IEA, 2017). Energy security is a global challenge and a priority to the inter- 
national agenda. The dependence and the effects of  excessive consumption of  fossil 
fuels have led to the development of  cleaner and more sustainable strategies, involv- 
ing more and more actors. National and international institutions play a key role in 
implementing these strategies. The European Union, for example, has been one of  the 
main institutions to encourage Member-States to increase the share of  renewable energy 
in national energy mixes and developing more green technology. In addition, the citizens 
themselves are important actors in terms of  energy efficiency, since small changes in 
behaviour on a daily basis, such as choosing a more efficient household appliance, for 
example, can have a great impact in the future of  the energy scenario.
Based on the conceptual framework presented above, the concept of  the Geopolitics 
of  Energy, as outlined in this article, is the study of  the interactions between all the actors 
involved in the global energy scenario, as well as the influence of  energy and all the 
variables of  the complex energy system (such as geographic location, supply lines, 
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technology and processing facilities, and factors that impact supply and demand, such as 
the analysis of  reserves, processing, new discoveries, increased consumption and research 
and energy technology) in the decision-making process at political, economic, military 
and social levels. 
The Role of  Energy Resources throughout History
Natural resources have had an essential role in international relations and its impor-
tance has changed throughout the centuries. The 18th and 19th centuries were the Age of  
Coal. The First Industrial Revolution took place in the British Empire during that period, 
wherein the required technology and innovations were developed, and spread through-
out Europe in the 19th century. One of  the changes in the metallurgical industry, after 
the Industrial Revolution, was the replacement of  firewood with coal. According to 
Deane (1965, p. 129) “the most important achievement of  the industrial revolution was 
that it converted the British economy from a woodland-water basis to a coal-and-iron 
basis”. Roy Church notes that “it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of  coal to the 
British economy between 1830 and 1913” (Church, 1986, p. 758). The truth is that the 
role of  fossil fuels in stimulating growth, after the Industrial Revolution, or of  geography 
in determining who experienced that growth during the 19th century, cannot be ignored 
(Fernihough and O’Rourke, 2014, p. 30). In Europe, the main industrial centres were the 
coal exploration regions, such as France and Germany. Due to the importance of  coal for 
the operation of  the industry, this became the main resource and allowed for bigger, 
cheaper and better production. 
In the 20th century, oil surpassed coal and became the most important energy resour- 
ce. During the First World War, motorized equipment such as tanks and aeroplanes were 
introduced, increasing the mobility of  armies, and the coal that powered the Allied navies 
was converted to petroleum. In the Second World War, oil became a cornerstone in war 
strategies, and securing access to oil became vital. For that reason, refineries, tankers and 
oil wells were important strategic targets. One of  the main reasons why the Allies could 
finally manage to put an end to the war was precisely that they enjoyed a better and more 
secure fuel supply (hook, 2010). 
It is after the Second World War, during the “Thirty Glorious”, that oil becomes the 
leading energy source, thus acceding to the status of  strategic product par excellence. 
Over the last fifty years it has become an almost indispensable element of  everyday life, 
whether in the shape of  fuels, plastics or synthetic materials. With the democratisation of  
the automobile since the 1950s, oil consumption has quadrupled in twenty years, and 
control of  this planetary resource has become collaterally an eminently geopolitical issue 
(Lopez, 2006). The oil issue has naturally become a political issue. The waves of  decolo- 
nization resulted in a multiplication of  actors in the political arena and increased inter- 
dependence and competition between producing and consuming States, as also between 
developed and developing countries. 
For the United States, oil was an important source of  power and influence in the 
twentieth century. In the Cold War context, U.S. policy focused on containing the Soviet 
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Union at all competition levels, such as economic, military or technological. Control of  
oil played a vital role in these efforts and in establishing and maintaining U.S. pre-emi-
nence in the international system (Painter, 2014). however, the Oil Crisis of  1973 was a 
crucial turning point in the development of  United States and Western industrialised 
nations. From here on, consumer States began to be concerned about their oil depend-
ence and started to focus on diversification of  suppliers and energy mix. In 1973, six 
Persian Gulf  oil producers voted to raise their benchmark oil price by 70 percent. The 
Arab members of  the Organization of  the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cut 
production and stopped oil shipments to the United States and other countries that were 
backing Israel in the yom Kippur War. By the time the embargo was lifted in March 1974, 
oil prices had stabilized at around $12 a barrel, almost four times the pre-crisis price 
(Ross, 2013). The Iranian Revolution began in early 1978 and ended a year later. During 
this period, the Iranian production of  oil suffered a huge decline but, at the same time, 
oil consumption continued to grow. As a result, prices increased from nearly $20 a barrel 
to almost $40 a barrel (BP, 2016).
Price fluctuation is a central element of  the geopolitics of  energy, and must be taken 
into account if  we are to understand it. Also, there is a close relationship between energy 
geopolitics and energy markets that must not be ignored. Traditionally, price increases 
have been accompanied by geopolitical factors interlinked with instability in produ- 
cer countries, supply disruptions, and the action of  producer countries on the market. 
According to Fernandes (2013), the most significant oil supply disruptions that have 
impacted oil prices are associated with striking events such as the Iranian Revolution in 
1978, the Iran-Iraq War between 1980 and 1988, the two Gulf  Wars, and the Asian crisis. 
In 2003 alone, three events on different continents caused disruptions in the energy 
market, which were reflected in the rise in oil prices: the first, the outbreak of  the Iraq 
war, the second, the attacks in Nigeria, and the third, the effects of  a strike in a national 
oil company in Venezuela.
however, the decline in oil prices7 from 2012 onwards has laid bare other equally 
important factors in price volatility, namely changes in the energy market, with an increase 
in the supply of  unconventional resources, in particular Shale gas from the United States, 
OPEC’s (especially Saudi Arabia’s) refusal to make cuts in production and the vicissitudes 
of  the economies of  consuming countries (i.e. the slowdown of  Chinese economy). This 
change in prices also made manifest that no country can guard itself  permanently from 
market impacts, and that all countries are influenced by price volatility, with price declines 
having negative consequences for producer countries, whose economies depend on the 
trade of  their energy resources. Finally, this price trend highlights another important 
issue for energy analysis: changes in existing types of  energy and changes in production 
zones. A good example is natural and unconventional gas.
7 From $110 a barrel in 2012, prices began dropping from July 2014 until to below $50 a barrel in 2015. 
Prices restart to rise, however, in 2016 they dropped to below $30 a barrel in 2016. Then from the end of  
the first quarter of  2016, prices started recovering and have been hovering around $50 a barrel. Macrotrends. 
Available at: <http://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart>.
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Natural gas is shifting from a regional to a global scale and it is playing a key role in 
the transition of  the energy paradigm, and its importance is supported by three factors. 
First, by the increase of  its consumption across the world, competing, since the 90s, with 
oil and coal, since it is a cleaner fossil fuel with lower environmental emissions, and more 
versatile, which contributes to overall energy system resilience to disruption (Evans and 
Farina, 2013). Second, this increase is also associated with the growth in the interconnection 
of  gas transportation networks worldwide, whether already built or in project8. Third, the 
world’s proved gas reserves are growing, about 40% over the past 20 years (BP, 2016)9. 
But the most relevant is the increase in unconventional gas reserves, mainly in the United 
States and their gas shale reserves10. The production of  natural gas in the US reached its 
highest recorded total in 2015. The exploration and production11 of  shale gas was made 
possible by the technological advances, namely in the fracking technic.
In addition to the importance of  fossil fuels for today’s society and the heavy de- 
pendence of  the latter on the former, cleaner energy has gained more space in the last 
decade. The increase in the production of  renewable energy resources12 is an important 
strategy to ensure energy security, as in the long run it will allow a decrease in the con-
sumption of  fossil fuels and, consequently, contribute to reduce the effects of  climate 
changes. The world’s leaders wish for a more sustainable society through the implemen-
tation of  a successful energy transition that will combat climate change and air pollu-
tion. Non-fossil fuels grew by 3.6% in 2015, up slightly on their average over the past 
10 years. Although the share of  renewable energy remains small (2.8%), its strong 
growth meant that it accounted for all of  the increase in global power generation in 
2015 and more than a third (38%) of  the entire increase in global energy consumption 
(BP, 2016). 
Energy as a Strategic Way for Power and (in)Security
Energy resources change geopolitical reality and can be a source of  power, control 
or influence in exactly the same measure as it can represent a substantial vulnerability. It 
can, also, either promote economic growth and prosperity or economic instability and 
decline. Throughout history, energy and geopolitics have always been interconnected 
8 The European Union, for example, has drawn up a list of  195 key energy infrastructure projects known as 
projects of  common interest (PCIs) to help create an integrated EU energy market. But the country that 
has presented the most global strategy in terms of  infrastructure is China, in particular One Belt one road 
initiative, launched by the president Xi Jinping, 2013.
9 Almost three-quarters of  the worlds proved natural gas reserves are located in the Middle East and Eurasia, 
with Russia, Iran, and Qatar together accounting for about 54% of  world proved natural gas reserves as of  
January 1, 2016 (EIA, 2016).
10 From 2010 to 2015, the US proved shale gas reserves increase, respectively, from about 97,449 billion cubic 
feet to 175,601 bcf  (EIA, 2016a)
11 In 2007 the shale gas production was only 1,293 bcf. In 2015 the number increased to 15,213, accounting 
for more than half  of  U.S. natural gas production in 2015 (EIA, 2016b).
12 In the case of  the European Union, since 2005 until 2014 the share of  energy from renewable sources in 
gross final consumption of  energy increased from 9 to 16.0% and the trend is to continue to increase. 
(Eurostat, 2016).
32 Geopolitics of enerGy and enerGy security
(Pascual, 2015). During the 20th century, access to energy resources was a key factor to 
create alliances and influence winners and losers in wars. In the 21st century, energy 
continues to be one of  the greatest strategic determinants in global and regional politics. 
As previously mentioned, energy is now indispensable for the proper functioning of  
a country at all levels, and an extremely important element in its stability. The risk of  
disruptions in supply would jeopardize the functioning of  the State and society, reducing 
national security. The energy scenario has been suffering changes and new challenges 
such as terrorism, piracy and climate changes are threatening energy security. It is vital, 
therefore, that States and international organizations manage their energy resources 
effectively, in order to maintain economic growth and security. Deprivation of  energy 
would lead to a downturn in economy, threaten industry, services, technology and even 
the functioning of  hospitals and public services which would affect citizens individually, 
leading to serious internal instability13. In this sense, access to energy resources, energy 
prices and energy policies and strategies developed by States are decisive factors in 
international relations. For all these reasons, energy security is currently a high priority for 
States. 
For some authors, energy resources can be a cause of  conflict among the world’s 
major energy consumers, such as China, India, Japan and the USA. To Michael Klare 
(2009)14 “this resource race is already one of  the most conspicuous features of  the 
contemporary political landscape and, in our lifetimes, may become the most cons- 
picuous one a voracious, zero-sum contest that, if  allowed to continue along present 
paths, can only lead to conflict among the major powers”. Michael Leigh claims that 
“many conflicts, foreign interventions and wars are the result of  a struggle for resour- 
ces” (2014, p. 2). A few of  these authors contend that regions rich in energy resources 
or transit routes could be more prone to conflicts since they are the object of  geopoliti- 
cal interests that need to be assured. Andre Mansson (2014), in his turn, identifies a 
number of  characteristics in the energy system that can affect the risk of  conflicts, 
including: (1) geographical concentration of  primary resources; (2) number and diver- 
sity of  exporters on the international energy market; (3) vulnerability of  infrastructure 
to attacks; (4) vulnerability of  users to disruptions and externalities related to intercon- 
nections with other systems.
Despite the consensus between resources and conflict, it is necessary to clarify what 
types of  conflicts can arise when energy issues are involved. According to Schwarz Hen-
rique (2007, p. 22) conflicts in energy can be of  three types according to the nature of  the 
actors that have faced each other in recent decades: the first are “political and military 
confrontations” between consuming powers and producer countries; the second are “ci- 
vil wars between groups or factions” which, within the producing nations, compete for 
13 For example, “transport systems, particularly in the United States, have become largely reliant on oil, so 
disruption of  oil markets can bring a great power to a standstill” (Pascual, 2008, p. 1).
14 See Klare, M. T., 2002. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of  Global Conflict. New york: holt; Klare, M. T., 
2004. Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of  America’s Growing Petroleum Dependency. London: 
Penguin.
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the sharing of  the income from the sale of  fossil fuels; and the third, the “conflicts of  
interest” between large consuming countries, which tend to worsen as the available fossil 
energy becomes less able to cope with rising demand.
In the first type of  conflict, resources have played an important role in post-Cold 
War conflicts, Middle East oil, solid minerals from Africa, land in Asia, and agricultural 
products in Latin America (Fernandes, 2012, p. 2). In the analysis of  conflicts at the end 
of  the 20th century, Mary Kaldor and Paul Collier (2000) argue that the interaction 
between resources and war is crucial to understanding contemporary conflicts. In the 
case of  oil, it has been considered the natural resource most associated with the beginning 
of  the conflict (Fernandes, 2012, p. 3). Oil appears to be especially linked to the separatist 
conflicts in southern Sudan and Angola’s Cabinda province (Fernandes, 2012, p. 2). Paul 
Collier and Anke Hoffler (2002) argue that the possibility of  earning available oil revenues 
by a non-State group or a foreign country is a financial incentive to start a conflict. This 
incentive seems to be greater when the population is less educated and when the economic 
value of  the natural resource is more difficult to estimate.
The second type of  conflict appears to be related to the concepts of  greed and 
grievance in civil conflicts, that is, the will to acquire more and the injustice of  access can 
be factors in the outbreak of  conflicts. The Niger Delta area is a good example of  this 
type of  conflict, where ethnic diversity has been associated not only with competition for 
resources in the form of  land, economic benefits and political power, but also perceptions 
of  grievance regarding exploitation and management of  the region’s oil resources. In this 
area of  Nigeria, three elements can be identified that link oil and the outbreak of  the 
conflict: the controversy over the ownership of  the oil areas, disagreement over the 
management of  oil resources and complications arising from the exploitation process 
(Fernandes, 2012, pp. 142-143). The controversy over the ownership of  petroleum areas 
is intertwined with areas where reserves have been found or oil is being exploited. What 
motivates the conflict is the possibility of  the inhabitants acquiring a larger share of  that 
land to obtain economic benefits/compensation from the oil companies and the gover- 
nment. The conflict may be between different local ethnic groups or between local ethnic 
groups and the government.
A variety of  grievances15 related to oil production have been presented by Delta 
militant groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of  the Niger Delta (MEND) 
and, more recently, the Niger Delta Avengers. Some themes are recurrent in their 
speeches, especially the economic exploitation of  the region by a repressive and corrupt 
State, the marginalization of  the Delta community in the production and exploitation of  
oil and the environmental damage caused by this exploitation. However, the profit 
obtained from the theft of  oil and the control of  production areas came to be associated 
with the objectives of  the militants, which allows us to say that if  oil was a catalyst for the 
outbreak of  conflict, it became a factor to prolong same (Fernandes, 2012, p. 147).
15 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, in a World Bank report in 2000, introduced the concepts of  greed and 
grievance in civil conflicts.
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The “conflicts of  interest” are evidenced by the heightening tensions over the long 
dormant territorial and maritime disputes, forging new military alliances and geopolitical 
rivalries. One of  the best examples is in the South China Sea, a region rich in energy 
resources16, including oil and natural gas, whose geopolitical interests are leading to various 
disputes. China and several Southeast Asian nations, such as Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam, 
Indonesia and Philippines claim ownership of  the South China Sea and its resources. 
Besides the importance of  energy resources in this area, it is also an extremely important 
world trade route, which is the main reason behind the United States’ interest in this issue. 
China regards the South China Sea resources as exclusively its own (Malik, 2015); however, 
each country has a different view about the limits of  sovereignty in deep-water areas. 
The Arctic, which accounts for about 13% of  oil and 30% of  natural gas still unta- 
pped (Dowd, 2013), is another example of  a current major conflict of  interests over 
energy resources. Climate changes such as global warming are melting the ice in the 
Arctic and making it more accessible, and these discoveries can lead to new disputes and 
weaken the relations among nations. Russia claims that the Arctic seabed and Siberia are 
linked by one continental shelf, which gives it rights to the entire area north of  Siberia 
extending up to the North Pole. however, Beijing now calls itself  the «next-door neigh- 
bour» of  the Arctic nations, and wants a share (Malik, 2015), mainly because the Arctic 
Ocean melt may benefit China by creating a faster navigation route between Europe 
and America. As demand for resources grows and factors in the international energy 
market begin impinging on the region, the Arctic may become a strategic area in resource 
competition. 
The liberal perspective of  international relations emphasizes that the energy future 
of  the great world consumers is closely linked. From this outlook, just as States share 
common challenges, such as vulnerability to fluctuating levels of  production and prices, 
they can also share common interests and foster cooperation relations (Fernandes, 2013, 
p. 61). A good example is the cooperation between Asian consumer countries, notably 
between China and Japan. historically, it can be traced back to the 1970s when Beijing 
exported oil to neighbouring countries, such as Japan. Currently, this cooperation resides 
in an agreement concerning the establishment of  actions of  mutual interest, such as the 
development of  renewable forms of  energy17. Since the 1980s, both the government and 
business of  both countries have agreed to jointly explore energy projects, namely South 
China Sea. however, while agreeing on the development of  joint operations, disparate 
standpoints as to the demarcation of  the area to be exploited prevented its effective 
implementation (Fernandes, 2013, pp. 295-286). 
16 EIA estimates there to be approximately 11 billion barrels of  oil reserves and 190 trillion cubic feet of  
natural gas reserves in the South China Sea (EIA, 2013).
17 In May 2006, the Japan-China Annual Forum on Energy and Environment Comprehensive Conservation 
was initiated, involving Ministers and business leaders from both countries. This forum seeks to develop 
reciprocal cooperation in the areas of  energy conservation and the environment between the two countries 
by increasing business and the spread of  advanced Japanese technology in China’s huge market (Ministry 
of  Economy, Trade and Industry of  Japan, 2011). 
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Although both energy suppliers and energy consumers are vulnerable to supply 
disruptions, the majority of  geopolitical analyses of  energy emphasize the risk to con- 
sumer countries alone and the possibility of  energy being used as an “energy weapon” by 
producing countries. In this perspective, energy can be “an indicator of  the capacity to 
exert power” (Kerr, 2012) and a “key element in understanding the dominant patterns of  
competition in the International System” (Oliveira, 2015). Sharing the same perception, 
Catarina Leal (2011) considers that current power struggles are increasingly becoming 
economic disputes for influence and resources. Control over energy supplies has become 
a central element of  this competition; however, it has been progressively backed by 
military force.
Russia, after the collapse of  the Soviet Union, and thanks to the policies carried out by 
President Vladimir Putin, has used its vast energy resources to stage a comeback as world 
power and continue to be a major player in the global energy game. The annexation of  
Crimea was an important step for Russian energy strategy, since it has given Moscow 
control of  a large swath of  the Black Sea, including deep oil reserves (Malik, 2015). Russia 
is a major energy producer and exporter18, but its economy is heavily reliant on energy 
exportation. This dependence means that Russia is vulnerable to various challenges such as 
downturns in oil prices and economic sanctions that might curb its economic growth. 
Presently, the EU is the biggest market for Russian energy exports, and Russia is a 
key supplier for the EU. Russia is Europe’s leading oil and gas supplier19, accounting for 
37% and 35% of  European consumption, respectively (BP, 2016). This mutual depen- 
dence represents a major challenge for Russian and EU energy security and both are 
searching for alternatives through diversification strategies suppliers (EU) and buyers 
(Russia). One other difficulty to overcome is the limited number of  transit countries such 
as Ukraine and Belarus. This dependence leaves European countries vulnerable to supply 
disruptions, whether caused by technical problems in infrastructure, or by political and 
commercial disputes. Successive crises between Russia and Ukraine since 2006 have 
shown that the main supplier of  the European Union (EU) is “unreliable and does not 
hesitate to use its energy resources as a geopolitical weapon” (Silva, 2008, p. 33).
Conclusion 
Geopolitics has always had a great importance throughout history. The geographical 
feature of  space influences the most diverse areas, from political thinking, to strategy and 
18 In 2015, Russia became the largest oil exporter in the world and remained the largest natural gas exporter, 
with the world’s largest gas reserves Russia exported 74.9% of  its oil production, 33.7% of  its gas, and 
41.8% of  its coal (BP, 2016 b)
19 In 2014, 69.1% of  natural gas imports came only from Russia and Norway, as well as 43.5% of  crude oil 
imports. In 2014, Russia was the main origin of  solid fuels (29%), crude oil (30.4% and natural gas imports 
(37.5%) and Norway has remained the second largest supplier of  EU imports of  crude oil and natural gas 
(Eurostat, 2016). The dependence on Russian natural gas affects European countries in different ways. 
Bulgaria, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, hungary and Lithuania are extremely reliant on Russian natural gas 
(between 90% to 100% of  natural gas imports are from Russia). On the other hand, countries such as 
Portugal, Spain, Denmark and Ireland are totally free from Russian exports (Eurostat, 2016).
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to decision-making processes. From Classical Geopolitics, with authors such as Kjellen, 
Mackinder, Mahan or Spykman, to Modern Geopolitics, with authors such as Aron, 
Kissinger or huntington, new geopolitical dimensions have emerged, such as the Geo- 
politics of  Energy. 
Despite the numerous analyses of  the geopolitics of  energy, only a few authors 
actually define its meaning. Taking into account the complex energy system, the innu- 
merable variables involved and the engagement of  different actors, we have set oursel- 
ves in this article to outline a comprehensive and holistic concept of  “Geopolitics of  
Energy”. A concept that is able to keep pace with changes in the energy system. A 
system that has been shifting over the years, due to a number of  factors, namely the 
energy needs of  its actors, the type of  resources available and technological advances.
Energy resources can work as a source of  power and security, as well as of  vulnerabi- 
lity and insecurity. Countries such as Russia and Saudi Arabia, for example, are in great 
advantage. Since they are major energy producers, large consumers depended on them, 
which increases their power and influence in the most diverse international arenas and in 
the energy market. however, it is important to bear in mind that this can also constitute a 
weak spot and a source of  insecurity, because their economies and their energy production 
may be dependent on energy exports and it is imperative that they enjoy a continuous 
demand for their energy at reasonable prices by a diverse group of  buyers in the long 
term.
Although there is no consensus, many authors relate emergence, development and 
termination of  conflicts with energy resources. Thus, according to this view, energy 
resources can be a source of  conflicts at various levels: conflict on a military scale, see the 
case of  the Gulf  War; civil wars, such as the Niger Delta, or even conflicts of  interest, 
such as the current situation in the South China Sea. On the other hand, resources can 
also be a source of  cooperation between consuming countries, as is the example with 
China and Japan, and even at a global level with regard to environmental concerns and 
the implementation of  renewables, which is translate into agreements such as the Pro- 
tocol Kyoto Agreement or the Paris Agreement.
Energy has always been essential throughout human history, although changes 
in the use of  resource types are slow and need some conditioning, namely technical 
ones. In the 18th and 19th centuries, coal was a key resource, while nowadays States are 
seeking to reduce dependence on its consumption due to adverse effects on the envi- 
ronment, climate and society. In the 20th Century, oil became the primary resource. Even 
though, since the 1970s, consumer countries have become aware that they cannot be so 
externally dependent on this resource and that it can be a “geopolitical weapon” in the 
hands of  those who possess it, oil remains one of  the main energy sources present 
in the current energy mix. In addition to the steady increase in natural gas, which has 
the advantage of  being a cleaner fossil resource, thus accompanying growing environ- 
mental concerns, renewables also continue to grow in consumption and production, 
although they still have a long way to go before becoming competitive in relation to 
fossil resources.
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The global energy scenario is changing and the traditional centres of  demand are 
being overtaken by fast-growing emerging markets. According to BP Energy Outlook 
2017 (BP, 2017), the world economy is expected to almost double over the next 20 years 
and the world’s population is projected to increase by around 1.5 billion people to reach 
nearly 8.8 billion people by 2035. Much of  the expected growth in the global economy is 
driven by emerging economies, with China and India accounting for around half  of  the 
increase. China is expected to be the largest growth market for energy, although it is likely 
to be overtaken by India. It is expected that world GDP almost doubles and this rising 
prosperity drives an increase in global energy demand. Global coal consumption and 
demand are slowing down. Oil demand continues to grow, although the pace of  growth 
is likely to decelerate. Natural gas is expected to grow faster than oil or coal, because of  
the rise in liquefied natural gas. Renewables are the fastest growing fuel source, with its 
share in primary energy increasing to 10% by 2035, up from 3% in 2015 (BP, 2017). The 
gradual transition in the fuel mix is set to continue with renewables, with nuclear and 
hydroelectric power expected to account for half  of  the growth in energy supplies over 
the next 20 years. however, oil, gas and coal will remain the dominant sources of  energy 
powering the world economy, accounting for more than three-quarters of  total energy 
supplies in 2035 (down from 85% in 2015). So, the challenge for the future will be how 
to meet the world’s increasing demand for energy as it grows and prospers while also 
reducing carbon emissions (BP, 2017).
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In 1905, Einstein’s genius showed us, by means of  a graceful mathematical equation, 
the equivalence of  Energy and Mass (e=mc2). Since that equivalence is affected by a huge 
factor, which is the square of  the speed of  light, one easily concludes that any mass, no 
matter how small it may be, corresponds to an absolutely extraordinary amount of  
energy. In the human scale, this transformation is not always easy to grasp, yet the des- 
tructive power of  even a modest atomic bomb is an apt illustration of  the close rela- 
tionship between energy and mass. 
Even though the universe appears to be a space brimming with energy in all direc- 
tions, its exploitation by human beings was a remarkably slow – I would even venture to 
call it painful – process. 
The word “painful” acquires also a quite literal dimension, since the first converter 
of  energy into work, used by our ancestors, was the human muscle itself. If  we envisage 
each one of  us as a biochemical generator of  energy convertible into work, we shall have 
to accept that, all individual efforts combined, the end result is a collective apparatus with 
the capacity to produce an enormous amount of  work. 
Naturally, in order for it to be fruitful, collective work must be oriented, steered and 
coordinated, which entails the construction of  a social hierarchy, the establishment of  
administrative bureaucratic procedures, the registration of  processes and contracts, and 
the exercise of  authority within a politically organised society. 
It is certainly no whim of  fate that, in the fertile crescent extending from the Nile to 
the Persian Gulf, along the Eastern shore of  the Mediterranean and the valleys of  the 
Tigris and Euphrates rivers, three relevant and contemporaneous aspects attended the 
rise of  the first civilisations, around 5000 years ago: the institution of  the State, the 
written language and slavery. 
In a time when work depended almost exclusively on sheer physical human exertion, 
slavery, more than a hierarchical distinction between victors and vanquished, was rather 
the social model that made it possible to get work done at a low cost. The incredible 
persistence of  slavery, as a legal system, until at least the 19th century, shows clearly the 
high level of  dependence by societies on human manual labour and the lack of  ingenuity 
to find alternative forms to harness energy. We must admit that human progress, insofar 
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as the utilization of  energy is concerned, was far slower than that involved in the 
domestication of  seeds and animals, when we traded the nomad for the sedentary. 
Energy – and this is precisely our point – is also, therefore, a driver of  growth and a 
tool for social change. 
The Strategic Equation
We are unaccustomed to regard energy as a weapon, but let us take a moment to 
consider that it is precisely in energy and its multiple forms that the operating principle 
of  weaponry has always resided. A sword, for instance, is no more than an object made 
of  metal. What renders it a fearsome weapon is the kinetic energy conveyed through it 
by the experienced arm of  a fighter. It is energy that turns a sword into a weapon. 
Likewise, it is a set of  energy transformations what makes an archer an awe-inspiring 
enemy: elastic energy stored in the distortion of  the flexible wood is transformed into 
kinetic energy and transferred to the arrow.
Even traditional defence systems, such as fortresses, are ultimately based on a simple 
energetic equation – whereas projectiles launched form below by the besiegers gradually 
lose kinetic energy as they approach the top of  the wall, any projectile launched from 
the top of  the wall reaches the besieger with tremendous energy. This transformation 
between kinetic energy and potential energy might not have been clearly grasped by 
fortress builders, but surely it was intuitively taken for granted. 
The emergence of  gunpowder in the battlefield changed the distance and the 
fierceness of  the combat actions. The energy resulting from the sudden expansion of  gas 
in the explosion imparted great speed to heavy projectiles that might themselves possess 
impact or time-delay explosive mechanisms. 
In modern times, lasers and particle cannons dispense with any kind of  projectile. 
Although energy has always been present in the field of  military confrontation, that 
presence extended beyond the operating principle of  weapons. Let us take a look at oil, 
for instance.
Oil, as well as its basic properties – such as the capacity to generate heat –, has been 
known since antiquity. In Europe, it was used to medicinal purposes; in China, in the 
evaporation of  water and salt production; and in Mesopotamia, in paving works. Oil was 
known from antiquity as well as its basic characteristics, such as the ability to produce heat. 
The alembic still of  Muslim Spain made it possible to obtain more complex sub products 
from oil, but it was the internal combustion energy that catapulted oil to the prominence it 
still enjoys today, essential as it is to the propulsion of  a society that runs on wheels. 
Few countries were so early aware of  the importance of  oil for development, and the 
significance of  controlling it as an element of  strategic value, as the United States of  
America in the turning of  the 19th to the 20th century. In 1860, the region of  Baku, in the 
hands of  the Russian Empire, produced 90% of  the world oil, while the USA had but an 
inchoate production. The strong American investment in oil extraction and refining, 
however, soon altered this picture. By the beginning of  the First World War, the USA 
were already one of  the top world producers. 
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As the First World War evolved, the mechanisation of  weapon systems ended up 
overcoming the stalemate of  the trench warfare. As fuels were crucial to keep the 
machines going, there was no doubt that access to energy sources was a key factor in the 
balance of  powers in the conflict. While the Germans were dependent on oil extracted in 
Romania, 80% of  the Allies’ needs were met by the North-Americans. Lord Curzon of  
Kedleston, Viceroy of  India and, later on, Secretary of  State for the British Foreign 
Affairs, declared, referring to the Great War, that “the Allies had been floated to victory 
in a wave of  oil” (Roberts, 2004, p. 40).
Excluding the USA’s and the USSR’s internal productions, by the time the Second 
World War breaks, American companies control 40% of  the world oil market1. This Ame- 
rican presence, economical in nature, proved to be so significant from the point of  view 
of  America geopolitics, that it became a vital interest point whose security was of  the 
utmost importance to assure. The protection of  this strategic interest through local or 
regional military presence shaped, throughout the 20th century, American geostrategy for 
the Gulf  region, and continues to draw there an important set of  red lines. 
It is no surprise that the issue of  energy has also dominated the Second World 
War. Germany did not have oil, and fed its war machine with synthetic fuel produced 
from coal, a grand investment to which it was committed since 1933. But the German 
war machine was never at ease as far as the energy available for its functioning was 
concerned. 
Japan’s problem was different. Since 1942, it had access to oil from the East Indies, 
yet transporting it safely to Japan was always a hard endeavour, due to the presence of  
American submarines along the supply route. 
We are therefore in a position to assert that, in both the world’s greatest conflicts of  
the 20th century, the ones in charge of  the production and controlled the energy logistic 
flows finally won the War. 
Nowadays, with the exception of  a few Special Forces, security and defence systems 
are growingly dependent on energy systems. Mules no longer pull artillery howitzers and 
masts and sails are of  little use in warships. The logistics involved in supplying a fighting 
division, even if  only from the point of  view of  fuel needs, is a real conundrum: the 
battle tank Leopard 2 has a fuel tank with a capacity of  1200 liters, giving a maximum 
road range of  a mere 500 Km. On the other hand, every weapon system requires energy 
generators, and the individual fighters themselves need an impressive number of  batteries 
that are crucial to the functioning of  their equipment. 
Seeing that, in the 21st century, we are even more dependent on energy than we were 
in the last century, perhaps we may still be right in claiming that, whoever controls energy 
1 In 1925, the USA already owned more than 70% of  the world oil production. Five among the seven giant 
companies that dominated the global oil industry of  the 20th century (The Seven Sisters) were American 
and were firmly established in the Caribbean, the Middle East and the East Indies. About the power 
relations established by the USA by means of  the oil, see Painter, D., 2017. Oil and World Power. Encyclopedia 
of  the American Foreign Relations. [online] Available at: <http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/
Oil-Oil-and-world-power.html> [Accessed on 5 January 2017].
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sources and its flows, assures a decisive strategic advantage in a prolonged conflict. 
Perhaps Europe should give thought to this notion. 
Energy is a fundamental part of  the equation in war, but might not be the pivotal 
factor. An archer who is strong but aims inaccurately is ineffectual. And the man who 
holds the sword must have the will to use it in defence of  his values and those of  his 
community. Will is, as we well know, a powerful aphrodisiac to victory. 
These lessons from strategy and history are meant to emphasise the following thou- 
ght: the issue of  energetic security is not a matter of  finding solutions in a geopolitical 
equation of  peace or quasi-peace. In such frameworks, solutions spring from and evolve 
in open markets and free trade.
On the other hand, in a geopolitical context of  serious crisis or war, the energy supply 
of  a country or a block is considerably affected, either because suppliers and consumers 
stand on opposite sides of  the barricade, or because the flow of  fuels has been hindered 
by security reasons, or because priorities favour the great powers to the exclusion of  all 
others. A country must be able, in times of  peace, to answer the basic questions of  who is 
going to supply the energy it will need and how will it manage to get it2.
Energy is a significant part of  the war equation, and has a decisive strategic value. In 
fact, in the absence of  energy beyond the fighter, war resumes its medieval form. 
Energy as a Geopolitical Factor
Energy, being a scarce, ill-distributed and expensive good, subject to considerable 
price fluctuations3, possesses a number of  features that render it able to be used as a 
powerful economic weapon, with significant repercussions in the perspectives for world 
growth and the geopolitical interplay among producers, among consumers and between 
the former and the latter.
As a weapon, it can be used in two ways: by creating a surplus in production or by 
decreasing that production. In the first case, the goal might be twofold: either to attack 
the economy of  competing countries that are heavily dependent on energy exports, or to 
render alternative energy sources economically unviable. In the case of  the decrease in 
production, the expectation is to cause market prices to soar. Usually, the cartelisation of  
energy is more effective in the second scenario. 
In both pictures, the geopolitical actor using energy as a weapon must comply with 
three conditions: it must produce on a global or regional scale in terms of  energy exports, 
in order to be in a position to impact market prices; it needs to possess a strategic 
multidimensionality that allows it to resist external threats and pressure; and finally, it 
must enjoy an economy stable enough to internally accommodate the economic losses 
entailed by its geopolitical game. 
2 The same reasoning applies to strategic reserves outside the country – where they are and how they can be 
retrieved. 
3 To have an idea of  how volatile oil prices are, check NyMEX, 2017. Crude Oil Prices – 70 Year Historical 
Chart. [online]. Available at: <http://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart> [Acces- 
sed on 10 January 2017].
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In the case of  Russia and natural gas, which we are currently discussing in the scope 
of  these conferences, only two and a partially a third of  the above requirements appear 
to be satisfied in order for it to be able to use energy in the geopolitical game: the Russian 
economy is in recession since 20154 and its export profile is rather narrow in range. 
About two thirds of  Russia’s exports are energy products5.
Energy availability is, as we know, an essential factor of  growth in Peace, and crucial 
to the conduct of  War. It is therefore puzzling that, in ancient geopolitical thought, the 
issue of  energy does not earn special attention. In the expansionistic orientations of  
ancient civilisations, access to energy sources does not appear to be a significant factor. 
Obviously, using the vanquished as slaves was a way to increase the available work power, 
but it seems unlikely that the territorial expansion of  the early empires was guided by that 
purpose. 
A possible explanation might be that probably, throughout the millennia, there was 
no relevant evolution in the production of  energy. 4200 years went by, for instance, 
between the construction of  the Great Pyramid of  Cheops and the Mafra Monastery. In 
both cases,6 human manual labour was employed, occasionally aided by pack animals. 
With the coal revolution and James Watt’s steam engine (patented in 1769), energy 
finally comes to geopolitics. Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, the great strategist of  sea 
power in the late 19th century, shows clearly how shifting from sail to steam generates new 
logistic needs. 
Mahan is quick to point out the ensuing consequences: should we transport more 
coal to enjoy more autonomy, then, in order not to lose speed, we would be forced to 
relinquish armour-plating on ships, which would be illogical. Navigation requires, there- 
fore, the establishment of  strongholds next to the sea lines of  communication.
A few years later, in his famous article “The Geographical Pivot of  history”, pre- 
sented on the 25th of  January of  1904 to the Royal Geographic Society, Sir halford 
Mackinder approaches on two occasions the energy issue. The references are brief  but 
elucidating. In his first reference, he compares the price of  transporting english coal by 
sea and german coal by land, to supply Lombardy. In his second reference, he shows the 
potential rail freight transport would acquire in accessing fuel, ores and cereals in the 
region between the Russian empire and Mongolia7.
By its entry in the geopolitics glossary, at the turn of  the century, energy would 
permanently earn its place in the postulates of  the discipline, so much so that oil and 
natural gas, for instance, are unevenly distributed throughout the planet – some have 
plenty, some have little and some have none. 
4 After a growth of  0.6% in 2014, the Russian GDI contracted 3.7% in 2015 (Matlack, 2016).
5 In 2014, around 35% of  exports were non-refined oil, 20% refined oil and 8% natural gas (Observatory of  
Economic Complexity, 2014).
6 The Great Pyramid of  Cheops at Giza, with its 2 million blocks of  stone was built in 2550 B.C. and the 
40 000 square metres of  the Mafra Palace/Monastery/Basilica do Palácio/Convento/Basílica de Mafra 
beginning in 1717.
7 On the 21st of  July of  1904, more than 9000 km of  Trans-Siberian railway, connecting Moscow and 
Vladivostok, were completed.
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So far, we have dealt mainly with the role of  resources such as coal, natural gas and 
oil in the geopolitical game. Additionally, it should be ascertained whether, in this interplay 
between energy giants, there is also room for renewable energy resources as weapons in 
the service of  nations. We shall see that indeed there is, albeit in a much smaller scale. 
There is a crucial difference between renewable energy systems such as wind and 
solar and the fossil-based ones – while the latter resources are unevenly scattered 
throughout the planet, wind and sunlight are within the reach of  everyone, even if  in 
unsymmetrical amounts. It is a vital difference, as far as the energy geopolitical game is 
concerned, since, on one side, we have unevenly distributed products and, on the other, 
energy resources whose exploitation depends mainly on adequate infrastructural, tech-
nological and economic support. 
A second essential difference pertains to the harnessing of  energy. If  a State should 
decrease the pace of  extraction of  its fossil products, these would not disappear from 
their natural deposits, whereas in the case of  wind and solar energy, the unused wind or 
sunlight must be considered forever lost for energy production.
A third difference has to do with storage. We may create strategic reserves to balance 
the fluctuations of  market prices, but the available technology is still inadequate to store 
solar and wind energy8.
A fourth – non-negligible – difference is a certain unpredictability in energy supply 
from renewable resources. Not all days are sunny, there is not always enough wind, and 
– in the case of  hydric systems – sometimes there is a lack of  rain. 
In short, the great number of  limitations that constrain the production of  renewable 
energy conditions its geopolitical role in international dynamics, when compared to that 
of  fossil fuels. They do diminish, however, the dependence on supplies from abroad, and 
so, in that sense, they allow for a more secure geopolitical role. 
Politics and Energy
Regardless of  the orientations imposed by strategy, recommended by geopolitics and 
advised by technical research, the energy paradigm of  a country invariably derives from 
a political decision through the delineation of  an energy policy9. 
Every political decision has associated costs, and energy policy, in particular, due to 
the dimension of  the investment in infrastructure and technology it requires, entails 
massive costs. The “solar highway”, recently opened in Tourouve au Perche, Normandy, 
is only one kilometre long and cost 5.2 million euros, a gigantic investment for a prototype 
that will accomplish no more that light the streets of  the town. 
Such costs are particularly important when, for one reason or the other, a decision is 
made to change the energy paradigm. 
8 Except for the contentions solution of, by means of  a dam system, pumping the water from downstream 
to upstream.
9 In the case of  Portugal, for instance, the established energy policy is founded upon two fundamental 
pillars: sustainability and economic rationality through the revision and join articulation of  the National 
Action Plan for Renewable Energy and the National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency. 
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Political decisions are certainly not arbitrary, although personal inclinations may 
always affect rationality. Among the factors that condition political decision in the field 
of  energy, we have international protocols which we have signed, European norms to 
which we are bound, economic and environmental pressure groups and all the ideological 
elements of  the democratic power game. To encourage discussion, and somewhat iro- 
nically, I must recall that, apparently, we have already banned from our domestic catalogue 
of  energy sources the following: coal, due to the greenhouse effect; nuclear energy, 
because of  our grandchildren; oil, because of  tourism; and dams, for the reason that they 
damage ecosystems. Valid decisions, no doubt, but all bearing consequences on the cost 
of  our energy and our dependence on energy imports. 
Three Final Notes
After so many centuries of  evolution as a civilisation, we must admit that we have 
never been comfortable with the way we have accessed, dealt with and managed energy. 
The undoubted progress made in this area came and still come at a tremendous social, 
strategic and economic cost. The investment in fossil fuels meddles with natural envi- 
ronmental and climatic balances, the investment in nuclear energy has generated waste 
which will weigh on future generations, and renewable energy is still economically 
disadvantageous. There is, therefore, a long way ahead, as far as research and development 
in the field of  energy are concerned. 
Second note: a large part of  the scenarios we are currently drawing, with solutions 
intended to decrease Europe’s vulnerability in terms of  energy, rely on an idea of  a strong 
Europe, committed to a firm political direction, capable of  enforcing, among member-
States, integrated policies, and ready to spend millions and millions of  Euros on trans- 
port, storage and global management infrastructure. And yet, does that same Europe still 
exist? 
2016 was an awful year for Europe. Anemic economic growth. The pressure of  
refugees against their borders. Conflicts in the East and instability in the South. Sanctions 
and internal dissent. “Brexit”. Countries without a government and governments set far 
apart from the political centre. A growth in affection for Putin. Terrorism. Turkey. Ame- 
rican elections. States declaring State of  exception, generalized acrimony with Brussels, 
etc., etc. The list is endless and we shall certainly have to add more lines to it in the course 
of  2017. 
And then we have the complex dissonance between affections, political discourse 
and strategic manoeuvring. Whereas it is notorious, in the extremes of  European political 
spectre, a growing admiration for Putin, NATO continues to reinforce, as never before 
since the end of  the Cold War, its frontiers with Russia. In November of  2016, more than 
4000 soldiers and equipment from 11 countries participated in the Exercise “Iron Sword” 
in Lithuania. The Netherlands began, on the 5th of  January, their second Baltic Air 
Policing mission, a mission already led by Portugal. In 2017, a Very high Readiness Joint 
Task Force (VJTF) will be set up, with 5000 NATO soldiers and rotating capacity, near 
the Russian border, in accordance with decisions agreed upon at the 2014 Wales Summit. 
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It is, therefore, in this extremely turbulent strategic setting, that we speak today of  a 
European dependence on Russian natural gas. 
Third and last note: If  there is a keyword for Europe in 2016, it is probably “security”.
Security – we should be well aware – is not a tradable good. Neither is it a good that 
can be guaranteed. It is, nonetheless, an invaluable thing, for it is the basis upon which all 
democratic experience, freedom of  speech, economic and social growth and freedom of  
circulation can be built. Globalisation made security more complex, contingent on a 
variety of  factors, some of  which unpredictable. Energetic supply is also a part of  the 
security equation. I believe security to be an individual and collective feeling. When we 
feel safe, we are not oblivious to the possibility of  threats or risks – we merely trust that 
we have prepared sufficient scenarios and responses in a way as to, serenely and orderly, 
react to the setbacks that inevitably trouble on occasion a politically organized society in 
a global world. 
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Energy: From Geopolitics to Security 
António Costa Silva
Europe and the world are today at a crossroads where issues related to the geopolitics 
and economy, global threats and the fight for the control of  strategic resources play a 
major role and will shape the future.
As it is depicted in picture 1 we are facing today challenges that range from the 
globalization effects, the decline of  the Nation-State, the emergency of  new actors in the 
international stage to global threats like the terrorism, migrations, the emergency of  
failed States specially in the Middle East and North Africa, the collapse of  order in 
several areas of  the globe. The other major component of  the analysis relates to the fight 
to control strategic resources not only energy or minerals but also water and food.
Picture 1. Global Challenges
In what concerns energy, the global landscape is changing. The Arabic Peninsula 
together with Iran and Iraq holds 70% of  the conventional oil reserves and is today in 
turmoil with the collapse of  order in several countries from Syria to Iraq, from yemen to 
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Libya, creating conditions for the emergency of  failed States. This means that the most 
important region of  the world for the supply of  oil and gas is politically fragile and 
involved in deep rooted conflicts that are exacerbated by the terrorism, by the 
disengagement of  the United States in the region and by the fight between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran aiming at the regional hegemony. Europe, Japan, China, South Korea are 
strongly dependent of  the energy supply from the Middle East while the United States, 
due to the shale gas and shale oil revolution, are today less dependent. The implications 
of  the shale revolution in the US are huge and may pave the way for the creation of  a new 
international energy order. The US are today an energy superpower and display three 
major basins – Bakken in North Dakota, Eagle Ford and Permian in Texas – corresponding 
each one of  them to a Persian Gulf  country producing within the American territory. 
This is changing drastically the world energy landscape, may convert the US in one of  the 
biggest exporters of  oil and gas, undermines the power of  OPEC, leads to a new era of  
more abundant and cheaper energy and is behind the collapse of  the oil price since 2014, 
with deep implications worldwide.
These changes require the development of  new concepts to tackle the energy 
security in the 21st century. This is particularly important for Europe, a continent that 
displays huge weaknesses due to its huge dependency on external sources for oil and gas 
supply. Europe holds only 0.8% of  the world reserves for conventional oil and 2% of  the 
world reserves for conventional gas (BP, 2016). Europe is very fragile in what concerns 
its huge dependency on external energy supply. 86% of  Europe oil supply comes from 
Russia, Middle East and Africa. 83% of  Europe gas supply comes from Russia, Norway 
and Algeria (Eurostat, 2017). 
On top of  that the energy security is a wide game where a mix of  complex factors 
intervene ranging from the energy supply to the stability of  prices, the environmental 
sustainability and the decarbonisation of  the economy, the security of  the whole energy 
chain from production to refining to distribution, the need to tackle different threats like 
the terrorism, the weather extreme events or the cyber-attacks.
Picture 2 depicts some of  these key issues. The security of  the supply is especially 
relevant for Europe. The geopolitics of  the pipelines and the instability in North Africa 
is a continuous source of  concerns for the Mediterranean countries. A clear example is 
Portugal that depends for its gas supply 35% from Algeria and 46% from Nigeria (Galp, 
2016). 
On the other hand, East and Central Europe have a huge dependency on Russia for 
the gas supply and Russia has used before the energy as a geopolitical weapon closing the 
supply to European countries in 2006, 2007 and 2009.
In what concerns the stability and competitiveness of  energy prices Europe has 
failed in building a common energy market. The European networks of  energy advance 
very slowly and still today the Iberian Peninsula is a sort of  “energy island” in Europe 
with the failure to increment the connections between Spain and France. The lack of  a 
true European Energy Market is a key weakness and a major factor that threatens the 
Energy Security in the continent. A liberalized and well-regulated single market is a key 
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goal because smooths the volatility of  the prices, increases the competition, diversifies 
the sources of  supply and increases Europe energy security.
Picture 2. Europe Energy Security
The environmental sustainability is also important and it implies a bid on the 
domestic resources especially renewable energies, development of  the circular economy 
and a common plan for the implementation of  the Agreement of  the Paris Summit held 
in December 2015 (COP 21). In order to achieve the proposed goals Europe needs to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40% by 2030. At the same time, Europe, by 
the same year, aims to have a 27% share of  renewable energy in its energy mix, with a 
27% improvement in energy efficiency (Haslauer, 2015).
The key issue here is that Europe needs to abandon its political “rhetoric” and learn 
to design and build market-based mechanisms that can enable the energy transition 
without major perturbations. Today we are witnessing in Europe that has undertaken a 
strong campaign in favour of  the decarbonisation of  the economy and the use of  
renewables, a paradox: several European countries are consuming more and more coal 
imported from the US. Coal is the most pollutant of  the fossil fuels, and there is a 
dissonance in Europe between the political rhetoric and the functioning of  the economy 
and the market. It is also a matter of  energy security the promotion of  a smooth transition 
of  the energy mix limiting the use of  coal and oil and promoting gas, the cleaner of  the 
fossil fuels, and the renewables. The decarbonisation of  the economy needs sound public 
policies able to materialize the political goals with well-designed market-mechanisms.
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Geopolitics and Implications for Energy Security
The current cycle of  the world economy has been shaped since the first semester of  
2014 where we have witnessed a drastic drop of  the oil price, a growing volatility in 
exchange rates, a shift in the policies of  Central Banks specially the US with the 
announcement of  the end of  the “quantitative easing” policy of  support to the economy, 
the turbulence in the financial markets, the crisis in emerging countries and the slowdown 
of  the Chinese economy. These events are interconnected and the shift of  the Federal 
Reserve policy in the US may be considered the trigger. Since then, in each trimester, 500 
billion US$ leave the emerging countries towards the developed ones, specially the US, 
changing drastically the international financial flows. This led to an appreciation of  the 
dollar and there is a strong negative correlation between the dollar and the oil price. At 
the same time, there was an excess of  oil supply in the world market due to the shale 
revolution in the US that produced 5 mb/d (million barrels/day) in 2008 and reached 9 
mb/d in 2014, competing with Saudi Arabia as the world top producer (EIA, 2017). 
The collapse of  the oil price had huge consequences in the economy of  exporting 
countries like Venezuela where the GDP dropped 6% in 2015 and 10% in 2016 (Rosati, 
2017). 
Also Russia, Angola, Algeria and even the Gulf  countries were affected.
The geopolitical implications are wide due to the fact that in recent decades we have 
witnessed the globalization of  the world demand for oil, gas and raw materials. In the 
past 80% of  the increment in oil demand was driven by Japan, Europe and the US. Not 
anymore. Today 85% of  the world oil demand is driven by China and other emerging 
countries. In global terms a study of  the US Geological Survey has shown that, compared 
with 60 years ago, the planet is consuming today, in percentage terms, 618 times more oil, 
1000 times more gas, 756 times more nickel, 1500 times more bauxite (see table 1) (US 
Geological Survey, 2000 quoted in Klare, 2012).
Table 1. Production of  Selected Countries, 1950, 1975 and 2000
(In thousand metric tons, unless otherwise noted)
Source: Klare (2012). 
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This happens when the key world oil and gas supplier, the Middle East, is in turmoil. 
The collapse of  order in the Middle East, the increase in terrorism activities with its 
spillovers, the emergency of  the Islamic State, the fierce regional competition for 
hegemony between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the emergency of  failed States in Syria, Iraq, 
yemen and Libya – all these events have been accelerated after 2011. In 2011 four major 
events occurred that shaped the evolution of  the Middle East: the withdrawal of  Ame- 
rican troops from Iraq; the death of  Osama bin Laden; the eclosion of  the “Arab Spring” 
and the beginning of  the Syria civil war. 
The turmoil in the Middle East creates a huge concern for the security of  oil supply. 
Each day 20 million barrels of  oil flow across the Ormuz Strait and this represents 86% 
of  Japanese oil imports, 82% of  South Korea oil imports, 42% of  China oil imports and 
22% of  Europe oil imports. From the world powers only the US, due to the shale 
revolution, are today prepared to face an emergency of  a sudden stop of  Middle East 
supplies and this may explain the current US policy of  “smooth” disengagement in the 
Middle East. This policy was announced by President Obama with his famous Statement 
“leading from behind” issued by the time of  Libya war that led to the collapse of  the 
Muammar Kaddafi regime.
For Europe, the current instability in the Middle East is a concern but it does not end 
there. The situation in the Maghreb Region is also volatile and this was demonstrated 
during the Arab Spring and later. In January 2013, the oil and gas industry suffered the 
worst attack in its history that occurred in the gas field of  In-Amenas in Algeria. An 
extremist Islamic group, coming from Libya, captured the field facilities and killed 39 
people, most of  them expatriates. These terrorist attacks are the result of  a combination 
of  three major factors: the collapse of  order in Libya with the emergency of  a failed 
State; the traffic of  weapons and the increasing activity of  Islamic extremist groups. This 
is a key concern for European countries. Italy has 25% of  its gas supply coming from 
Libya through the Greenstream pipeline that crosses the Mediterranean and this pipeline 
was closed when the war in Libya intensified. Italy experienced a very difficult situation. 
Portugal and Spain have a huge amount of  gas supply coming from Algeria through the 
Maghreb pipeline and it is a sort of  “miracle” that this pipeline was not affected during 
this period of  turmoil in North Africa.
The previous analysis shows that the European Energy Security involves today a 
multi-dimensional and complex interplay of  different factors and realities. If  we combine 
all these elements with the tense relationship that exists today between Europe and 
Russia, the overall landscape is worrying. From the geopolitical point of  view it is 
important that Europe contributes for the stability of  the Middle East and North Africa 
but, simultaneously, it is important for Europe to redesign its relationship with Russia.
Europe, Russia and the Atlantic Basin
The concept of  energy security that prevails today means security of  supply of  oil 
and gas. This concept is Stated in Article 103 of  the Rome Treaty that created the Euro- 
pean Community. The same concept is emphasized in the Article 100 of  the Maastricht 
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Treaty where it is complemented with an appeal for the diversification of  European 
sources of  energy supply in terms of  products and geopolitical areas (Silva, 2007).The 
European Union needs a new concept of  Energy Security able to face the key challenges 
it faces today. The European Union imports more than 85% of  oil from Russia, Middle 
East and Africa, all regions in turmoil and this huge dependency risks to increase 
significantly in the near future.
Nowadays, the prevailing concept of  energy security in Europe States that “the 
security of  supply in the field of  energy means to ensure, for the public health and the 
efficiency of  the economy, the physical uninterrupted availability of  energy in the market 
at competitive prices for all consumers (private and industrial), in the framework of  the 
sustainable development objectives established in the Amsterdam Treaty (European 
Commission, 2001).
This concept is an important element of  energy security but it deserves to be 
enlarged, at the light of  a new thinking that is required to address the new challenges of  
the XXI Century, ranging from changes that occurred in Europe and at the world level 
after the fall of  the Berlin Wall in 1989, to the new terrorism threats, the climatic issues 
and the conclusions and recommendations of  COP 21, the Climate Summit held in Paris 
in December 2015. It is also important to address the geopolitical changes created by the 
emergency of  the Unites States as an energy superpower and its role in the near future in 
terms of  oil and gas exports. The erosion of  OPEC and its new role at the world stage, 
the reemergence of  the Atlantic Basin as a main platform for energy flows and the 
security of  the whole energy chain from production to refining and distribution, that can 
be affected by extreme weather events like the Rita and Katrina hurricanes that occurred 
in 2005, need also to be addressed and incorporated in a new concept of  energy security 
able to operate in the complex environment of  the 21st century. All these concerns are 
summarized in table 2. As depicted, the concept for energy security in the 21st century has 
to be enlarged and updated (Silva, 2012).
The energy security concept for the 20th century was based on the need to avoid 
supply disruptions (as happened in 1973 during the Arab embargo to western nations). 
This concept encompassed a string of  policies ranging from the creation of  the Strategic 
Reserves of  oil, the creation of  the International Energy Agency as a platform to defend 
the consumer’s interests and the design of  “CAFE” (Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency) 
to establish standards for the auto industry. 
The major concern addressed by the policies of  energy security in the last decades 
of  the 20th century was driven by a key idea developed in the aftermath of  the 1973 oil 
shock, as expressed by R. Scott (1995) “Secure oil supplies on reasonable and equitable 
terms.” 
These policies were very effective in the 20th century but they need to be updated to 
incorporate the new challenges and threats of  the 21st century: the terrorism; the growing 
instability of  key producing countries; the erosion of  the OPEC “spare capacity”; the 
dependency on OPEC countries; hurricanes Katrina and Rita effects; the threat of  
paralysation of  the energy grid; the blackouts; the extreme volatility of  prices; the climatic 
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threat; the piracy and threats to energy flows; the unsustainability of  the current energy 
model. For Europe is also a key issue, in terms of  Energy Security, to avoid an excessive 
dependency of  Russia, transforming Russia in a strategic partner. Nevertheless, at the 
same time, Europe must be able to diversify its sources of  energy supply from Russia and 
use the potential of  the Atlantic Basin to build a strategic alternative axis with the 
incorporation of  the Iberia Peninsula as a rotating platform of  energy flows, and a major 
hub of  supply enhancing the existing LNG terminals. Portugal (Sines) and Spain display 
50% of  Europe LNG importing facilities and can provide Europe with a competitive 
supply of  gas and oil capitalizing the international flows from the US and Africa.
Table 2. The Concept of  Energy Security
In the US the issues related with Energy Security are more advanced as reflected in 
the initiative of  Jan Kalicki and David Goldwyn (2005) in their work “Energy and 
Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy” . They designed a definition of  energy 
security for the 21st century stating that “Energy Security is the ability to access the 
resources that are necessary for the continuous development of  the national power” 
(Kalicki and Goldwyn, 2005). Kalicki and Goldwyn, more specifically, Stated the need for 
the countries “to have access to oil and gas resources that are reliable, diverse, and ample 
and at competitive prices” taking into account “the adequate infrastructure to ensure the 
flow of  these resources to the market” (Kalicki and Goldwyn, 2005). They draw the 
attention to the fact that energy security today needs to encompass two very important 
components: the ability to ensure the access to the resources and the ability to protect the 
global economy from the effects of  the extreme volatility of  the price (Silva, 2007). The 
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thinking on energy security encompassed new dimensions in the aftermath of  the Cold 
War with contributions from Michael Klare (2001). he drew the attention to the emer- 
gency of  conflicts between nations driven by the need to access natural resources, includ- 
ing energy, in order to ensure their future and survival. Also Sovacool and Brown (2010) 
tried to develop a more systemic approach emphasizing four major factors: availability of  
resources; accessibility to the resources; efficiency of  the production and outcome; 
sustainability in terms of  preserving the environment.
The energy security concept varies widely across different periods of  time. Also 
different threats emerge in different cycles of  activity. This is why the concept of  energy 
security covers different dimensions and it is difficult to be formulated in a clear and direct 
form. Some authors like V. Valentine (2011) call the attention to the “fuzzy nature subject” 
of  the energy security concept. Geopolitical changes like the fall of  the Berlin Wall; the 
acceleration of  the pace of  globalization (that led also to the globalization of  oil and gas 
demand); the “Arab Spring” that disseminated instability across key producing oil and gas 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa; the economic and financial crisis of  
2008/2009 that changed dramatically the demand pattern for energy; the shale technological 
revolution in the US (that created conditions for the US to emerge as an energy superpower); 
the recent election of  Donald Trump as president of  the US and the announced protectionist 
policies (that may end up with a “border adjustment” tax meaning specific tariffs for 
imports) – all these factors impact drastically the world oil and gas market and introduce 
new challenges in terms of  energy security. Nowadays it seems undeniable that the US with 
the shale revolution and the public policies defined to safeguard its energy security, are in a 
much better position than Europe to defend their energy security.
Furthermore there are different definitions of  energy security shaped by the pers- 
pective and nature of  different countries and their place in the energy chain and in the 
energy system.
For a consuming country the energy security must address the reliability of  supply, 
reasonable and competitive prices and access to affordable resources. For a producing 
country the energy security must address the sustainability and reliability of  the demand, 
competitive prices in the markets and safe energy flows across the supply chains. In this 
regard some authors have identified more than 40 different definitions of  energy security 
which leads to difficulties in terms of  the operationality of  the concept.
This type of  difficulties and challenges increase today with the growing virtualization 
of  energy facilities and the technological innovations that will lead to the creation of  the 
“Internet of  Things” including the “Internet of  Energy”. This growing virtualization has 
drawn the attention of  different companies and operators to the cyber threats. The oil 
and gas industry has received a wake-up call on the 15th August 2012 when the facilities 
of  Saudi Aramco where attacked by a cyber virus that paralyzed in few seconds more 
than 30,000 computers (Bronk and Ringas, 2013, p. 81). Fortunately the cyber-attack did 
not reach the Center of  Operations of  Saudi Aramco in Dhahran, otherwise the main 
pipelines and terminals could be affected creating a very serious situation for the world 
energy system. As the things move very quickly in the cyber space, it is a must for the 
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future to tackle the cyber security as a major component of  the energy security architecture 
of  countries and companies in the 21st century.
It is undeniable that we need a new conceptual framework able to respond to a new 
string of  threats and, in this regard, it is important to identify key elements that are 
suitable for building a consistent energy security architecture of  the European Union in 
the 21st century. It is our belief  that the European Union needs to redefine its concept of  
energy security to face the new challenges identified above. For the European Union it is 
crucial, besides many other factors, to ensure two crucial components:
(1) Avoid the excessive dependency of  energy on Russia specially in Eastern and 
Central Europe by redefining the role of  the Atlantic Basin and building an 
alternative Axis of  supply able to minimize the risks of  Russia use of  energy as 
a “geopolitical weapon”;
(2) Reduce the costs of  energy across Europe through the real implementation of  
the Common Single Energy Market breaking the barriers for the flow of  energy 
between the Iberia Peninsula and the rest of  Europe, building cross-border links, 
building and linking a common network of  pipelines and electric grids across 
Europe, fostering the competition, creating conditions for further diversification 
of  supply and more energy security;
Picture 3 characterizes the main issues related to a European energy security 
architecture for the 21st century.
Picture 3. European Energy Security on 21st Century
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Conclusion
In terms of  the European Union dependency on Russia, it is important to diversify 
the sources of  gas and oil supply, but, at the same time, build a new relationship with 
Russia. It is clear from what happened in 2006, 2007 and 2009 that Russia is not a reliable 
supplier of  energy to Europe and Russia regime may use energy again as a “geopolitical 
weapon”. If  everything remains as it is today, within three decades Europe will rely on 
Russia gas even in a more expressive way (75%). It is clear that Russia wants to dominate 
European gas supply and builds alliances with certain European countries like Germany 
being the gas pipeline Nord Stream the best example. Germany solved its gas supply 
problem but at the expense of  Poland, the Baltic countries and other Eastern European 
countries. At the same time, Russia makes acquisitions of  several dominant assets in 
Europe and reinforces its State energy system. The European Single Energy Market is 
paralyzed because Russia State companies like Gazprom and Rosneft built strong alliances 
with European companies that dominate energy markets like E.on and RuhrGas that 
hold 60% of  Germany Energy Market or Gas de France that dominates 70% of  French 
Energy Market (OCDE, 2008, p. 141).
These features are very important to be considered because Europe is paralyzed in 
terms of  energy policies and diversification of  supply due to this strong relationship 
between European companies and Russia State companies. The result is that Europe 
weaknesses and fragilities are today even more exposed. There is a string of  Eastern 
and Central European countries that depend on Russia gas for more than 50% like Esto- 
nia (100%), Finland (100%), Latvia (100%), Lithuania (100%), Bulgaria (89%), Slovakia 
(83%), Hungary (80%), Austria (60%), Slovenia (60%), Poland (59%), Czech Republic 
(57%), Greece (56%) and Romania (24%) (The Economist, 2014).
This landscape is dramatic. This is why it is a key challenge for the future of  Europe 
Energy Security, the implementation of  at least three major policies.
The first is to build a new relationship with Russia. Russia must be a key strategic 
partner of  Europe for the future but this partnership must be based on a more solid rela- 
tionship where Russia is a key energy provider of  Europe but not the only and dominant 
one. To achieve that goal it is crucial that Europe builds a new alternative for Russia gas 
and oil supplies. This alternative is an Atlantic Axis of  supply, enhancing the reemergence 
of  the Atlantic Basin (with the role of  US as an important gas and oil exporter) and 
promoting the Iberia Peninsula (with the contribution of  Sines LNG facilities), as a main 
platform for importing gas and distribution to the European countries. This regards as 
well the solution of  the cross-border links promoting the development of  the Single 
Energy Market and the development of  energy flows across European countries.
The building of  the Atlantic Axis for Europe energy security and the development of  
the cross-border links must be implemented in combination with the development of  the 
European Single Energy market. Energy is at the inception of  the European community 
with the coal and steel market and the Euratom Treaty for atomic energy in 1956. But 
today there is not an active integrated energy policy in Europe and the Single Energy 
Market is still a fiction. An open and competitive energy market in Europe is a key element 
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for energy security. The Europe of  energy is today captured by the monopolies and the 
huge dependency on Russia. Even the liberalization of  energy markets in many countries 
is below the expectations. The liberalization is supposed to increase the competitiveness, 
diversify the supply, reduce the prices and increase energy security. There are good 
examples of  liberalization as in the UK where the market of  gas and electricity brought 
more diversification in supply and reduced costs. However, the reality in many countries, 
including Portugal, is that the incumbents continue to dominate the market, there are 
difficulties in the access to the logistic platforms by new operators, the prices are higher, 
the increase in competition is limited, and the increase in supply is constrained. The 
implementation of  the Single Energy Market requires also that more equilibrium is 
achieved between market and regulation. The market must function as much as possible; 
the regulation must function as much as necessary. Barriers of  entry must be eliminated 
and access to the logistic platforms must be ensured. One thing is clear: the reinforcement 
of  the monopolies in the European energy system distorts the market. Without strong 
moves ahead in order to implement the Single Energy Market it is not possible to improve 
the energy security and reduce the energy costs which are one of  Europe most important 
weaknesses when compared with the US. Lower energy costs in the US provide today to 
the American companies huge competitive advantages in the world economy.
It is also crucial to implement in Europe the cross-border links in the energy system. 
The Iberia Peninsula is still today an “Energy Island” in Europe. The links between Spain 
and France are only 1.6% of  the global potential showing clearly that they are marginal. 
Without a strong political compromise to build the Single European Energy Market and 
the reinforcement of  the Energy cross-border links, the European energy security is very 
fragile.
Finally it is also compulsory at the level of  the European Union and besides all the 
other key measures discussed before, to develop a system to cope with the cyber threats 
taking into account that with the growing virtualization of  energy facilities those type of  
attacks are more and more frequent. And it is important to retain that at the virtual space 
the things move very quickly and today the cyber-attacks risk to jeopardize not only the 
energy security but also the security of  the democratic system as a whole. A solid response 
to this threat must be designed not only to enhance the energy security but also to protect 
the future of  the European democracies.
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A Contribution to the Analysis of   
Energy Security
Carla Patrício Fernandes 
Energy is crucial and indispensable to modern society, insofar as every domestic and 
service activity such as road, air and maritime transports and, consequently, trade and 
international economy, are dependent on this resource. In order for societies to keep 
evolving while preserving their internal economic, political and social stability, there is a 
need for “constant, affordable and uninterrupted” energy supplies. however, as human 
progress moves forward, challenges and problems also tend to become more multifaceted 
and multidimensional, leading several authors to call out for the replacement of  the 
traditional1 concept with a wider and more comprehensive concept of  energy security. 
In the present article, we set upon ourselves to analyse some of  the questions that 
steer the issue of  energy security, introducing, to begin with, a brief  contextualisation of  
energy challenges since the beginning of  the 20th century, when the strategic importance 
of  oil gradually became evident. A second main point shall be the analysis and assessment 
of  the concept of  energy security, with the adoption and explanation, further ahead, of  
the multidimensional concept of  energy security, featuring four dimensions: security, 
foreign policy, domestic policy and economic policy. 
Energy: The Driving Force of  the Development of  Societies
The history of  energy2 dates back to prehistory, with the acquisition, by Man, of  the 
ability to control the use of  fire, for food and protection. The progress of  human 
civilisation was made possible by the discovery and taming of  other energy sources. 
however, the replacement of  energy sources is a “slow process, requiring stimuli in order 
for the new energy sources to assert themselves” (Silva, 2012). 
The great milestone in the history of  energy took place in the 18th century, with the 
invention of  the steam engine and the beginning of  the Industrial Revolution, marking 
1 Created following the oil crisis of  1973.
2 According to Priberam Dictionary (2013), etymologically, the word energy comes from the greek ἔργον 
(ergon) which means work. In Physics, energy is related to the capacity of  a body or physical system to 
produce work. Energy, according to the laws of  physics, cannot be created but only transformed (first 
principle of  thermodynamics), and each type of  energy is able to cause certain and specific phenomena in 
physical systems. Different energy sources can be found in nature and are classified, according to how they 
can be managed and produced, into two groups: non-renewable energy sources (for instance, mineral coal 
and oil) and renewable energy sources (for instance, hydro, wind and solar power). 
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the use and importance of  energy for modern times. Later on, in the second half  of  the 
19th century, two other energy sources have their début – oil and electricity. 
however, as societies evolve, the consumption of  and dependence on energy has 
increased at a global level, rendering countries ever more vulnerable as far as energy is 
concerned. Outside events that might impair their energy supply systems “can have a 
negative effect on the wellbeing of  the country’s population and/or the integrity of  the 
State, its territory and its institutions” (Christie, 2009, p. 277), and, ultimately, national 
security. In the words of  Admiral Frank Bowman, Former Director, US Naval Nuclear 
Propulsion Program, “our national security is inextricably linked to our country’s energy 
security (…) Energy and economic security – key components of  our national security 
– must be undergirded by alternative forms of  energy available indigenously and from 
countries whose values are not at odds with our own” (2007, p. 41). 
In this fashion, energy might be at once a leverage factor and a constraining factor 
for societies. In fact, in the last 100 years, energy issues have influenced a number of  
decisions by States and Institutions. A great number of  such decisions served as models 
for current strategies of  energy security. For instance, the diversification strategy goes 
back to the historical decision made by the First-Lord of  the Admiralty Winston 
Churchill, on the eve of  the First World War, to convert the source of  power of  the 
British fleet from coal to oil3. Such decision meant, on the one hand, the replacement of  
secure Welsh coal by insecure oil from the region known at the time as Persia. On the 
other hand, it meant granting the British Navy a great advantage in terms of  speed and 
fuel autonomy. Moreover, it marks the first decision confirming the strategic importance 
of  oil. 
In its turn, seizing control of  the territory according to oil production zones was the 
plan behind the German military operation Barbarossa, the invasion of  the Soviet Union 
(1941) and the Japanese invasion of  many countries in Southwest Asia, during World War 
II. In both cases, oil had a strategic dimension and energy security was a matter of  natio- 
nal strategy (yergin, 2006, p. 69).
In the 50s and 60s of  the 20th century, thanks to the economic growth, the impro- 
vement of  living standards, and the advent of  the combustion engine and electricity, the 
increase in global consumption and the ensuing demand for energy more than doubled4. 
however, security of  energy supply was not yet a major political priority for developed 
countries. The bulk of  the population in developing countries did not such much as have 
access to energy, particularly electric power. 
This increase in demand, in its turn, spiked an increase in international energy trade, 
which more than quadrupled, overwhelmed by the world oil demand (BP, 2011). Until 
1980, the international oil market was dominated by an ensemble of  Western oil com- 
3 According to Lopes Velho (2010, pp. 108-109), the pioneer in the conversion of  ships from coal to fuel oil 
was Marcus Samuel which, along with Admiral Fisher, defended that the future of  transports resided in the 
combustion engine, and that the British Navy should work in that direction. 
4 It was driven by the boost in consumption in North America, Western Europe, The Soviet Union and 
Northeast Asia. 
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panies known as the “Seven Sisters”5. And even though these companies supplied cheap 
oil in a relatively steady fashion, oil-exporting countries became increasingly dissatisfied 
with the distribution of  wealth resulting from exportations and created the Organisation 
of  Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 19606.
In the following decade, the two oil crisis7 that shook Western industrial countries 
brought about, for the first time, an era of  insecurity in energy supply. These crises caused 
the – at the time – dominant energy source, oil, to become scarce and expensive, and made 
manifest, for consuming countries, not only the heavy dependence on a source of  energy, 
but also the challenges of  depending on supply from a single region or supplier. Conco- 
mitantly, the same crises represented a victory for the new actor in the world energy strategy 
games – the OPEC, which for the first time used oil as a “geopolitical weapon”, in an 
attempt of  prompting political changes in consuming countries, in the face of  Israel. 
To cope with this threat, possible future disruptions in oil supply and the volatility of  
market prices, the International Energy Agency (IEA) was created8, in 1974, by the 
countries included in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). Its creation is a landmark in the history of  energy security, not only because it 
meant the definition of  a first concept of  “energy security”, but also by virtue of  the 
goals of  this institution, particularly those related to energy cooperation among member 
States. Furthermore, it represents a positive outcome for this period of  energy insecurity9, 
by drawing the attention of  political decision-makers in consuming countries to the 
importance and need of  cooperation in matters such as security of  supply, long-term 
energy policies, development and research (IEA, 2016). 
5 They were Standard Oil of  New Jersey (now ExxonMobil), Standard Oil of  California (now Chevron), 
Gulf  Oil, Standard Oil of  New york, Texaco, Anglo-Persian Oil Company (now BP) and the Anglo-Dutch 
Royal Dutch-shell (now Shell).
6 In the early 1960s, as a reaction to the unilateral reductions in oil price brought about by the “Seven 
Sisters”, the First Arab Oil Congress was held in Cairo. Later on, between the 10th and the 14th of  September 
of  the same year, government officials from Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela met in the 
scope of  a conference known as the Baghdad Conference, which resulted in the creation of  the OPEC. 
7 The first crisis, in 1973-74, was caused by a number of  measures coordinated by the members of  the 
Organization of  Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) directed to the countries that had 
supported Israel in the yom Kipur War. In October of  1973, with the downturn in oil production from 
around 20.8 million barrels per day (mb/d) to 15.8 mb/d, the global oil demand standing at 57.1 mb/d. 
The decline resulted in a deficit in the international oil market and was followed by an upturn in oil prices, 
more than 400% above the previous levels (International Energy Agency, 1994, p. 28). The second crisis, 
similarly, comes about in association with events in the Middle East, mas was also catalysed by the 
considerable growth in world oil demand. The Iranian revolution beginning in 1978 along with the slump 
in output in Iran, in 1979, led to the soaring of  oil prices since the middle of  the 70s, doubling between 
April of  1979 and April of  1980 (Graefe, 2013).
8 This Paris-based Agency places a special emphasis on security of  oil supply, and its goal is the creation of  
effective mechanisms for the implementation of  policies in energy matters. More recently, its scope of  
work extended also to the policies of  climate change. It has endeavoured to work in collaboration with the 
rest of  the world, particularly with the great energy consumers and producers, such as the Russian 
Federation and the People’s Republic of  China. 
9 Energy insecurity is defined as “the loss of  welfare resulting from a change in the price or physical 
availability of  energy” (Bohi et al., 1996, p. 1).
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The insecurity of  supply was gradually dampened in the course of  the second half  
of  the 80s, due to an expansion in output in non-OPEC countries, and a decrease in 
demand, which resulted in the shrinkage, for six consecutive years, of  oil prices (Gately, 
1986). During this decade, importers began to diversify the geographic origin of  import 
resources – betting in countries that did not belong to the OPEC, to diversify primary 
energy sources and to encourage the production of  endogenous resources, including in 
the energy matrix other energy sources, such as natural gas and nuclear power. 
All these changes represent the first signs of  an attempt to manage security of  
supply, and were accompanied by a number of  other measures, equally relevant to energy 
security. Among them, emphasis must be given to the creation of  the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) by the World health Organization and by the United 
Nations Environment Programme, in 1988. The IPCC marks the acknowledgement of  
the negative effects of  fossil fuel use on the increase in Earth’s temperature and the need 
for the implementation of  global climate policies. 
The 90s began with two major events – the Gulf  War (1990-1991) and the dissolution 
of  the Soviet Union (1991) – that had a negative impact on energy security. The first 
triggered anxiety among the exporting States and cause oil prices to soar exorbitantly, 
alerting once again the consuming countries to the need for seeking suppliers in less 
volatile areas, specially outside the Middle East (Looney, 1992). The second event, in its 
turn, had devastating economic and social consequences for the countries emerging from 
the former Soviet Union. For energy security, particularly in Europe, it highlighted how 
hazardous it was the transit through Ukraine, when Russian gas exported to European 
countries was withheld, after Ukraine was deprived of  gas supply by Russia, for short 
periods of  time10 (Stern, 2006, p. 2). 
As far as energy is concerned, the end of  the Cold war was signalled by the need to 
overcome divisions among Eastern European and former Soviet countries and the rest 
of  Europe. By the need, in particular, to promote cooperation, development and security 
of  supply of  the European Economic Community. With this goal in mind, and as an 
answer to the growing energy interdependence between European countries, the process 
leading to the European Energy Charter, in 1991, was initiated (European Union, 2017). 
In the early 21th century, several events, such as the terrorist attacks of  September 
the 11th and the subsequent war in Afghanistan, unleashed a second era of  energy inse- 
curity that has persisted to this day. It is also a period marked by the rise in world energy 
consumption, mainly on account of  the emergent economies of  China and India.
In a volatile market, supply flows can be affected by the unreliable atmosphere of  
producing countries, often referred to as “resource nationalisms”, by geopolitical ten- 
sions, by terrorism or even natural catastrophes. hazards and threats spark uncertainty as 
to the constant availability of  supply, might compromise supply, unbalance demand and 
impact the energy market. 
10 This measure ensued from the lack of  payment for Russian gas imported by Ukraine, unable to pay even 
50 bcm (Stern, 2006, p. 2). 
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The upsurge in new challenges and tensions such as the Arab Spring and the “Islamic 
State” intensified the instability in traditionally producing zones, further exposing the 
risk, for consuming countries, of  depending on unstable and fickle areas of  the Middle 
East and Africa. The global boom in maritime transport of  energy, in its turn, and later 
on, the confrontation involving the Iranian nuclear programme, generated concern 
within energy security over the so-called “sea issues”, in the world’s most important 
strategic “chokepoints”, such as hormuz and the Strait of  Malacca (EIA, 2014). 
Concern over energy security extended beyond oil supply. The gas crises between 
Ukraine and Russia, in 2006, 2009 and 2014, forced European gas importers to rethink 
their strategies for security of  supply and for the need to diversify routes and suppliers.
Lastly, the consequences of  the nuclear accident in the Fukushima Daiichi power 
plant, on the 11th of  March of  2011, raised the debate over the viability of  nuclear 
energy as a measure for security of  supply and for the reduction of  the green-house 
effect gases. Meanwhile, technological development in the access to energy, namely 
hydraulic fracturing technology, made possible the access to and exploration of  uncon- 
ventional hydrocarbon reserves11, causing changes in the global energy market while 
shifting to energy security other and we concerns. 
Energy Security: Concept and Characteristics
Despite the spotlighted awarded, for decades, by experts and political leaders, to 
energy security as a pivotal national goal, there is no consensus concerning its meaning. 
Benjamin Sovacool (2011, pp. 2-3) quotes Aristotle’s claim that “who controls the 
definition, controls the debate” and States that energy security is multidimensional and 
the existence of  a plurality of  concepts12 makes meaning “diffuse” and often “incoherent”.
This conceptual ambiguity is challenged by several authors (Chester, 2010, p. 893; 
Sovacool and Brown, 2010, p. 79). hisham Khatib (2004, p. 14), for instance, in his arti- 
cle titled “Business as Usual”, points out that this tendency to define energy security as 
“the continuous availability of  energy in the right form, in sufficient quantities and at 
reasonable prices” is self-contradictory. In the first place, it requires the existence of  
energy “in the right form”. Notwithstanding the defence of  renewable energy sources as 
the more “right”, the only available energy sources, at the moment and in the near future, 
are fossil fuels. Secondly, this definition encompasses “reasonable prices”, also a contro- 
versial notion, especially when it is combined with national interests between producing 
and consuming countries. “Reasonable prices”, to the former, means high enough prices 
to ensure return on investments in the development of  their energy output, whereas to 
11 According with European Commission (2017) the “unconventional hydrocarbons are resources found in 
reservoirs with geological characteristics and locations different from those where oil and gas are usually 
produced. They include natural gas from shale formations (shale gas); natural gas from coal seams (coalbed 
methane) and crude oil from shale formations or other formations with low permeability (tight or shale 
oil)”.
12 In the introduction to The Routledge Handbook of  Energy Security, Benjamin Sovacool (2011, pp. 5-6) presents 
45 different concepts of  energy security. 
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the latter, prices are “reasonable” when they are low and represent a stimulus to the eco- 
nomic growth of  their countries. In this sense, as Alhajji (2007c) claims, to have reasona- 
ble prices is an “elusive goal judged by subjective criteria” and should be replaced with 
“low price volatility”. 
Upon analysing the concepts of  energy security we observe that meaning varies 
according to energy resources, geographic location, political system, economy and the 
external relations of  the countries themselves. however, a simple distinction can be 
carried out to clarify what is energy security to consuming and to producing countries. 
The former seek security of  supply, the assurance of  finding constant supplies for their 
needs, through a diversity of  suppliers and adequate transport infrastructure. The latter 
prioritise security of  demand, the assurance that their production will be purchased at 
a fair price, provided by a diversity of  costumers and over a long term, so that national 
budgets might anticipate a steady and predictable revenue flow. They prefer to have 
maximum control over their energy industries, trying to obtain sufficient investment as 
necessary to maintain or increase output, ensuring that their economies are sufficiently 
diversified so that they are not reliant on fluctuating energy commodity prices (Fer-
nandes, 2013, p. 32).
Thus, energy security means different things to European importing countries and 
to a producing country such as Saudi Arabia or a transit country such as Ukraine. The 
former Saudi Oil Minister, Hisham Nazer (1989 cited in Alhajji, 2007b) defined energy 
security as “maintaining and enhancing access to where the oil exists in such obvious 
abundance”. In this case, “abundance” is obvious and refers to a country possessing one 
of  the largest reserves in the world. The EU, on the other hand, needs to “ensure the 
uninterrupted physical availability of  energy” in the countries where it “exists in abun-
dance”. Ukraine, in its turn, is an importing country and is as much interested in hav- 
ing access to the “abundance”; however, as a transit country, it favours cooperation 
with European countries. As President Viktor yanukovych (Europapress.es, 2012) con-
tended at the World Economic Forum in Davos, in 2012, Ukraine presents itself  as a 
“trustworthy partner” of  the EU, “in the transfer of  hydrocarbons” from Russia and for 
the “country’s integration in the European space and to strengthen energy security in 
the region”. 
Naturally, even among consuming countries, there are identifiable differences in the 
goals of  energy security, depending on what the challenges entail for the country. Whereas 
the main goal of  China, as the second largest oil consumer of  the world, is to secure 
long-term oil supply contracts, in an attempt to mitigate the challenges of  a growing 
external dependence based on maritime transport, the EU member-States are concerned 
with the challenges that the dependence on Russian gas and transport by a reduced 
number of  transit countries involve, and seek to find reliable long-term partners. 
In energy security bibliography, the outlook of  consuming countries prevails, 
grounded in the defence of  security of  supply. Until the decade of  2000, the dominant 
trend in energy security was the one ensued from the oil crisis of  1973-74. It was defined 
as the “access to a continuous supply of  energy, at reasonable prices” and was directed 
 idn cadernos 67
mainly at “preventing disruptions to supply and minimising the effects, in consuming 
countries, of  the impact of  a supply crisis”, especially of  oil. 
The majority of  concepts issued from the traditional school of  energy security point 
to one other feature: the overwhelming prominence of  the Sate as the main actor in 
charge and the chief  receptor of  energy security. The definition laid out by Daniel Yergin 
is inscribed in this traditional analysis of  energy security, when he describes it as “securing 
regular and adequate supplies of  energy, at reasonable prices, and in ways that do not 
jeopardise major national values and objectives” (1988, p. 111). This definition identifies 
“national values and objectives” as the assets to safeguard through energy security. 
Countering the “Western dominion” in the concepts of  energy security, various ana-
lysts and leaders from producing countries (Kaveshnikov, 2010; Minister of  Petroleum 
of  Islamic Repulic of  Iran, 2012; Putin, 2014;) defend that the security of  demand ele-
ment should also be considered a part of  energy security. Among the energy exporting 
countries, Russia is the most exacting over security of  demand. The chief  document of  
Moscow’s energy policy, the Energy Strategy until 2030 (Ministry of  Energy of  the Rus-
sian Federation, 2010, p. 28) considers energy security as one of  the most important 
elements of  national security: “Energy security is the country’s security, that of  its citi-
zens, society, State and economy from the threats to reliable supply of  fuel and energy”. 
This definition evinces Russia’s concerns as a consuming country, but is complemented 
with the outlook of  an exporting country: “These threats are determined by external 
(geopolitical, macroeconomic, market) factors, as well as by the condition and operation 
of  the country’s energy sector”. And he lists as threats: “instability of  world energy mar-
kets and volatility of  world energy prices, increasing competition at traditional markets, 
low diversification of  export, transit dependency, and politicisation of  energy issues” 
(Ministry of  Energy of  the Russian Federation, 2010, pp. 34-35).
There is no doubt that energy security is a common objective, despite covering the 
different interests of  all the actors involved in the complex energy system. however, and 
precisely for being “common”, it should incorporate the interests of  all involved parties: 
consumers, suppliers and transit countries. 
According to Kaveshnikov (2010, p. 587), energy security should be defined as the 
elimination of  threats that, in the long haul, might prevent energy from becoming a 
driver of  the economic development of  countries. Guided by this vision of  energy secu- 
rity, energy importers must ensure the supply of  energy in sufficient quantities and the 
right conditions to maintain the necessary economic development. Energy exporters, on 
the other hand, must have a guarantee of  sufficient and lucrative demand, so as to keep 
the energy sector secure. This analysis of  energy security sensibly incorporates the idea 
of  a fairer distribution of  profit and risks. Now, if  all the actors defend the need for 
“stability”, both market (producing countries) and flows (consuming countries) stability, 
they should cooperate in the fight against the challenges faced by global energy security 
(Minister of  Petroleum of  Islamic Repulic of  Iran, 2012; Putin, 2014).
When the first two oil shocks occurred, the USA’s concern was centred on security 
of  supply and the challenges related to the dependence on oil imports. Nowadays, their 
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concern extends other energy resources, such as natural gas e unconventional energy 
resources, and problems are multifaceted and multidimensional, ranging from climate 
change to demographic pressure, the threat of  terrorism, cyberterrorism and piracy. 
In addition to the fact that energy security also has become the target of  threats, the 
State has ceased to be the only actor, because energy security is seen as a global asset, 
everyone’s responsibility and for the good of  all (societies, State, groups and indivi- 
duals). This extension in the breadth of  energy security translates also into values that 
transcend “national values” and include issues such as the environment, sustainability 
and public good13.
This need to add new dimensions to energy security may be observed in the refor-
mulation itself  of  the concept of  energy security made by the Energy International 
Agency. In 1985, the “adequate supply at reasonable prices” was the chief  feature of  
energy security (IEA, 1985, p. 29), while a decade later, it was presented as “ a new way 
to avoid market distortions” (OECD/IEA, 1995, p. 23), because “an international mar-
ket working smoothly will offer accessible, secure and continuous supplies” (OECD/
IEA, 2002, p. 3). More recently, energy security has also acquired a physical component 
and a price component, and has been presented as “an uninterrupted physical availability 
at an affordable price”, while including a new value, “respect for environmental con-
cerns” (IEA, 2011). 
The traditional perception of  energy security is currently regarded as very narrow, 
for it does not include the new actors, challenges and values of  energy security. In this 
sense, a number of  authors (yergin, 2006, Fernandes, 2013; Silva and Rodrigues, 2015) 
argue the need for the establishment of  a new concept of  energy security for the 21st 
century. Such a concept should be able to meet a series of  concerns, currently envisaged 
as overriding, in such a way as, for instance, “to integrate producers and consumers in a 
global treaty that ensures the flow of  energy resources, promotes investment and trade, 
and works to spark competitiveness in supply and demand” (Silva and Rodrigues, 2015). 
Some authors (Alhajji, 2007c; Baumann, 2008; Sovacool, 2011; Von hippel et al., 
2011) contend that the new concept should be multidimensional, that is, a concept that 
encompasses internal and external actions, possessing a variety of  dimensions. That 
according to Alhajji (2007c) “are general and universal, but weight of  each differs by 
place and time. The level of  interaction among them also differs from country to country 
and from time to time”. 
That dimensions can also be combined and whose number may vary according to 
the author. In Alhajji’s view (2007c), energy security consists of  six dimensions: economic, 
environmental, social, foreign police, technical and security. Bauman (2008, pp. 14-15), in 
his turn, lowers the number of  energy security dimensions to four: internal, economic, 
13 In this article, we argue that the questions that guide “security for whom”, “security for what values” and 
“security from what threats” security studies must be incorporated in the current energy security analysis. 
These questions are seldom dealt with in the bibliography devoted to these matters, showing up with 
similar interrogations “protect from what, from what risks and by whom” in works analysing Chinese 
energy security by Von hippel et al (2011) and by Leuga et al (2014).
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political and security. General Cabral Couto, at the conference “Energy sovereignty: a 
strategy for Portugal”, held at the Institute for National Defence, on the 26th of  January 
of  2010, advocated the same multidimensional understanding of  the concept. The 
dimensions he listed, applied to Portugal’s energy security, were also four: geopolitical, 
economic, military and internal.
Multidimensional Concept of  Energy Security 
Given the complexity of  the analysis of  energy security and the multiple dynamics 
accompanying it, we shall adopt and analyse the concept of  multidimensional energy 
security within view of  four dimensions: security, foreign policy, domestic policy and 
economic policy. 
The first, the “security” dimension of  energy security, pertains to the security of  
means, infrastructure and information systems in the service of  energy production, 
storage, transport and distribution. From this dimension springs the need for States to 
use Security Forces, Armed Forces or Information Services to protect the whole energy 
system from threats14.
Defining what threats and risks are might help to shed light on the analysis of  the 
concept in this dimension. It is considered that there is a threat to energy security when 
a State or non-State actors use “means originating in a conscious will with the purpose of  
affecting the normal energy flow between consumption and output” (Duarte and 
Fernandes, 2010, p. 9). Also worth stressing are hostile pirate or terrorist actions against 
critical targets such as energy infrastructure, and the “use of  energy as weapon” by a 
group or a country. In both examples, even countries that do not constitute themselves 
the target of  threats might come to suffer consequences, through disruptions in supply 
and price upturn. Risks can be caused by adverse events that do not derive from hostile 
intention, and are divided into short and long-term risks. The former include physical 
disruption in supply due to human faults or errors and to adverse weather conditions. 
The latter comprehend the stockpiling of  untenable and precarious tendencies at home 
or abroad, such as persistently low stocks and the growing and heavy dependence on 
imports (Duarte and Fernandes, 2010, p. 9).
Saudi Arabia is the world’s biggest oil exporter. Thus, a possible attack against any 
critical point of  the Saudi oil system, that should cause a disruption in supply and 
deprived the market of  oil for several weeks, might have devastating repercussions for 
consuming countries and for Saudi Arabia itself. That is why this country implemented 
security mechanisms to safeguard its energy resources. For instance, after the attack by 
terrorists (connected to radical Islamic organisations) against the yanbu oil terminal, in 
the Red Sea, in 2004, it created a security system worth five billion dollars a year, with a 
work force of  35 thousand men15, to defend a network of  over 152 000 km of  oil pipe- 
14 For an analysis of  security vulnerability of  oil and gas pipelines, see Parfomak, P. W., 2013. Keeping America’s 
Pipelines Safe and Secure: Key Issues for Congress. CRS Report for Congress.
15 That work force received extensive training through a programme of  technical support from the USA, and 
has as its sole responsibility the task of  defending the Saudi energy system from internal and external 
threats (Obaid, 2011). 
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lines linking terminals, refineries and gas and oil wells. China, in its turn, concerned with 
the insecurity of  its oil importations, arriving in the country chiefly by sea, is developing 
“energy security by proximity”, by setting up land corridors with neighbouring countries 
(Fernandes, 2013). 
The States’ concerns over the vulnerability of  energy transport are shared by 
multinational organisations such as NATO, which included energy security in its strategic 
concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit on the 20th of  November of  2010. According 
to Michael Rühle (2011), head of  the Energy Security Section, in NATO’s Emerging 
Security Challenges Division, the role of  the Alliance must be that of  “develop the 
capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of  critical infrastructure 
and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on 
the basis of  strategic assessments and contingency planning”.
The assessment of  a country’s position in terms of  energy security involves two 
phases. The first phase includes the identification of  risks and threats to its supply, the 
assessment of  the likelihood of  their occurrence and the impact of  any such occurrence. 
The second includes the formulation of  an energy security policy in light of  the country’s 
level of  energy vulnerability16. The energy policy, in its turn, can be formulated according 
to short or long-term scenarios. In the first case, the concern may be the possibility of  
suffering a sudden disruption in energy supply, resulting in a pronounced inflation of  
prices17, demand sports or the abusive use of  energy resources by the consumer. The 
second scenario is rooted in a concern ensuing from the possibility of  an unexpected but 
prolonged disruption in energy supply which might entail, for the consuming country, 
the readjustment of  its patterns of  energy demand. (Fernandes, 2013, p. 38). 
These two scenarios illustrate one other feature of  energy security: its multidimensional 
nature in terms of  time or era. That dimension can be found in the energy security 
concept of  the International Energy, in the distinction between long and short-term 
energy security. The former “mainly deals with timely investments to supply energy in line 
with economic developments and sustainable environmental needs”. The latter deals 
“focuses on the ability of  the energy system to react promptly to sudden changes within 
the supply-demand balance” (IEA, 2011b).
In order to mitigate the short and long-term challenges, States can use the energy 
diversification strategy (Luft and Korin, 2009, p. 336), in its three more relevant forms: 
diversification of  routes, suppliers or buyers and energy sources. 
Diversification of  routes must be analysed within a framework that accounts for the 
16 That vulnerability is aggravated by the fungibility of  transports, the distance between the location of  the 
resources and the facilities that receive them, the distance between resources and the consuming country, 
and even the political, economic and social circumstances of  the producing country (Fernandes, 2013).
17 The most significant disruptions in oil supply, with an impact in oi prices, are related to momentous events, 
such as the Iraqi Revolution in 1978, the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988, the two Gulf  Wars and the 
Asian crisis. In 2003 alone, three events occurring in different continents caused disruptions in the energy 
market that resulted in an upsurge in oil prices – the first, the onset of  the Iraq War, the second, the attacks 
in Nigeria, and the third, the outcome of  a strike in a State-owned oil company in Venezuela (Fernandes, 
2013, p. 38).
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costs and benefits of  the development of  new routes when compared to the risks and 
threats that weigh on the already existing routes. Diversification of  suppliers is generally 
the way to reduce risk and maximize diversification. Lastly, diversification of  energy 
sources concerns the decrease in the dependency on fossil fuels and the wager on clean 
and sustainable energy sources. Both diversification of  routes and of  suppliers may be 
placed in the “Foreign Policy” Dimension of  Energy Security, insofar as the challenges 
posed by the dependence on one supplier, one market and a reduced number of  transport 
routes may influence the external insertion of  countries and their diplomatic alignments 
(Fernandes, 2013, p. 40). 
The foreign policy of  energy security is carried out by many countries and companies 
by means of  “energy diplomacy”18, in the sense of  “establishment of  peaceful contacts, 
at a bilateral and multilateral level, with the detainers of  powers in other countries. This 
contact involves a negotiating process with the purpose of  “reaching a usually written 
agreement, over a specific problem” (Magalhães, 2005, p. 38), which might be substantiated 
in the signing of  contracts.
China is the best example of  the use of  bilateral and multilateral energy diploma- 
cy as an instrument of  foreign policy by consuming countries. Since 2001, this type of  
diplomacy is aimed at three groups of  countries (producers, transport and potential 
competitors) with different, albeit relatable, objectives. Supported by the “Going Out” 
strategy, it includes visits from high government officials and the establishment of  stra-
tegic partnerships, enabling the creation of  a favourable atmosphere so that national oil 
companies, through the financial support of  the Chinese State-owned banks, may subse-
quently participate in the energy sector of  producing countries and have access to know-
how (Fernandes, 2013). 
To producing countries, energy diplomacy “is an instrument of  foreign policy to 
establish peaceful contact” with detainers of  political powers in consuming countries, 
with the purpose of  concluding contracts for the exportation of  their energy resources 
and attracting investment for the development of  their energy sector. In Andrews-
Speed’s view (2009), the governments of  producing countries have specific and diffe- 
rentiated objectives when seeking foreign investment in their energy sectors. These 
objectives can be grouped into six categories: (1) the need to attract foreign investment, 
in the face of  the imposition of  sanctions or other international restrictions19; (2) to 
decrease their dependence on certain external parts, despite their success in attracting 
foreign investment for the energy sectors20; (3) countries that either possess resources 
or offer conditions of  marginal interest, at the moment, for the international oil com- 
18 The concept of  energy diplomacy used here is based on the concept of  diplomacy of  Ambassador José 
Calvet de Magalhães (1995, p. 83): “it is an instrument of  foreign policy to establish peaceful contact 
between the detainers of  political power from two states”.
19 This category includes countries such as Iran, Sudan and Myanmar, which seek investment from countries 
such as China, India, Russia and Malaysia, restrained from competing in the international market for a long 
time. 
20 It includes countries such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, vis-à-vis the traditional Russian influence. 
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panies21; (4) the need for investment, both in their oil sectors and in infrastructure 
capable of  boosting their economic development22; (5) countries that seek security of  
demand and are driven by the ambitions of  their own national oil companies23; (6) Sta- 
tes that seek political and strategic partners that might counterweight the USA or the 
West in24.
The third dimension of  our concept of  energy security is the “internal”. This 
dimension encompasses two types of  energy strategies. Firstly, a strategy centred on the 
improvement, extension and integration of  the whole energy system, which includes the 
expansion and construction of  new energy networks and power plants, the construction 
of  terminals and liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage facilities and the creation of  
national strategic reserves. This strategy enables countries to attain a greater resilience 
in their energy system, that is, a greater capacity to “prepare for, absorb, recover from 
and more successfully adapt to adverse events, it thus includes a dynamic and proactive 
notion of  managing potentially harmful stressors” (Gößling-Reiseman, 2016, pp. 1-2). 
Secondly, a strategy encompassing concerns with the type of  primary energy consumed 
and the commitment in the diversification of  energy mix in the energy matrix, and relies 
on investment in alternative endogenous sources, such as renewable (hydric, wind, solar 
and biomass) and unconventional (shale gas, coal bed methane, tight gas, oil sands and 
shale oil). This strategy, despite failing to protect countries from the challenges of  the 
market, such as supply and price fluctuations, may assuage the challenges posed by 
natural disasters or political turmoil, thus contributing to continuous energy security 
and creating an adequate setting for sustainable economic growth. The USA are one 
of  the biggest examples of  the strategy of  energy source diversification in the energy 
matrix, with their bet on the exploration of  shale gas. This investment enabled the repla- 
cement of  coal with gas in the bulk of  electric and thermal power stations, the intro- 
duction of  gas in the transport system and the outset of  NLG exportations for Mexico, 
Chile and a number of  Asian countries: China, South Korea and Japan. 
These changes in the USA’s energy production are having an effect on the global 
market and the energy trade. The downturn in natural gas prices in the USA, for instance, 
is impacting the consumption of  coal in the country, which, because it has decreased, 
resulted in an upsurge in the exportation of  this fossil resource. In Europe, the increased 
exportations combined with a slowdown in Chinese demand have led to a fall in coal 
prices and a boost in coal consumption. In 2011 and 2012, in countries such as England, 
Spain and Germany, the use of  coal to generate electricity grew steadily, to such an extent 
21 As is the case with Iraq, which, due to related challenges, has attracted the participation of  Chinese State-
owned companies, possessing ample funds and ready to run greater risks. 
22 Very common in African countries such as Angola, Sudan and Nigeria. 
23 It includes, for instance, Middle Eastern countries that are aware that Asia, not the West, will be their 
biggest client in the future and which, therefore, seek to establish improved economic and political 
rapports with the Asian governments.
24 It is the case with a series of  Latin American governments which, from the point of  view of  foreign 
relations, appear to seize China’s interest in their resources as a counterweight to the USA. 
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that there was new investment in coal-fired power plants25, drawing attention to the 
weaknesses in the implementation of  climate change European policies. 
The exploration of  unconventional hydrocarbons is triggering the creation of  a 
“new strategic world map”, with the redefinition of  the world energy map and the geo- 
political importance of  producing areas and detainers of  energy reserves. In this map, 
giant suppliers such as Russia, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela may coexist alongside coun- 
tries with a few internal resources to supply their own needs and which also have the 
potential to become themselves supplying countries. 
Lastly, the fourth dimension of  the concept of  energy security is the “economic” 
one. As previously analysed, energy has always been key to the development of  societies, 
although its importance has grown substantially following the industrial revolution and, 
to a considerable degree, due to the intensive use of  fossil fuels. 
Xavier Labandeira and Baltasar Manzano (2012, p. 2) argue that a minimum supply 
of  energy is essential for the functioning of  economies, and explain that the laws of  ther- 
modynamics imply that energy is necessary, at least, in a minimum quantity for the mate- 
rial transformations that are related to most productive processes. Energy goods are 
likewise important, not only as intermediate inputs for production and transport, but also 
as final outputs that are often necessary for basic human wellbeing. Energy-related issues 
are highly relevant across the economic system, due to the capital-intensive investment 
in durables (associated to different types and levels of  energy consumption) and their 
subsequently long depreciation periods. The combination of  these two factors thwarts 
the agents’ capacity to react in this area. 
In this dimension, the countries are concerned with the impact of  a possible scarcity 
in energy resources on economic development, inflation, unemployment, namely in the 
balance of  payments or in the country’s currency value. It encompasses the concerns of  
consuming and producing countries that may also be affected by a downturn in demand 
by importing countries, decreasing energy-based export revenue and causing a slackening 
of  their economies. 
Energy security must be considered in a global perspective, as a concept involving 
reciprocity between energy exporting and importing countries. In 2008, during a meeting 
between oil consuming and producing countries in Jeddah, in Saudi Arabia (Jeddah Energy 
Meeting), the effects of  price volatility – affecting not only companies and consumers in 
importing countries, but also energy producing countries – were debated. It was argued 
that price volatility, lest it earns the combined action of  importing and exporting coun- 
tries, will have an impact on all, as well as on the long-term stability of  the international 
energy market and of  world economy. 
Among the chief  consequences that were put forward, the following warrant special 
emphasis (OPEP, 2008, p. 13): (1) the negative impact on economic growth, particularly 
in the less developed countries, through the energy-economy link; (2) the effect of  higher 
25 Another driving force was the relinquishing of  nuclear power in certain countries, as for instance in 
Germany, following the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant in 2011.
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oil prices on high energy-consuming industries and on transport costs, which may result 
in a rise in inflation; (3) the persistence of  oil price volatility encumbers upstream and 
downstream investment, causing delays in necessary financing; (4) higher oil prices and 
their volatility increase the activity of  future oil markets, with a spiral effect. 
One of  the most important policies to improve the economic dimension of  energy 
security, especially in emerging economies, consists of  breaking or at least limiting the 
relationship between GDP and energy consumption, namely through an increase in 
energy efficiency and the reduction of  energy intensity in the industrial sector. Energy 
efficiency is important for energy security in consuming countries, since that, by enabling 
a reduction in dependence on imported fossil fuels, it renders it possible to reduce the 
need for investment in energy infrastructure and also fuel costs. Consuming countries 
such as China, the USA and the EU member States recognise the importance of  energy 
efficiency and have publicly presented the measures they are developing or the objectives 
they wish to carry through. The International Energy Agency (OECD/IEA, 2012, p. 7) 
argues that, although approaches for an efficient world scenario vary from country to 
country, energy efficiency can only become visible through the estimation and dissemi- 
nation of  its economic benefits. 
Conclusion
Energy remains a global challenge, despite the upsurge in the available types of  
energy sources. In the last years we have witnessed, triggered by technological advan- 
cements and environmental and climate concerns, a retrieval of  the early low-carbon 
energy sources used by man. These sources allow countries such as Portugal to reduce 
their energy dependence and minimise the impact of  price volatility in their economies. 
Energy security has been guiding important decisions and strategies throughout 
history. If, until the end of  the Cold War, it was essentially a matter of  national interest, 
currently it is also a global issue, in the hands of  all and for the benefit of  all. 
Concomitantly, the challenges faced by energy security were essentially short-term 
and supply-related, mainly concerning oil. Nowadays, reflecting the temporal dimension 
of  energy security, concerns are a matter of  long-term pondering of  strategies that enable 
the energy system to react promptly in the face of  sudden changes in supply and demand.
From 2000 onwards, energy security problems became more multifaceted and 
multidimensional. The threats are no longer only material, but also cybernetic, and can 
impact the whole energy system, a fact which has led a series of  authors to appeal to the 
creation and use of  a broader and modern concept of  energy security. 
Bearing in mind that these challenges convene all the actors in the energy system, we 
commit ourselves, in the present article, to an integrated analysis based on multiple 
dimensions (security, foreign policy, internal and economic) which comprehends, among 
others, factors such as energy availability and affordability, energy efficiency, the 
environment, economy and technology. The analysis applies, in its turn, a multidimensional 
concept of  energy security that includes internal and external actions with different yet 
combinable dimensions. 
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In view of  the fact that the creation of  a “new strategic world map” is underway, 
with the redefinition of  the world energy map and the geopolitical importance of  pro- 
ducing areas and holders of  energy reserves, it is important to ponder, in light of  these 
changes, the evolution and adaptation of  the concept of  energy security. Lastly, curtailing 
limitations, ambiguities and inconsistencies in the meaning of  energy security will allow 
for a shared language between scholars and political decision-makers, thus contributing 
to a wider analysis of  the challenges faced by energy security. 
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Russia-EU Gas Relations:  
“There is a Light in the End of  a Tunnel”
Aleksei Grivach
Russia and the EU are playing the most challenging game in their relations since the 
end of  the Cold War – and probably in their whole history. Both sides have a long list of  
mutual claims and fears (more or less substantiated), including in the sphere of  natural 
gas. The developments of  the past have negatively affected both the political atmosphere 
in Europe and mutual confidence, even among experts.
There was a strong political demand to start drifting away from each other, which 
bears the risk of  eventually severing the gas chain that unites us. Especially as all sides 
involved are fully aware of  the weak link: Ukraine continues to be the single most impor- 
tant transit country for Russian gas, but is at the same time in the throes of  a severe crisis 
of  Statehood.
The story started long before the last escalation in Ukraine 2014, when armed coup 
in Kiev provoked referendum in Autonomous Republic of  Crimea to join Russian Fede- 
ration and pro-Russian separatist movement in Donbas region. Back in 2006, making up 
the G8 summit in St Petersburg, Russia proposed a formula of  international energy 
security based on a comprehensive upstream and downstream cooperation, which would 
have allowed for increasing the level of  confidence and the sharing of  investment risks 
between all market players. It was a global initiative but for sure the main idea had been 
to lift up Russian-EU energy relations on a new high level. 
however, our European partners made another choice based on unilaterally changing 
the rules of  the game, leading to the supplier bearing both investment and transit risks, 
as the use of  infrastructure becomes politically motivated. It was a way of  confrontation. 
Diversification of  supply of  energy sources, mainly in gas, had been proclaimed as the 
priority course of  the EU energy policy, though at first it was not officially declared that 
the diversification is all about Russian gas supplies, all clearly understood, what does it 
mean in reality. Later on with 3rd Energy Package (its rules are not fully implemented and 
codified in the EU yet, almost 8 years after adoption) and establishing Energy Union 
strengthening and development of  the energy cooperation with Russia is not mentioned 
as a priority or even a key issue for energy security. 
On the other side of  the medal we have almost 50 years old experience of  building 
up relations that run and guaranty suppling European countries with Russian natural gas 
sustainably and competitively. 
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This model, although its beginnings trace back to the height of  the Cold War and its 
history includes many international disputes and major transformations in the participant 
States, has become a key element of  European security in general. At its peak, the system 
of  mutual relations in the natural gas sphere lived up to all expectations: it was stable, 
environmentally-friendly and economically attractive.
One should not forget that cooperation in the sphere of  energy, primarily natural gas, 
has contributed to geopolitical stability in Europe for almost half  a century, underpinning 
all sides’ aspirations to solve strategic issues through reasonable compromises. 
Moreover, real trend is that Russian gas supplies to the EU are rising both in terms 
of  physical volumes and share in the European gas market, despite huge political tensions 
and phobias. 
To start with EU is the second biggest gas market in the world, consuming about 450 
bcma. But unlike the leading US market which is now almost self-sufficient (and in most 
challenging years net imports were not higher than 20% of  US national gas balance), 
Europe is world top market in terms of  imports. Moreover, it is market with increasing 
import dependency. During the last ten years from 2005 to 2015 the supplies of  gas from 
third countries to the EU rose from 60% of  the gas market to 70%. And in 2016 import 
share may reach three quarters, based on preliminary figures.
Chart 1. EU Gas Production and Imports Share in Indigenous Consumption, %
Source: Eurostat, NESF calculations (2017).
This is due to the decline of  indigenous gas production in EU Member States. Over 
the decade it dropped by about 40%. We expect that this trend will continue, even though 
in 2016 European production as of  preliminary estimations increased a little thanks to 
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new small fields put into operation in the UK and in Ireland, and stabilization of  gas 
output in the Netherlands. 
This means that more gas imports and more importing infrastructure will need to 
be available. The alternative, restricting gas usage and the construction of  importing 
infrastructure for political reasons, would be disastrous for energy security, industrial 
competitiveness and even the EU’s goal of  reducing carbon emissions. huge imports 
urges to support well balanced and mutually beneficial relations with current suppliers 
and optionally try to find new producers that are able to send additional gas to Europe 
safely and at reasonable prices. 
The results of  longstanding European Commission’s policy of  gas supplies diver- 
sification seem to be very poor at the moment. The picture is very simple – 3 main 
sources of  pipeline gas supply – Russia, Norway and North Africa (Algeria and Libya). 
Plus 23 LNG terminals in 10 EU countries sourcing liquefied natural gas by long term 
contracts with producers and short term deals in global LNG market. 
Chart 2. Natural Gas Imports to the EU, bcm
Source: ENTSO-G, UTG, Gassco, Snam Rete, DESFA, Enagas, GRT Gaz, NESF Calculations (2017)
In total there were more than 350 bcm of  imported gas in 2016, +10% yoy. Norway 
supplying gas to North Western Europe (with small amount for Iberian Peninsula), 
Algeria sending gas to Italy and Spain, unrested Libya with quite small deliveries to Italian 
market only. And Russian gas feeding almost all destinations except may be Britain, 
Belgium and Iberian far West.
What is also very important is that there are different types of  pipeline gas available 
to Europe in terms of  resource base, upstream and transportation capacity etc all what 
we call security and flexibility. Norway supplies are running at the top of  their ability in 
terms of  export pipeline capacity and existing gas reserves. In the medium term they will 
have to resolve the dilemma of  supporting current production levels versus prolonging 
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the life time of  gas exporting in that country. Algeria’s exporting infrastructure is under- 
utilized, but the amount of  gas available for exports is open to question. We saw large 
scale volatility caused by a combination of  production declines from major fields, com- 
paratively modest new reserves brought into production and domestic demand growing. 
Libya is a quite marginal gas source supplying only Italy and facing enormous civil war 
risk. Finally, North Africa as we know from Libyan case is not the most stable and secure 
region in the world. 
There is also the long-awaited Southern corridor, which is being built from Azerbaijan 
via Turkey to the EU, landing in Southern Italy. For a number of  years Turkey that is by 
its own 100% dependent on gas imports sends small amount of  gas (up to 0,6-0,7 bcm 
per year) to Greece. Just to have a sign of  new route of  gas supply to Europe is coming. 
Significant flow is scheduled to come on stream by 2020. It may reach a 10 bcm 
plateau for another 5 years, then up to 20 bcm of  gas later on may be added from other 
new sources like the Levant, or Turkmenistan or Iran. This will involve quite marginal 
volumes for the total market (2-6%), and there is too much that “may” happen and not 
enough that “will” happen! Not forgetting about Turkey as a powerful transit partner for 
the EU is coming as a bonus with this project. 
And at the end of  the day we had come to main current supplier (Russian gas) and 
main optional source (LNG). Russia has a huge resource base that is at least 8 times 
higher than Norway and Algeria obtain both. Extended spare production capacity is in 
place as well. This, for example, allowed Gazprom to send to the EU market an additional 
25% in the 4th quarter 2016 year on year despite very high exports level we had in the end 
2015. 
Whatever today’s politicians may think, Russia and the EU have enjoyed 50 years of  
cooperation in energy, and there are also mutual long-term obligations in place linking 
both sides for another 20 years and thousands bcm that still have to be produced in 
Russia and delivered to the European customers.
Chart 3. Share of  Russian Gas in the EU Market, %
Source: Eurostat, NESF calculations (2017).
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Moreover, since 2010 Russian gas share in EU consumption rise from 23% to 31% 
in 2016, when we have seen an exporting record high for Gazprom also in terms of  phy- 
sical volumes, more than 150 bcm to the EU. No matter was there decline in consumption 
in the EU or rally. It is worth to note that these results are achieved in period of  highest 
political controversy and gas interdependency gives to all sides more moderation and 
consideration of  mutual interests. And that is very important for energy security and for 
security in wider sense. 
What Russia lacks is sufficient and fully safe infrastructure to meet Europe’s growing 
gas needs. Russian gas flows to the EU via two main direct pipelines Nord Stream to 
Germany and yamal Europe to Poland and via Ukraine. There is another direct pipeline 
to Turkey – Blue Stream.
Chart 4. Russian Gas Exports to Europe and Turkey by Route, %
Source: Gazprom, NESF calculations (2017).
But only 15 years ago Ukraine had almost total monopoly over Russian gas transit. 
And even in 2008 its share was about 70%.
Putting into operation of  3 new routes – Blue Stream, yamal-Europe (to Germany 
via Belarus and Poland) and Nord Stream to Germany via Baltic sea made Russian gas 
supplies to Europe and Turkey much more secure. Ukrainian share decreased to 40-45% 
but is still very high and for some European countries crucial to meet energy security 
issues.
Ukraine is saying there is high potential for transit. But here you can see the real 
picture. That is very challenging in terms of  security of  supply bearing in mind the age 
of  the Ukrainian transit system. There are three main pipelines through Ukraine, one is 
40 years old and is not currently operational, the second is 33 and will be 36 years old in 
2020, and the third will be 33 by the end of  decade. And they already used close to their 
maximum. Maximum that will be decreasing dramatically over few coming years due to 
technical aging and lack of  investments. So the Ukraine transit system would need total 
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renovation before it could be relied on to continue transporting large volumes of  gas 
safely and sustainably in the long term.








Start of  
operation
Soyuz Pipeline  
(Novopskov-Uzhgorod) 1,567 12 26 1976
Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod 
(Ukrainian section) 1,160 9 28.5 1983
Progress Pipeline  
(Sudzha-Uzhgorod) 1,120 9 28.5 1988
Source: Naftogaz Ukraine (2017).
Finally, at the end of  2019 long term contract between Gazprom and Naftogaz for 
transit will expire. Ukraine shows no will to prolong it based on reasonable conditions. 
Not taking in mind political risks, there is always possibility that pipelines crossing 
Ukraine may be damaged by anti-Russian radicals supported or not-supported by official 
government.
And some European nations are still highly dependent on Ukrainian transit. Bulgaria 
– 100%, Greece 63%, Baumgarten hub area with Austria, Italy Hungary, Slovakia and 
number of  other countries – 60% in 2016.
Obviously, new infrastructure investments to transport Russian gas for the benefit 
of  the European market is a must in any case. Political instability makes investments into 
Ukrainian system very challenging and not reliable for Russia as a high class gas supplier 
to European customers. And that is why five European energy peers (two world leaders 
in LNG sales are on that list – Shell and Engie) in 2015 agreed to develop the Nord 
Stream 2 project and are still committed to it, despite great political pressure on them and 
project as whole. With proved safe route, transparent economics (tariff  is lower than via 
Ukraine) and 55bcma capacity meeting current and new potential needs.
Turkey already made its choice signing with Russia intergovernmental agreement on 
Turkish Stream pipeline project that will deliver safely gas to Turkish market in part that 
is now flowing across Ukraine (12-14 bcma). 
Part of  the European political establishment and media are running campaign in 
order to save Ukrainian transit with around 2 billion USD of  fees paid by Russian 
Gazprom to State company Naftogaz Ukraine annually for Russian gas transportation to 
neighbouring countries. Putting aside the fact that Russia as a buyer of  transportation 
services have to account risks and competitiveness of  different routes, where is another 
logical problem. Ukrainian route cannot be maintained in situation of  European diver- 
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sification policy targeting decreasing Russian gas share and volumes in the market. 
however, free competition will bring additional advantages to the European customers 
and further increase of  demand for Russian gas. In that case new delivery contracts had 
to be signed for imports and that contracts may be bind to the investment projects of  
Ukrainian gas pipelines renovation.
Chart 5. LNG Regasification Terminals Capacity in the EU and LNG Entry into the 
European Gas Grid, bcm (natural gas in gaseous State)
Source: ALSI (2017).
While the situation on LNG in Europe is that it has a very good position in terms of  
regasification infrastructure but a disappointing market performance. This is because of  
the high cost of  LNG and the need to compete for volumes against other regions that 
have no alternative to liquefied gas. So when we talk about LNG capacity growth, we 
should also keep in mind the high long term demand in non-OECD Asia, South America 
and the Middle East.
That is the reason why European regasification infrastructure has only been 
utilized at less than 25% of  capacity over the last few years. And that also has a direct 
impact on investment and a limiting effect on the potential value of  the LNG industry 
in Europe.
We have a very striking example of  LNG losing out to pipeline gas: just 5 years ago 
Spain was predominantly supplied with LNG. LNG had a 78% share of  the Spanish gas 
market and pipeline gas only 22%! Now pipeline gas supplies are about 60% of  the 
market, and Algerian gas accounts for two thirds of  total gas supply in the country. And 
it is comparable to the Russian gas share in Poland, for example, and much higher than it 
keeps in Italy.
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To conclude there is no illusions that either partner – Russia or the EU – could not 
survive a possible break-off  of  their gas relations, even though Russian gas plays a signi- 
ficant role in the European natural gas market (33%) and the European energy balance 
(about 7%), while the EU is the top source of  Russian gas revenues (above 40%) and 
natural gas supplies to the EU are featured prominently in Russia’s total export revenues 
(10% in 2016). Almost everything can be reshaped. The question is how wise and 
expensive would such a reshaping be? It would backfire economically, politically and 
socially for both sides and the negative strategic consequences are hard to calculate. A 
break-off  would benefit almost everyone (such as the US, China, the Gulf  States), except 
Russia and the EU.
There is much concern (largely unfounded) about the level of  Russian gas in Europe. 
But the EU should put aside ancient phobias and be reassured by having huge spare 
capacity for LNG, ready to supply extra LNG whenever the market calls for it. In case of  
any emergency Europe would have the opportunity to activate that insurance framework?
Bad news is that LNG is more expensive solution and needs higher prices in general. 
The good news is that Russian pipeline gas plus the LNG option means that there will 
most likely be a cost effective and secure future for gas imports. Some investments are 
needed to eliminate the transit risk for some of  the pipeline gas, and at the end of  the day 
the actual figures for the use of  gas from different sources in the EU will be set by fair 
competition.
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European Energy Security: the Reconcilable 
EU and Russian Approaches?
Licínia Simão
EU-Russia energy relations are framed by the broader institutional setting within 
which relations between the two actors developed since the end of  the Soviet Union, in 
1991, and reflect important changes on energy management both in the EU and Russia, 
as well as ongoing shifts in global energy markets. Pragmatic cooperation on energy 
between Western Europe and the Soviet authorities developed in the 1960s, overcoming 
ideological differences and creating important levels of  interdependence, namely through 
the establishment of  long term contracts. With the end of  bipolar confrontation, the 
levels of  dependence on Russian energy by Western European countries rose significantly 
and despite recent efforts aimed at diversification, are expected to remain high for the 
foreseeable future. 
Considering this, any discussion on the EU’s energy security needs to depart from 
the analysis of  its energy relations with Moscow. Energy security is, in itself  a contested 
concept, as discussed elsewhere in this volume. From the perspective of  the current 
EU-Russia relations, a shared understanding of  energy security would be an important 
step to reconcile three diverging perspectives on the issue: those of  consumers, producers 
and transit countries. Moreover, the limited institutional contexts to address energy 
issues, with clearly underdeveloped governance frameworks, makes energy vulnerable to 
geoeconomics readings of  its use and its securitisation. 
This chapter departs from a social constructivist reading of  the energy dynamics 
developing between the EU and Russia, highlighting the importance of  practices in 
shaping actors’ perceptions and interests. Energy security is thus conceived as a material 
condition, but also as a specific understanding by governing elites and their societies of  
potential existential threats, as defined by the Copenhagen School of  security studies. 
Analysing the set of  discursive and non-discursive practices developed both by the EU 
and Russia in order to define their views on and action towards energy security is helpful 
to understand how existing perceptions came about and how they can be addressed. The 
main question driving this research focuses on what are the factors shaping mutual 
perceptions of  EU-Russia energy relations, which help explain the potential obstacles to 
a shared approach to energy security in Europe. 
The article takes a multi-level analysis to gauge the importance of  a series of  factors 
shaping EU-Russia energy relations, including global dynamics changing global energy 
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markets, institutional changes developing in the EU with the establishment of  a common 
energy policy, and the regional context of  competition between the EU and Russia over 
their shared neighbourhood. The analysis of  how these factors have shaped EU and 
Russian perceptions of  each other’s role in energy security is articulated with the his- 
torically divergent view of  energy security between producers and consumers, and of  
their strategies to assure their interests, namely governance and geo-economics approa- 
ches.
Social Constructivism and Policy Making 
Social constructivists are driven by a critique to materialism – not its refusal. This is 
to say that although material elements of  power objectively exist in international relations, 
they become politically relevant through human action. Thus, perceptions and the 
elements shaping them are crucial to our analysis of  international politics. We can illus- 
trate this point by referring to the dependence of  Western European States on Russian/
Soviet energy. Although the objective fact of  dependence exists, the interpretation 
regarding the value of  dependence has changed over time. Whereas in the 1990s there 
was no articulated concern with this objective reality, eventually there was a shift and 
energy dependence came to be perceived as a source of  insecurity. how can this be 
explained? According to social constructivists it is the value attributed to the fact, defined 
by one actor’s perception and understanding of  reality, that explains the change in policy 
and thus should be the central dimension of  academic interest.
The importance of  ideas has been largely accepted by most theories of  international 
relations, moving the contestation to the realm of  “how” social perceptions influence 
policy making. The definition of  national interests and the policies that they derive, must 
thus engage with specific approaches, including historical contextualisation of  their 
development to assist in the explanation of  why certain perceptions persist and how they 
affect policy making. This methodological approach will be particularly useful to our 
analysis, as we address the changing historical context for mutual perception on energy 
security in Europe. Moreover, social constructivists focus particularly on the social 
transformation of  interests and perceptions. This means that it is through social inter- 
action that collective meaning is shaped. Actors’ identities and interests are shaped by all 
sources of  interaction in a collective environment, including through “socialization and 
internalization […], the drive for social recognition and prestige […], the effects of  social 
norms on interests and on behaviour […], and the presence or absence of  a sense of  
‘community’ […]” (hurd, 2008, p. 303). 
This brings about another distinctive feature of  social constructivist approaches, 
namely the mutual constitution of  agents and structures, which is also helpful to our 
analysis. By accepting that both agents and structures change through their interaction, 
social constructivists open the possibility to understand how new structures come about 
and how actors can reinforce or undermine rules and institutions through their actions, 
while simultaneously being shaped by existing norms. In order to illustrate this, the 
expansion of  EU-based norms and standards for energy development can be perceived 
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as resulting both from a strategic objective defined by EU actors, but also the result of  
the general acceptance of  these rules as beneficial for a shared view of  development 
across Europe. In this scenario, Russia’s rejection of  these rules, is both an attempt to 
denounce the instrumental nature of  norms and a refusal to reinforce them by adapting 
its policies. 
By focusing on the discursive articulation of  ideas about energy security and the 
matching policy options, this chapter seeks to understand the factors driving the mutual 
perceptions of  the EU and Russia regarding their energy security. Moreover, we will also 
adopt a historically contextualised reading of  these dynamics, in order to map the 
evolution of  perceptions and thus identify the factors driving change over time. 
EU-Russia Relations: What Role for Energy?
Relations between the EU and Russia formally began after the collapse of  the Soviet 
Union in 1991. By 1994, a new political agreement had been negotiated, establishing the 
basis for future economic and political relations. The Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) reflected a specific understanding of  the role of  the EU in Europe, 
namely its centrality in shaping the normative frameworks of  the continent. Illustrating 
this, the PCA established the political principles of  democracy, human rights and rule of  
law as fundamental structures in Russia’s post-Soviet reforms, as well as a series of  steps 
towards economic liberalisation, which should underpin bilateral economic cooperation. 
Although initially there was significant support in Russia for liberal economic reforms 
and the integration of  the country in Europe, it gradually became apparent that Russia’s 
economic structure was under intense pressure and that its integration into western 
institutions would be hard to achieve. 
Cooperation on energy issues developed during the 1990s, despite Russia’s decreasing 
energy production levels. The decrease in domestic consumption, due to the collapse of  
the industrial complex of  the Soviet Union, allowed Russia to maintain and even expand 
its energy supply commitments to European markets, in search of  much needed capital 
(Gustafson, 1989). Energy Dialogue in the framework of  the PCA began in 2000, 
followed by strategic documents by the EU and Russia on energy development. The EU’s 
Green paper on energy, published by the European Commission in 2000, and the 
Commission report on “European Energy and Transport Trends to 2030”, of  2003, 
inaugurated a new approach by the EU to energy. Several important elements included in 
this new approach are directly relevant to Russia as a key supplier of  energy to European 
markets. Environmental and economic concerns pushed Europeans towards an inte- 
grated view of  their energy security, linking energy supply and management of  demand. 
A central response towards establishing competitive and sustainable economies, according 
to the EU, was the completion of  the internal market on energy (European Commission, 
2003, p. 3). 
These steps illustrate how, for Europeans, energy security was equated with security 
of  supply – stable and at affordable prices – and was closely connected to environmental 
sustainability and economic competitiveness. From the view point of  Russia, energy 
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security has a more complex meaning, with several dimensions attached. According 
to Sharples (2013, p. 686), for Russia, energy security regards security of  demand, but 
reflects three central dimensions of  energy for the Russian society and government: 
economic, social and political. The economic relevance of  energy derives from the reve- 
nues generated by energy exports, particularly gas, to Russia’s GDP. According to some 
estimates, the direct and indirect dependence on energy exports can be as high as 67 to 
70% of  its GDP (Movchan, 2015). Sharples underlines how both Russia’s “Energy 
Strategy to 2030” and its Foreign Policy Concept, underline the central goal of  attaining 
“the highest possible profit for the national economy” (Ministry of  Energy 2009) and the 
“‘stability of  demand and secure transit’ as key aspects of  energy security, alongside 
security of  supply” (Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, 2008, cited in Shaples, 2013, p. 686). As 
a social commodity, energy also contributes to the ability of  the government of  keeping 
subsidised energy prices domestically and to increased quality of  life. These subsidies, 
however, are derived from the profits incurred by Russia’s energy companies from their 
sales to European markets where energy prices are considerably higher. Finally, as a 
political commodity, energy exports to the EU also provide Russia with status and shape 
its identity as a strategic partner of  the EU (Shaples, 2013, p. 686).
Considering this scenario, EU attempts to ensure energy security through diversi- 
fication and reduced consumption have been perceived by Russia as a source of  insecurity. 
Moreover, the deepening of  integration on energy issues and the establishment of  a 
liberalised EU energy market has posed important dilemmas for Russia. The European 
Commission anti-trust case against Gazprom aimed at preventing the imposition of  
conditions to EU countries negatively impacting the development of  an integrated gas 
market and to assure the flow of  gas at fair prices (Vestager, 2016), illustrates this point.
Cooperation on energy between the EU and Russia developed considerably in the 
2000s, increasing the dependence of  some EU member States on Russian gas, now tied 
to long-term contracts with Russian State-own energy companies. Although this was 
rather unproblematic initially, Russia’s use of  its energy as a political tool towards former-
Soviet States coincided with the EU’s enlargement and the inclusion of  important anti-
Russian advocates in the Council. Thus, the gas crises between Russia and Ukraine, in the 
winter of  2005 and 2008, facilitated a shift in EU perceptions regarding Russia’s reliability 
as an energy supplier and explain important changes in EU energy policies, namely its 
central concern with short-term responses to disruptions and its strong commitment to 
diversification (European Commission, 2014). The Russian Foreign Minister has echoed 
the views in Moscow that the EU and its member States would be wise to avoid such a 
political reading of  energy and to deal with the issue on pure commercial terms (Lavrov, 
2016). 
As further developed below, competition over the shared neighbourhood between 
the EU and Russia has led to increasing tensions and confrontation in, among other 
countries, Ukraine and Georgia. With the ongoing crisis in Ukraine and the annexation 
of  Crimea by the Russian Federation, in March 2014, relations between Moscow and 
Brussels have reached new lows. The imposition of  mutual sanctions has limited eco- 
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nomic exchanges, whereas mutual suspicion of  interference in domestic affairs has led 
to accusations and suspicion, disrupting cooperation at all levels (Romanova, 2016). 
Although energy trade has been spared from sanctions, technology transfers and invest- 
ments have been targeted. Moreover, Moscow has continued to develop its bilateral rela- 
tions with EU State-Members, pursuing a policy of  differentiation which seeks to limit 
the ability of  the EU to speak with one common voice on issues affecting relations with 
Russia, namely on energy. 
Considering this context, the next sections address three specific factors affecting 
energy relations between the two actors, in order to assess how they have contributed to 
shaping mutual perceptions, by shaping the social context within which policy making is 
developed. The first deals with shifts in global energy markets with the emergence of  
new producers and consumers have facilitated adjustments by both the EU and Russia 
regarding the strategic importance of  their interdependence on energy issues. Although 
the reality of  interdependence coming from existing contracts and infrastructure cannot 
be overcome quickly, there are ongoing changes which over the last decade have created 
new opportunities and demand a readjustment of  EU-Russia energy relations. The se- 
cond addresses the increased competition over the shared neighbourhood. This dimen- 
sion allows for a particular insight on how third parties have influenced energy relations 
between the EU and Russia and how governance and geoeconomics readings of  energy 
coexist and interact. Finally, significant changes in the EU energy market alluded to 
above, in particular the EU’s common energy market and common energy policy. It 
becomes particularly striking how Russia’s energy policy has perceived these moves as 
ostensive and at times as a threat to its own energy security, by affecting the ability to 
pursue its business model in Europe.
Systemic Shifts in Global Energy Markets
Energy markets are rapidly changing due to a combination of  factors, including 
changes in consumption patterns, diversification of  oil markets and increased competi-
tion in gas markets, climate change and transnational investments in energy, and the 
importance of  increasing global access to energy and the human and economic conse-
quences of  failing to achieve this goal (Pascual, 2015). These systemic shifts influence 
and are in turn influenced by EU and Russian policies and practices, as well as their 
mutual perception of  their energy relations. 
Changes in global consumption patterns include a sustained increase in energy needs 
globally, but particularly visible in non-OECD countries, developing and raising living 
standards through fast and growing energy demands (EIA, 2016). Among energy sources, 
natural gas is one of  the fastest growing, whereas coal is clearly stagnating in demand 
(EIA, 2016). Thus, energy consumption in Europe is expected to remain high, especially 
in the natural gas sector, since natural gas has increasingly replaced other less clean energy 
sources for electric and industrial production. Moreover, added pressure on suppliers 
such as Russia from fast developing markets in Asia, namely China, is expected. Consi- 
dering this scenario, diversification of  supply sources has been perceived by the Euro-
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pean Commission and some of  its member States as favouring the EU’s energy needs of  
large amounts at affordable prices. 
Besides diversification in consumption patterns, energy markets have also been 
affected by changing patterns in energy production and growing competition for both 
resources and markets. In the natural gas sector, new and cheaper supplies from shale 
formations in the United States and Canada have contributed to supply gas markets. 
Existing shale gas reserves elsewhere and the diffusion of  technology will mean that 
more and cheaper gas is available in the global markets (EIA, 2016). Liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) producing capacity is expected to increase globally, whereas some of  the tradi- 
tional markets for LNG such as Japan and Korea have diminished their energy needs, 
freeing more gas for raising markets such as China, India and ASEAN countries, but 
potentially also for Europe.1 This scenario poses important dilemmas for Russia-EU 
energy relations. Russia is looking to renegotiate long-term contracts both in Europe and 
China for natural gas supply, but European buyers are increasingly attracted to the lower 
prices of  LNG and the fact that it is not politically sensitive. 
Investment trends are also shifting, becoming more transnational and more con- 
cerned with climate change. Investment patterns in 2015 reflected the drop in oil and gas 
prices, diminishing total investments in energy by 8%, compared to 2014 (IEA, 2016). 
This has meant that producers have less money available to invest in new technology and 
in new production sites at a time when energy is more available and less expensive. Oil 
and gas remain the sector with the largest investments, but there has been a shift towards 
low carbon emission energies, as a result of  government incentives. The EU is a leader in 
clean energy development and one of  the leading markets for energy investment, behind 
China and the United States. In 2015, investments in the EU energy market amounted to 
140 billion dollars, whereas in Russia, investment was of  85 billion (IEA, 2016). 
Finally, global energy markets are also affected by the need to make clean and safe 
energy available to more people globally, as part of  the efforts to reduce “energy pover- 
ty”2 and raise levels of  development. Non-OECD countries are expected to account for 
83 percent of  expected growth of  energy demand between 2008 and 2035, whereas they 
are often also sponsoring distinct development models and specific views of  the role of  
energy in development (Ladislaw, 2011, p.1). This situation requires adaptation from both 
energy producers and energy investors, with potential impacts on the EU-Russia energy 
relations. 
Overall, we are now facing the development of  truly global energy markets, reflecting 
the reductions in costs and more advanced technological possibilities of  gas transportation. 
This flexibility of  gas markets is favourable to consumers, increasing their energy security, 
but has been detrimental to energy producers’ energy security (Colombo et al., 2016). The 
1 IEA, 2016. IEA sees major shifts in global gas trade over next five years [online] Available at: https://www.
iea.org/newsroom/news/2016/june/iea-sees-major-shifts-in-global-gas-trade-over-next-five-years.html 
[Accessed on 11 February 2017].
2 See more information on this concept at IEA. Energy Poverty Available at: <https://www.iea.org/topics/
energypoverty/> [Accessed on 15 February 2017].
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development of  new energy projects linking Russia to the EU should be assessed in this 
context. The Russian President’s speech at the last World Energy Congress in Istanbul 
underlined the importance of  global access to energy, particularly in developing countries 
and emerging economies (Putin, 2016). This is a significant signal that Russia is paying 
close attention to global energy competition and will look to position itself  as a global 
supplier, diminishing the importance of  the European market for its energy security. 
Competition over the Shared Neighbourhood
The role of  the EU in shaping political and economic institutions throughout the 
European continent has become much more pronounced, following the end of  the Cold 
War and the demise of  the Soviet Union. Euro-Atlantic integration and enlargement to 
Central and Eastern Europe were perceived in Europe and in Washington as the most 
effective means of  assuring peace and stability in Europe and of  managing the transition 
of  these countries towards liberal democracies and market economies. As has been 
Stated by EU officials, enlargement has been the EU’s most successful foreign policy. 
From the view point of  Moscow, the EU’s and NATO’s growing role in European 
security has been increasingly perceived as problematic. 
Although initially President Putin sought to develop closer ties with EU institutions, 
as a means of  off-setting what he perceived as the greatest source of  international and 
regional instability –US’s unipolarity – it quickly became apparent that collaboration with 
the EU faced important obstacles. The profoundly distinct nature of  the two actors, 
namely Russia’s growing power centralization and the EU’s post-national and supranational 
governance structure; the persistence of  mutual suspicion among EU member States and 
officials regarding cooperation with Russia on sensitive issues, including security and 
defence; Brussels insistence in modelling relations with Russia after its enlargement poli- 
cies, namely through the European Neighbourhood Policy, and thus pursuing a pattern 
of  strong interference in domestic affairs, which Moscow absolutely rejected. All these 
issues contributed to a growing sense of  competition and misalignment of  priorities 
between the two sides, which eventually affected energy relations. 
The EU’s neighbourhood policy, the ENP, was established in 2003 as a means for the 
EU to project influence beyond the prospects of  enlargement, both towards its eastern 
and southern neighbours. The main approach was to expand the Union’s regulations and 
normative frameworks – its governance structures – through jointly agreed reforms with 
its neighbours, as well as increased financial, political and commercial support. The ENP 
was initially offered to Russia as well, but Moscow declined to integrate this policy fra- 
mework, perceiving it as inappropriate considering the ambition of  constituting a stra- 
tegic partnership between the EU and Russia. Thus, in 2004, a roadmap was agreed to 
establish four common spaces between the two actors, which was hoped could signifi- 
cantly shape the European continent and position Russia as a strategic partner of  the EU 
in terms of  its gradual connections to Asian markets. 
The development of  these two distinct forms of  engagement with neighbours from 
the former-Soviet Union and Russia were not always easy to reconcile. Moreover, as it 
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became clearer that the EU’s ENP was accompanied by important shifts in the foreign 
policy orientation of  some of  these countries, to Russia’s perceived detriment, Mos- 
cow’s benevolent understanding of  the ENP changed significantly. The Rose Revolution 
in Georgia, in 2003, bringing to power the pro-western Mikheil Saakashvili and Ukrai- 
ne’s Orange Revolution, in 2004, removing from power the Russian-backed Viktor 
yanukovitch, raised concerns in Moscow not only regarding the future of  relations with 
these two neighbours, but also that future popular uprisings could take place in Russia 
itself. 
Energy was a crucial part of  the ENP’s strategic goals. The completion of  the gas 
and oil pipelines, linking Baku, in Azerbaijan, to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast through 
Georgia, meant that Russia’s monopoly over the export of  Caspian energy reserves to 
European markets had been broken, by 2006. US support to these projects was funda-
mental and EU commitment to developing further infrastructures bypassing Russia 
raised important concerns in Moscow. Overall, however, the imports through these alter-
native pipelines remained marginal, considering EU energy needs and Russia remained its 
most important supplier. Nevertheless, the political signal was given that these pipelines 
may constitute the umbilical cord linking the countries in the South Caucasus and East-
ern Europe to Western institutions (Cornell, T. and Socor, 2016). 
Russia’s desire to limit western influence in its near abroad led the Kremlin to envi-
sion a series of  ways through which governments in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe 
could be pressured to maintain close relations with Moscow. Energy figured prominently 
among Russia’s tools, both through the subsidization/renegotiation of  energy contracts, 
as was the case in Ukraine; through the imposition of  restrictions to diversification, as 
was the case in Armenia; or through the use of  armed violence to disrupt energy flows, 
as was the case in Georgia, in 2008. In the years prior to the financial crisis, energy prices 
remained high and Russia was enjoying large revenues from its exports, making the use 
of  energy as a political weapon more attractive. 
Despite these tensions, Russia sought to maintain the negative externalities of  this 
policy within the region, making sure they did not affect its western costumers. This 
concern was visible for instances during the war in Georgia, in 2008, when Russia targeted 
a Georgian railroad vital to transport crude from Azerbaijan to Georgia, whereas it did 
not target the BTC, in order not to affect directly its western partners. however, this was 
a late lesson, since the energy cuts imposed on Ukraine, in 2005, after the failure to 
renegotiate energy prices affected EU consumers and led to important changes in the 
Union’s perception of  Russia as an unreliable supplier. The policy implications of  this for 
the EU are addressed in the next section. Despite the hardening of  relations after 2008, 
business continued and energy even featured prominently in the EU-Russia partnership 
for modernization established in 2009. however, negotiations with Ukraine led to a new 
standstill in 2008 demanding EU action, namely mediating between the parties. 
The situation changed considerably after the 2013 Euromaidan movement in 
Ukraine and the ousting of  President yanukovitch after his party rejected a proposal to 
sign a new Association Agreement with the EU. The unfolding of  the Ukrainian crisis led 
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to the imposition of  mutual sanctions between the EU and Russia, namely on sectors 
relevant to energy development, including technology and investment, crating added 
pressure on Moscow to gather support from China and other potential investors. 
Ukraine’s concerns that Russia is seeking to bypass it as transit country has also echoed 
in the EU and pressure has been applied to get Moscow to commit its energy to supply 
Ukrainian pipelines. The EU is committed to support Ukraine in the modernization of  
its infrastructures and energy sectors in general, as well as to mediate between the parties, 
making sure that we do not reach another energy crisis. Moreover, the operationalization 
of  the Baltic pipeline, linking Russia to Germany, reinforced Ukraine’s concerns and 
drive EU member States to question this EU choice. 
EU energy policy choices have largely been contested by Moscow, as has been made 
clear in President Putin’s remarks: 
“I would like to single out that attempts to hold back the energy sector’s development 
for the sake of  any country’s political ambitions are unacceptable. I am referring 
here to the currently fashionable practice of  unilateral sanctions and unjustified res- 
triction of  access to investment resources and advanced technology. This does not 
in any way produce the results these measures’ initiators expected. Nonetheless, the 
authorities in a number of  countries follow a practice of  recommending businesses 
to wind up profitable projects and renounce buying energy supplies at the best prices 
and via the shortest delivery routes. They cite as justification the need for allied 
solidarity and bloc discipline.” (Putin, 2016)
Developing a Common EU Energy Policy
The development of  a common EU energy policy and energy market has been 
perceived a strategic success for the EU in a troubled and difficult context, decisively 
contributing to enhancing the energy security of  European citizens. The EU’s dependence 
on Russian natural gas posed a central source of  insecurity for many Eastern and Central 
European countries3, especially those relying on Ukraine as a transit country (Protasov, 
2010, p. 27). As Russia began to use energy as a political weapon against those former-
Soviet countries who sought closer ties to the Euro-Atlantic institutions, its reliability as 
a natural gas supplier was questioned, propelling the EU to take more forceful action 
towards the development of  means of  assuring its energy security. Among these mea- 
sures, diversification of  supplies (today Russia accounts only for one-third of  Europe’s 
gas), development and improvement of  internal infrastructure for transporting natural 
gas in all desired directions, storage options, have resulted in most member States being 
capable of  withstanding crisis scenarios (Boersma and O’hanlon, 2016). These moves 
have also resulted in greater strategic autonomy in EU foreign policy, as the maintenance 
of  sanctions on Russia due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine shows. 
According to the European Parliament, the EU’s energy policy aims at addressing 
specific energy challenges, including “increasing import dependency, limited diversifica- 
3 Bulgaria, Finland, Slovakia, Romania, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia are particularly dependent on Russian 
natural gas.
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tion, high and volatile energy prices, growing global energy demand, security risks affecting 
producing and transit countries, the growing threats of  climate change, slow progress in 
energy efficiency, challenges posed by the increasing share of  renewables, and the need for 
increased transparency, further integration and interconnection on energy markets” and 
designing measures “to achieve an integrated energy market, security of  energy supply and 
sustainability of  the energy sector” (European Parliament, 2016). The general policy 
framework rests on the comprehensive integrated climate and energy policy adopted by 
the European Council in March 2007 and was further advanced by the European Com- 
mission communication ‘Energy Roadmap 2050’ and the Green paper of  27 March 2013 
on ‘A 2030 framework for climate and energy policies’. The European Council decision of  
2011 of  completing the Internal Energy Market by 2014 has been advancing, namely 
through the adoption of  important regulations such as the Third Energy Package. EU 
regulations have important impacts on how energy companies operate in a common 
regulated space, as the European Commission probe on Gazprom illustrates. 
Moreover, the EU has also focused on strengthening external energy relations, 
meaning that “cross-border cooperation on the part of  the EU with its neighbouring 
countries and creating a wider regulatory area, through regular information exchange on 
intergovernmental agreements and collaboration” (European Parliament, 2016) has 
provided the EU with the necessary information and tools to develop an integrated view 
of  its energy security. As mentioned above, the role of  the Energy Community has been 
particularly salient in achieving regulatory alignment between the EU and neighbour- 
ing countries. Improving security of  energy supply has also been a priority of  the EU, 
requiring member States to keep reserves of  energy for crisis situations. The ongoing 
conflict in Ukraine, further stimulated EU member States to reduce the EU’s energy 
dependence on Russia, requesting that the Commission develop a by June 2014 a com- 
prehensive plan to reduce EU energy dependence. The European Energy Security Stra- 
tegy, proposed by the Commission was approved by the heads of  State of  the EU in 
June 2014 and included “[d]iversifying external energy supplies, upgrading energy infras- 
tructure, completing the EU internal energy market and saving energy […]. The strategy 
also highlights the need to coordinate national energy policy decisions and the importance 
of  speaking with one voice when negotiating with external partners” (European Com- 
mission, 2014).
In the words of  the former European Commission President, José Manuel Barroso 
(cited in European Commission, 2014), the EU has done a lot in the aftermath of  the gas 
crisis 2009 to increase its energy security. yet, it remains vulnerable. The tensions over 
Ukraine again drove home this message. In the light of  an overall energy import depend-
ency of  more than 50% we have to make further steps. The Commission has tabled a 
comprehensive strategy today which will be discussed by EU leaders in June. I count on 
their strong support, since increasing energy security is in all our interest. On energy 
security, Europe must speak and act as one.
In fact, Ukraine has become a focal point of  contention in EU-Russia energy 
relations, as President Putin’s Statements cited above illustrate. The final elements of  the 
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EU’s approach to energy security included increasing energy efficiency; making the best 
use of  the EU’s indigenous energy resources, and research, development. 
Aligning EU and Russian Interests on Energy: the Governance 
Perspective
The article takes a multi-level analysis, to gauge the importance of  a series of  factors 
shaping EU-Russia energy relations, including global dynamics changing global energy 
markets, the institutional changes developing in the EU with the establishment of  a 
common energy policy, and the regional context of  competition between the EU and 
Russia over their shared neighbourhood. The analysis of  how these factors have shaped 
EU and Russian perceptions of  each other’s role in energy security is articulated with the 
historically divergent view of  energy security between producers and consumers, and 
of  their strategies to assure their interests, namely governance and geo-economics 
approaches. In fact, perceptions about security depend on a series of  factors, including 
the efficiency of  channels of  dialogue, the existence of  authoritative discourses about 
what constitutes a threat and receptive audiences to such discourses. The institutionalization 
and regulation of  energy relations provides important means to assure common unders- 
tandings of  energy security and integrated views, between producers, transit countries 
and consumers about what could be done. Moreover, energy security also needs to con- 
sider environmental and development goals and thus could amply benefit from a gover- 
nance approach. 
however, geostrategic readings of  energy and domestic-driven concerns with eco- 
nomic performance and budget deficits dictate politicized views of  energy security. 
Domestic constituencies are more sensible to economic arguments than they are to the 
need for global coordination within international organization. EU-Russia energy rela- 
tions have suffered from similar tensions, as the EU’s attempt to regulate the energy 
sector has lacked the openness to incorporate the concerns of  producing countries, such 
as Russia, and thus has been perceived in Moscow as a political tool of  its own right. The 
European Commission and EU member States are well aware of  the political potential 
of  EU regulations, namely in establishing enabling conditions for EU businesses outside 
EU borders. Thus, energy governance would require a broader global setting, rather than 
just a regional one, to assure a truly multilateral framework for energy management. 
Energy is a central component of  EU-Russia relations, and most likely it will continue 
to be, despite decreasing mutual dependence, resulting from diversification of  global 
energy markets and despite the imposition of  sanctions, which affect EU investments in 
the energy sector in Russia and technology transfers. Over the last decade, EU perceptions 
of  Russia as a problematic energy supplier have shaped to a large extent the EU’s energy 
policy, namely regarding diversification of  sources, storage capacity and solidarity among 
member States. Energy dependence also meant that despite tensions in bilateral relations, 
namely due to Russia’s assertive foreign policy in Eurasia, there was a clear tendency 
among EU member States and institutions towards normalization of  relations, seeking to 
contain economic damage. As the levels of  EU dependence on Russian energy decrease, 
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the negative economic impacts of  sanctions on Russia will be diminished for the EU, 
removing incentives for normalization of  relations. 
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Russia, Oil Energy and Arms
José Félix Ribeiro
Russia’s Energy and Geoeconomy
Russia as Oil and Natural Gas Producer and the Russia/Europe Energy Inter-
dependence 
In 2015, Russia was the world’s top crude oil producer (including light condensates), 
the third oil and other liquids producer (after Saudi Arabia and the USA) and the second 
dry natural gas producer (after the USA). 
That year, oil and natural gas turnover made up around 43% of  the Russian federal 
total budget turnover (EIA, 2016). 
Russia and Europe exhibit a strong energy interdependence – Europe depended on 
oil and natural gas imports from Russia in 30% of  their total imports of  both hydro- 
carbons. And Russia’s exports to Europe constituted 60% of  its total oil exports and 75% 
of  its natural gas exports (EIA, 2016).
Russia and the Potential for Extraction of  Conventional Oil and Natural gas 
Russia possesses 80 thousand million barrels of  proven oil reserves (Oil and Gas 
Journal, 2016 quoted in EIA, 2016), the majority of  the reserves to production being 
located in the Volga-Urals region, stretching to the Caspian Sea (the oldest region in 
production) and to Western Siberia, between the Ural Mountains and the Central Sibe- 
rian Plateau. As shown in Map 1, there are other basins containing significant reserves, 
although located further North, towards the Arctic and, further East, in East Siberia and 
on the Sakhalin Island. 
As to natural gas, Russia holds the world’s largest conventional natural gas reserves, 
which slightly exceeds one quarter of  the total world reserves (32,3 tcm) (BP, 2016, p. 20). 
More than 40% are located in Western Siberia, while other significant fields are located in 
the North and East of  Russia. 
The geography of  oil and natural gas exports and their transit – chart 1 illustrates 
Russia’s oil exports distribution. Germany and the Netherlands stood out in Western 
Europe, Poland in Eastern Europe, Belarus in Eurasia and China in Asia – which, in 
2015, was already the single largest market for Russia, followed by Japan. 
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Map 1. Location of  Russia’s Main Oil Fields 
Source: EIA (2014). Country Profile Russia.
Map 2. Location of  Russia’s Main Natural Gas Fields
Source: EIA (2014). Country Profile Russia.
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Chart 1. Main Markets for Russia’s Oil and Condensates Exports (2015)
Source: EIA (2016).
Chart 2. Main markets for Russia’s natural gas exports (2015)
Source: EIA (2016).
Chart 2, on the other hand, showing the distribution of  natural gas exports, highlights 
the exports to Europe – Germany, Turkey and Italy, and the minor scale of  exports to 
individual markets in Asia (except for Japan), albeit the “Other” share was significant, 
encompassing other markets in Asia. 
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The largest share of  oil exports are made by means of  oil and gas pipelines whose 
internal network – a heirloom from the USSR – stretches onto Europe, which is the case 
of  the Druzhba pipeline (Baltic Pipeline System (see Map 3) and oil terminals such as 
Primorsk (in the Baltic Sea) and Novorossiysk (in the Black Sea).
Natural gas is carried through a vast network of  pipelines – connecting producers, 
Central Asia and the Caucasus (former USSR), and other pipelines more suited for 
exporting to Europe, with a first generation that uses Ukraine as a transit point and, more 
recently, with a new generation that manages to bypass Ukraine, using Belarus and Poland 
(the case of  yamal 1). 
Map 3. Main Oil and Gas Pipelines from Russia to Europe
Source: Austvik (2007).
Russia has in its plans for energy development to ensure a more significant presen- 
ce in the international market of  LNG, which will allow a greater flexibility in terms of  
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redirecting natural gas in accordance with the spot1 market (instead of  long-term 
contracts). At the moment, Russia has a single LNG export terminal, on Sakhalin Island 
in the Pacific (in operation since 2009). There are proposals for new LNG terminals in 
varied stages of  planning and construction, such as: yamal LNG – a project located in 
the yamal Peninsula, in the Arctic (technologically, politically and economically 
challenging); and Shtokman LNG – in the Barents Sea.
Arms and Energy: Two key Industrial Complexes in the Russian 
Economic and Political Transition of  the 1990s 
During the transition years from USSR to Russia, the fate of  four large production 
complexes, inherited from the Soviet period, and which supported a number of  other 
interest groups in the new Russia – the Military-Industrial Complex, the Fuel and 
Energy Complex, the Metallurgy Complex and the Agro-Industrial Complex – was 
significantly different, as well as their visions for the future. We shall emphasize the first 
two complexes. 
During the USSR period, the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) occupied a central 
position in the structure of  production, even absorbing one quarter of  the GDP and 
concentrating the core of  the country’s scientific and technological potential. It combined 
the production of  military and space equipment (Picture 1) with a marked position in the 
production of  certain equipment goods (such as the energy, light and agro and food 
industries) and almost the monopoly of  durable consumer goods (except for automobiles). 
It was hit harshly by the transition to the market economy, a blow from which it failed 
to recover, having seen the armaments acquisitions by the Ministry of  Defense drop to 
68%, between 1991 and 1993, to which were further added the effect of  the fall in 
domestic investment, which impacted the production of  capital – namely durable – 
goods, also hit by the devaluation of  the rouble and the opening of  the market to imports. 
About a third of  the MIC remained in Ukraine, with an emphasis to Space, Missile and 
Electronics Defense.
Diversity in the midst of  the military-industrial complex and the possibility of  
forging partnerships with foreign companies (which is easier to accomplish in the space 
and aerospace industries), rendered hard the effectiveness of  joint lobbying. State support 
to exportations, in the framework of  centralized international marketing, was one of  the 
measures taken to minimize the difficulties of  the moment. The military-industrial 
complex, or at least one share of  it, would favour political powers that betted on increasing 
expenses with defence and the creation of  privileged relations with arms-importing 
countries, even if  it resulted in an aggravation of  tension with the USA.
The fuel and energy complex, particularly in what concerns the oil and gas sectors, 
was the one that saw its position more substantially improved, in the orbit of  giant 
companies – some of  which ensuing from privatisations –, turning into the nuclear 
1 The spot market is a public financial market in which financial assets are traded for immediate delivery, in 
contrast with markets in which delivery is due at a later date, which are known as futures markets.
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centre of  private groups that were formed during the Ieltsin presidency (common 
referred to as the “oligarchs”). Although there may have been different inclinations in its 
midst (for instance, as to how open the sector should be to Western companies), a 
number of  common interests made for internal cohesion: 
 
Picture 1. Military-Industrial Complex – Russia’s “Crown Jewel”
Sources: Adapted from Ministry of  Defence of  the Russian Federation (2017).
•  Prioritising exports and bringing the prices closer to world market prices in the 
dealings with ex-USSR countries, and, internally, favouring the channelling of  
investment to the energy sector instead of  others; vouching for lower tax rates; 
•  An interest in investing abroad so as to ensure a significant and costless participa-
tion in the development of  energy sectors in the former Soviet Republics of  the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, or in the development of  the oil sectors in former 
USSR allies (Libya, Iraq); 
•  Selective opening to investment from Western companies, beginning with periphe- 
ral areas (the Arctic and Sakhalin Island); in the context of  a foreign policy that 
warranted stability in the internal and, above all, external flow of  Russian oil and 
gas, and hence the effort, at that moment, to maintain a good relationship with 
Ukraine, through which was still carried the majority of  exports to Europe, and the 
interest in the pacification of  Chechnya, both producer and node in the Russian oil 
flow network. 
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Energy and Arms: the Turn of  the Millennium
The State Links the Two Complexes Financially: Military-industrial and Fuel 
and Energy
With the rise of  Vladimir Putin to the Presidency of  Russia, a strategy was defined 
centred on the use of  the revenue from the Fuel and Energy Complex and the rents 
which it generated to fund investment in the Military-Industrial Complex, favouring its 
technological competitiveness. This strategy demanded the reduction of  future influence 
from foreign corporate actors on the energy complex, cutting off  at the same time the 
influence on the Russian private groups sector, non-aligned with Kremlin and interested 
in partnerships with foreign companies, namely American companies such as EXXON 
MOBIL. 
The following elements stand out in that new post-2000 orientation: 
•  The State’s energy rents as a crucial element for the funding of  innovation in the 
Military-industrial Complex, which is regarded as the most important asset for its 
international affirmation. At the same time, Russia accomplished this “energy-
arms” liaison through the sale of  armament to oil-producing States that possessed, 
at the time, means for its acquisition without risk of  payment delays. 
•  The value, attached by Russia, to its Euro-Asian centrality in terms of  energy, 
which renders it capable of  selling oil and natural gas both to Europe and to the 
Asia-Pacific, namely to China (which is currently a buyer of  both weapons and 
energy). 
•  The employment of  energy, by Russia, to manage or reinforce its influence on the 
former USSR space – first and foremost, withdrawing from Ukraine its stand as 
transit point to Europe (see the initial propositions of  the Nord Stream and South 
Stream pipelines), which would allow Russia, further ahead, to use the “energy 
weapon” against Ukraine without jeopardising the supply to Europe. Concomitantly, 
it sought to seize partial control of  the production in Central Asia (Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan), placing it in its oil and gas pipeline network, which allows it to 
ensure the fulfilment of  its supply commitments, while the new northern energy 
provinces are not in full operation yet. 
•  The employment of  energy, by Russia, to strengthen its influence on Europe while 
maintaining total control of  the energy supply to the Eastern European States that 
joined NATO and the European Union, and progressively building partnerships 
with “central” European States (namely Germany, Austria and hungary).
•  Russia has been willing to maintain a competition between China and Japan for 
access to Eastern Siberian energy reserves, an orientation which was present 
throughout the Putin presidencies and which would be suspended during the 
Medvedev presidency, apparently favourable to a reinforcement of  relations with 
China. 
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Map 4. Russian Natural Gas Exports to the EU, in 2012 (%)
Source: The Economist (2014).
Russia Face to Face with a Dilemma
Energy geoeconomy in Russia faces a major challenge: energy basins – upon 
which production and exportation of  oil and natural gas by Russia have relied on since the 
60s/70s – located in Volga and particularly in Western Siberia are entering into a phase of  
decline in production (see Chart 3), a decline which might be somewhat postponed should 
the EOR technologies developed by Western companies be given intensive use.
Chart 3. Russia: Decline in Production in the NG Giant Fields of  Siberia  
and its Successors 
Source: Soderbergh (2010).
Overcoming this limitation involves a massive investment in the development of  the 
new Northern provinces in the Arctic border, in Eastern Siberia and in the Far East (see 
Sakhalin Island), as well as the harvesting of  their vast reserves of  shale oil and shale gas. 
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To proceed with the development of  the new fields and the great investment it 
entails without compromising the priority of  applying energy rents in the military-
industrial complex, Russia is forced to seek abroad partners that might invest in that 
development, finding a couple of  those partners in the Asia-Pacific – China and Japan. I 
tis worth point out that a number of  Western oil companies – Exxon Mobil, ENI, Statoil, 
Total, Shell, BP – have negotiated joint exploration and development deals for a number 
of  these new fields, but the sanctions imposed by the USA and the European Union on 
Russia in 2014, following the annexation of  Crimea, halted their participation. 
Russia, Eurasia and the Levant/ Persian Gulf  
The more relevant features of  Russia’s position in these two great producing regions 
are highlighted below: 
•  Russia is faced with the interests of  the former USSR States in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia that possess the energy potential to increase exportations to Europe 
and/or Asia/Pacific, thus contributing to the construction of  a new system of  gas 
pipelines in and from Eurasia and no longer Russiacentric; 
•  Russia has accepted to share influence in Central Asia, in the framework of  a 
partnership agreed with China in the scope of  the Shanghai Cooperation Organi- 
sation, serving a strategy of  global competition with the USA. however, it must 
deal with China’s financial capacity to gain increasing influence in the region; 
•  In Eurasia, Russia is in open conflict with one of  the energy transit States – Ukraine 
–, and has been unable, so far, to count on as a partner one other transit State – 
Turkey. So much so that Turkey has reinforced its role as transit corridor in virtue of  
Georgia’s interest in taking up that position so as to gain more autonomy from Russia. 
•  If  China has a Eurasian strategy to “protect itself ” from USA’s naval superiority, 
Russia, in its turn, refuses to be limited to the Eurasian space, and has a Southern 
strategy reaching out to the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, as a condition to 
preserve its status as global power. 
•  Located in the Persian Gulf, Iran, enjoying a vast Indian coastline and, at the same 
time, bordering on the Caspian Sea and former Soviet Central Asia, is a key partner 
in Eurasian strategies that aim to challenge the interests of  the USA, and not only 
protect themselves from the disparity in naval capacities, which further benefit the 
USA (the case of  China). 
Russia, China and Japan – Russia’s Geoeconomic Shifts in the Energy Sector
In the years of  2013 to 2015, Russia has undertaken a set of  new orientations 
respecting energy geoeconomy (and geopolitics). These orientations have been put to 
practice, not only by virtue of  commercial options, but also as a response to geopolitical 
processes taking place in Eurasia (vide the Ukrainian crisis) and in the Persian Gulf  and 
the Levant (vide negotiations with Iran over the nuclear programme) and to geoeconomic 
processes underway in the Eastern Mediterranean (for instance, the discovery of  gas in 
Israel and Cyprus).
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These new orientations entailed a greater focus, by Russia, on energy supply in the 
Asia-Pacific, a greater relevance ascribed to the energy rapport with Turkey and Greece, 
and the improvement of  relations with Saudi Arabia. 
In May 2014, Russia has finally accepted to negotiate a NG supply contract with China, 
with lower prices than previously intended, and a 30-year agreement was signed between 
the companies GAZPROM and the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC). 
Under its first phase, Russia will supply China 38 bcm per year of  natural gas, starting in 
2018. Future phases could increase this volume to 65 bcm per year by 2020 (EIA, 2014).
The contract links the natural gas price to international crude oil prices and operates as 
a take-or-pay scheme (according to which, CNPC must pay for the gas even if  it decides not 
to receive it). Additional production necessary to satisfy the deal will come from Eastern 
Siberia and will entail the construction of  a new infrastructure – the Power of  Siberia gas 
pipeline – which will transport gas towards South, to China, and towards East, to an LNG 
terminal in Russia’s Far East. Months later, in November 2014, in the margins of  the APEC 
meeting in Beijing, an agreement was reached to increase the volume of  natural gas to be 
supplied and, at the same time, a currency swap favouring the Chinese yuan. 
Resuming the strengthening of  relations with Japan, which was a feature of  the 
Putin presidencies, in October of  2014, the Russian government proposed to Japan the 
construction of  an underwater pipeline linking Eastern Siberia and the hokkaido Island, 
in the North of  the Japanese archipelago (Map 5), i.e. “balancing” the reinforcement of  
the relations with China with an opening for Japan (and bolstering the already existing 
relationship through projects Sakhalin I and II).
Map 5. Project for an Underwater Gas Pipeline Linking Russia and Japan
Source: Gazprom (2015).
Russia, Ukraine and Turkey 
Turkey as an Energy Hub Favoured by the USA and the EU 
The implosion of  the USSR and the Independence of  the States of  the Caucasus and 
Central Asia surrounding the Caspian Sea, where the USSR had important exploration and 
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development operations of  energy production, transformed the Caspian oil and gas field 
into a new frontier which the “Anglo-Saxon” oil companies ChEVRON, EXXON MOBIL 
e CONOCO PhILIPS, BP. BG, and ShELL, in partnership with other IOCs such as ENI 
and TOTAL and with State-owned companies established in those new States, endeavoured 
to occupy. At the same time, in Russia, those companies became closer to the new oligarchs 
controlling oil enterprises undergoing privatization processes. This first phase corresponds 
roughly to the period of  the Ieltsin presidency in the Russian Federation. 
The Clinton administration would orientate the action of  these companies in the 
Caspian basin, so as to free that new border from the monopoly of  the infrastructures of  
oil and gas transport inherited from the USSR, which crossed the Russian territory. Tur-
key, given its unique position as “ceiling” of  the Persian Gulf  and “bridge” to the Cauca-
sus, came to occupy a central place in the North-American geopolitical and geoeconomic 
strategy, in a new Great Energy Province. Thus, geoeconomically, Turkey saw its own 
position increase in value. 
Strengthening of  Ties between Russian and Turkey in the Field of  Energy
In 2015, Russia gave up the construction of  the South Stream and, alternatively, went 
ahead with a pipeline project that would also bypass Ukraine while crossing Turkey, onto 
Southern Europe. 
Map 6. Russia – From the South Stream to the Turkey Stream
Source: Flores (2014).
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This new route ascribes a much more significant role to Greece as a transit coun- 
try, and places Russia in the position of  having energy relations with two States under 
strong bilateral tensions –Turkey and Greece (vide the issue of  Cyprus), both members of  
NATO. Furthermore, by shifting the gas pipeline route to the South, it competes more 
easily with hypothetical projects by Israel, of  use the future production of  the great natu-
ral gas fields of  the Eastern Mediterranean, in a joint enterprise with Cyprus, to supply 
Europe. Let us recall the blossoming of  military relations between Israel and Greece, 
following the crisis in the former’s relation with Turkey. 
Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia 
In addition to these choices regarding energy relations, in July of  2015 Russia 
cemented another bond – no direct connection to Ukraine in this case. We have in mind 
the visit to Moscow of  the Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman, son of  King Salman bin 
Abdul Aziz, Vice-Prime-Minister and Minister of  Defence of  Saudi Arabia, accompanied 
by the Ministers of  Foreign Affairs and of  Oil. 
Let us bear in mind that Russia’s main partners in the Persian Gulf  and Levant have 
been Iran and Syria, whereas Saudi Arabia is a geopolitical rival of  Iran’s and has been 
involved in undertakings that strive for the overthrow of  the current Syrian regime. Saudi 
Arabia is by tradition a regional ally of  the USA and, in terms of  the oil market, it leads 
in OPEC a policy of  production cuts that has contributed to a decrease in oil prices, 
impairing all of  Russia’s economic strategy.
On this occasion, a number of  commercial, financial and technological agreements, 
concerning oil and armament, were signed. We shall highlight two of  them in the field of  
economy: (1) the Saudi decision to make huge direct investments in Russia (10 billion 
dollars) and (2) the contract for the acquisition of  nuclear power plants from Rosatom. 
In view of  an improvement of  relations between the USA and Iran, and following 
the signing of  an agreement over Iran’s nuclear programme, in the framework of  
negotiations between Iran and P5+1, Russia has become closer to Saudi Arabia, which is 
interested in being able to count on Russian support in a future effort of  containing Iran, 
in addition to its traditional partnership with the USA. 
The importance, for Russia, of  its ties with Saudi Arabia, is derived from one simple 
matter: 
The price of  oil is crucial to the revenue of  Russia’s federal budget and, in that sense, 
to the decision of  what share of  it may be channelled by the State to modernise the 
Military-Industrial Complex, which in the future will be forced to compete, not only with 
that of  the USA, but also with that of  China. 
OPEC, despite its more reduced capacity to determine prices, as a cartel remains a 
relevant actor, and Saudi Arabia still plays a central role in OPEC’s actions.
For this reason, in the last few months, Russia has attempted to intervene in the 
OPEC inside negotiations (namely between Iran and Saudi Arabia) in support of  a policy 
of  combined production cuts intended to spike prices. 
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Conclusion
Energy takes up a key role in Russia’s Grand Strategy, not as far as energy security is 
concerned, as is the case with the European Union, but as an instrument for the 
establishment of  partnerships that allow it to gain more autonomy and influence over the 
USA, and more significance in the face of  the emerging powers – China and India. 
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Some Features of  the Russian Foreign 
Policy Approach to Europe 
Franco Tomassoni
Introduction
In its relationship with Europe, Russia has been taking advantage of  Europe’s 
incapacity to diversify its energy suppliers in a context in which domestic energy sources 
within European borders are being depleted. By following this path, and in the absence 
of  a common European energy strategy, Russia has been an effortless winner. In fact, if  
one of  the concerns of  European energy security is the diversification of  suppliers, 
iterated in numerous documents and studies (Commission of  the European Communities, 
2000; European Commission, 2014; European Commission; Directorate-General for 
Energy and Market Observatory for Energy, 2016), it is also a fact that this strategy has 
not always been carried out with resolve. 
The purpose of  this chapter is to analyse how Russia’s investment is connected to its 
ambition as a global power, and how this affects its relation with the European Union. 
We regard Russia as a global power solely in the sense that it is a decisive player in many 
geopolitical scenarios, capable of  being a model for many States. The main idea that 
presides over the proposed analysis is that Russia on its own cannot change international 
balances, though it can be decisive in helping others do so. 
If  we consider the theoretical distinction between conservative and reactionary 
powers, and that between international homogeneous and heterogeneous systems (Aron, 
2002), we have a hard time interpreting the case of  Russia. The post-Second World War 
international system acknowledges Russia’s central position in the global order. On the 
other hand, Russia has the ambition to change the geopolitical configuration of  some 
regions, such as the Middle East or the Arctic. Moreover, there are processes redefining 
the world order that transcend that same Russian ambition, in which the main agent of  
change is China. In that context, one question requires elucidation: how does this affect 
Europe? 
While the corollary of  the argument defended here is that Russia’s energy resources 
are what grants it its capacity to be a global power, the weaknesses of  this State cannot 
be overlooked: Russia does not have a strong domestic economy or a developed domestic 
market and, unlike during the Soviet Union period, it does not have a multidimensional 
geopolitical capacity. By this we mean the productive and technological capacity to project 
consumption and development models beyond its borders, as well as the capacity to 
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propose an alternative model of  economic organisation. It lacks a social and political 
model capable of  inspiring other States. 
In line with this consideration, in the foreign policy of  the Russian Federation it is 
possible to find a dimension of  power very similar to the concept of  “power deflation” 
proposed by Talcott Parsons to describe those situations in which authority can only be 
asserted through instruments of  constriction (Eckstein, 1980) – in this case, energy 
resources. This being the argument defended, the understanding of  Russian foreign 
policy cannot avoid considering the historical circumstances that led Putin to power and 
that represent a nationalist return around which a part of  the Russian elite, following the 
failure of  the 90s, is organised. This view, based on a strongly nationalist political dis- 
course, also represents the power block sustaining Putin, as well as the oppositions to the 
current Russian government (Savino, 2014). To this end, it is appropriate to take a look 
at what type of  relationship exists between Russian economic and political power and its 
energy sector. 
The first part of  this chapter will adopt a historical-political perspective to describe 
Russian foreign policy, whereas the second part will focus specifically on economic and 
geopolitical issues.
A Few Preliminary Considerations
Before outlining the key passages of  Putin’s rise to power and highlighting the 
features of  critical change in Russian foreign policy, some elements of  the context in 
which this country operates should be mentioned. Following the 1990s, a new situation 
in international relations looms. The unipolar moment, the assertion of  a single develop- 
ment model with only one superpower in the lead, without any adversary (Brezinski, 
1997), leaves room for events that run in parallel: a redefinition, imposed by the political 
and economic reality, of  the strategic projection of  the USA and the emergence of  new 
players working towards the accumulation of  systemic capacity and global ambitions. In 
order to be well understood, the changes that took place within the apparatus of  Russian 
government and power should be read in light of  this context. This is quite noticeable in 
the proliferation and revitalization of  numerous international organisations, carried out 
by many States seeking autonomy at different levels vis-à-vis the international organisa- 
tions created around the USA. 
The Russian Federation is involved in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), 
the Central Asia Cooperation Organisation (CACO), the Commonwealth of  Independ-
ent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), is a member of  the 
UN Security Council, the G8 and the G20. Besides, it has bilateral cooperation agree-
ments with European countries and the European Union (EU) aimed at consolidating a 
common economic and security space. Furthermore, Russia’s presence in the BRICS 
allows it to project its economy worldwide and to manage its presence, in a multilateral 
context, in several regions of  the globe. however, it is clear that this alliance is deeply 
contradictory and far from representing a global political project between strategically 
homogeneous actors. On the contrary, it is a coalition between players organised around 
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subjects where they can come to agreement, using this framework of  cooperation as a 
tool of  mutual tactical-strategic manipulation1. 
The consolidation of  Russia’s global role also implies stability at regional level. Its 
area of  influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, a region marked by the presence of  
many actors, is of  vital interest. however, this region in particular presents a high risk of  
instability for Russia: the expansion of  NATO to the east, which includes the former 
Soviet republics, or the instability in the south-western border, not only in Georgia but 
especially with the crisis in Ukraine, the height of  the conflict between Russia and the 
Euro-Atlantic axis. This gives rise to contradictions in the relationship between Europe 
and Russia – in 2016, 41% of  the Russian gas destined for Europe passed through 
Ukraine (European Commission; Directorate-General for Energy and Market Observa-
tory for Energy, 2016).
Finally, two more aspects must be summed up. First, the comatose State of  Russian 
economy in the 1990s, with the 1998 default (Putin becomes President of  the Russian 
Federation the following year), a condition of  which Russia got out ambiguously, alter- 
nating between periods of  growth and periods of  recession (Chiodo and Owyang, 2002). 
Second, the demographic crisis, which made life expectancy drop by ten years, immediately 
after the fall of  the Soviet Union (Shlapentokh, 2005), and which has continued until 
today. 
The geopolitical scenario and global ambition developed by the power block centred 
around Putin must be read through its capacity to manage an unfavourable context. This 
capacity was precisely having been able to turn this situation to its own advantage. To this 
end, the weapon of  energy resources played a central role, and it is through a coordinated 
policy on the geopolitics of  oil and gas that Russia became key in defining the geopolitical 
order, by asserting itself  as a decisive player in important landscapes, from the Middle 
East to Europe and Asia. 
however, the geostrategic prominence of  Russia has increased substantially over the 
years. Although many events in the international scene had the capacity to speed up a 
number of  processes (for example, the economic crisis that weakened both the USA and 
European integration; or the crisis in Ukraine that speeded up the rapprochement 
between Russia and China), Russia’s emergence as a global actor has been prepared and 
constructed knowingly ever since the second half  of  the 1990s. 
1 This contradictory aspect is represented by China and the financial institutions the BRICS have developed. 
China simultaneously takes part in the Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank (a project that excludes the 
USA but that involves its European and Asian allies), in the Asian Development Bank (a project centred 
on the USA), and in the BRICS New Development Bank (which should fund the “New Silk Route”, 
against which India, another important BRICS partner, has already presented an alternative project). 
Besides these and other contradictions, the change in the Brazilian political scene renders this coalition 
even more problematic. 
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Putin, Medvedev, Moscow, Saint Petersburg: Transition to the 
“Putin System” 
The Russian political system cannot come to terms with the use of  categories whose 
root lies in the history and political development of  Western Europe. The categories that 
define it are “sovereign democracy” and “verticalisation of  power”. The concept of  sov-
ereign democracy instituted by the Kremlin has three main implications: first, at the 
centre of  the international political system is the State, not other actors such as NGOs or 
multinational companies, which assume parity between States, despite their national 
order; second, it makes a distinction between States that are completely sovereign and 
those that are not, which means the second cannot fully participate in the dynamics of  
international change; third, it is a model used by the Russian Federation to win the loyalty 
of  the States of  Central Asia, with which it shares economic, institutional and cultural 
projects (ISPI, 2011). This concept is also marked by the powerful and profoundly cen-
tralised bureaucratic machine of  the Russian Federation. This means the State controls 
the strategic sectors of  the country and manages the oligarchs’ fight for the acquisition 
of  energy resources and the industrial sectors. All political power is in the hands of  the 
government, with a decisive role for the president (ISPI, 2011). 
These peculiarities may apparently also be features of  other States, and the realist 
perspective they hint at is not specific to Russia. Nevertheless, the need to incorporate 
these guidelines into State management is also part of  a strategy and of  a process of  
constitution of  the Russian State, as well as of  the formation of  its elites. In order to 
understand them, it is necessary to take a look at the historical-political matrix that 
generates them. 
With the end of  the USSR, the Russian Federation lives a time of  extreme economic 
and political instability: two attempted coups (1993 and 1998), the first Chechen War 
(1994-1996) and a default in 1998. Rampant capitalism and liberalisations leading a small 
group of  oligarchs to power dominate the country. Furthermore, a formerly great power 
becomes a territory to be conquered by several criminal gangs. In the 1990s, the Interior 
Minister estimates that 40% of  private companies, 60% of  State companies and 50% of  
banks are controlled by organised crime (Rahr and Pachomov, 1998). Out of  the ensem-
ble of  this organized crime and the old structures of  Soviet power comes the oligarchic 
system governing the country from the end of  the Gorbachev era to the Putin era, 
known as the yeltsin family.
The highlighted categories are affirmed in opposition to this situation, which is also 
from where Putin emerges. When, in the summer of  1999, yeltsin appoints the Prime 
Minister, everything seems to continue the oligarchic type of  politics. No one could 
imagine that a man who had grown among the administration of  former Leningrad and 
had been successively called to Moscow by the same yeltsin – before as head of  the 
presidency’s administration services (a kind of  shadow cabinet, central in the manage-
ment of  power) and, later, as head of  the FSB (successor to the KGB) – could become 
the “snake within the family”. 
 idn cadernos 121
however, in no time Vladimir Vladimirovich’s intentions are well understood. On 
his arrival to the Kremlin, Putin puts things clearly: politics is one thing, the economy and 
business are another, and the only possible way of  bringing these two together is by 
subordinating the economic order to geopolitical demands. Businessmen meddling in 
State issues do not have an auspicious future ahead of  them; the others are entitled 
freedom of  action, agreeing to avoid any interference in the Russian Federation’s strategy 
to return to the international scene. 
This is how the oligarchs in the State administration are replaced by men sharing the 
same view as Putin, who chooses those who were close to him during his experience in 
the administration of  Saint Petersburg, as well as those closer to him in his career as KGB 
and FSB agent (the so-called siloviki, a term used to designate former agents who were 
part of  the information services during the Soviet era). The relationship with Medvedev 
should also be seen in light of  these facts. The result of  this policy, which someone 
describes as State “de-privatisation”, was a clear division between political and economic 
power, which aroused energies that influenced economic development in the first years 
of  the 2000s (Tretjakov, 2008).
The return of  the country’s strategic sectors to State control is the main turning 
point for a renaissance of  the Russian Federation as a global power. Energy resources 
play a crucial role in this dynamic: the Putin transition affected the main State companies, 
namely in the energy sector, such as Gaznovaya Promyshlennost (Gazprom). In the 
1990s, Gazprom had to resist the privatisation process. Anyhow, the gold share stayed 
with the State (38%, the same percentage kept until 2004). In the first year of  the 2000s, 
the government of  the Russian Federation made several operations and managed a share 
of  over 50% in the capital. From 2000 on, the administration changed. The former 
president appointed by Gorbachev at the time of  Gazprom’s creation was replaced by 
Medvedev and the trustee was immediately replaced by Miller, a former colleague of  
Putin’s in the administration of  Saint Petersburg.
Political Power and Energy Resources: the Case of  Gazprom as 
a Geopolitical Tool
The Russian Federation is the world’s largest gas exporter and second largest oil 
exporter. Its gas reserves account for over 17% of  the world’s reserves, whereas its oil 
reserves account for approximately 6%. More than 50% of  its exports are energy resour- 
ces. 70% of  the production of  these two resources is exported (BP, 2016). The strength 
of  Putin’s economy and of  the Russian Federation as an energy superpower is based on 
this aspect, which also entails its dependence on the buying and transit countries. In line 
with important studies on energy security (yergin, 2006), Russia is moving towards the 
diversification of  its buyers. 
The largest Russian company is Gazprom, which controls 95% of  the reserves, 90% 
of  the production, owns the pipelines and manages most of  the upstream. This company 
was born in 1989 with Gorbachev’s decision to merge the Oil and Gas Ministries. The 
chairman of  this State company at the time was Chernomyrdin, former Deputy Prime 
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Minister in charge of  Fuel and Energy and Prime Minister of  the Russian Federation 
between 1993 and 1998. The President of  the Board of  Directors back then was Vyakhi- 
rev. The importance of  this company for Russian geopolitics is obvious. 
Gas exports to Europe in 2015 represented approximately 82% of  the Russian Fede- 
ration’s gas exports, which includes EU countries, Switzerland, Serbia and Turkey (BP, 
2016). It is interesting to take a look at the disaggregated data of  exports: 23.4% to Ger-
many, 13.5% to Turkey, 12.4% to Italy, 5% to France (BP, 2016)2. Europe’s centrality for 
the exportation of  Russian gas and for the Russian economy is clear. The geopoliti- 
cal importance of  this trade is also clear, since Europe is not a homogeneous whole, to 
which is added the Turkish variable. however, Russia’s tendency to turn east (IEA, 2009) 
is also obvious, particularly following the crisis in Ukraine.
In 2012, China increased its Russian gas imports in over 33%, an interesting number 
considering China’s gas demand grows every year (Asianews, 2013). Regarding oil, in the 
last 5 years, Russian exports to Beijing have increased more than 100% (42% only in the 
first semester of  2016), making Russia overtake Saudi Arabia in supplying China (RT, 
2016). For the Russian Federation, an expansion to the east also has the purpose of  
diversifying its buyers and competing with USA’s exports, which may eventually be 
implemented, jeopardising Russia’s centrality in the common European energy market. 
As can be seen, Gazprom lies at the heart of  business between the Russian State and its 
partners. 
Although the axis Kremlin-Gazprom is not born with Putin – Chernomyrdin and 
Vyakhirev had been allies in the 1995 elections with the party “Our home Russia”, 
renamed in the media as “Our home Gazprom” –, during his presidency this State 
company becomes a key tool in the conduct of  foreign affairs (Grazioli, 2010). It can be 
safely said that energy resources are one of  the key vectors of  Russian foreign policy and 
Gazprom its privileged instrument. This company is a real global player. It does not 
merely deal with the upstream processes: acquisition of  the rights to exploration, extrac- 
tion, production, processing, distribution and marketing. With the hundreds of  companies 
it manages and its subsidiaries, this company is present in the media and financial sectors, 
both in Russia and in the rest of  the world. 
With its policy of  diversifying buyers and investing in long-term projects, Gazprom 
develops close relations both with State companies and private entities. In 2005, the Blue 
Stream pipeline between Russia and Turkey is fully functioning. In 2006, the Russian 
company signs the South Stream memorandum with the Italian company ENI, a project 
that would end up not being pursued but whose goals are today being redesigned within 
the scope of  other infrastructural projects. That same year, preparations for the offshore 
platform in the Barents Sea begin – a field of  gas reserves that, with the Nord Stream, 
will be sent to Germany. The French Total and the Swedish Statoilhydro are partners in 
this project (Grazioli, 2010). The first pipeline of  the Nord Stream was inaugurated in 
2011, the second in 2012. Gazprom holds a 51% share in the company that manages this 
2 Percentages calculated by the author, based on the data in BP (2016).
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pipeline (Nord Stream AG) and has German, French and Dutch partners. Moreover, 
Gazprom increases the production of  LNG, liquefied natural gas, and in 2005 sends its 
first cargo to the USA, in 2009 it signs a supply contract with Shell until 2028. Besides, 
there is cooperation with the former Soviet countries and other Asian countries. Finally, 
the agreements with Latin-American companies should not be forgotten.
It is evident how Gazprom is involved with the major economic regions of  the 
world, having long-term trade and cooperation agreements, as well as pipelines and off-
shore platforms, both with State and private companies. This global presence, which 
expands from the complex framework of  the Russian Federation’s foreign policy strat-
egy, equips it with an important geopolitical tool. In fact, one of  the outcomes of  the 
Putin transition is the implementation of  restrictions on foreign companies and on the 
exploration rights of  private companies, which further reiterates the concept of  “sover-
eign democracy” highlighted above. Plus, to reinforce this strategy, a series of  new pipe-
line projects are underway, aiming at the diversification of  transit countries so as to avoid 
those that might create problems for the gas trade. In this regard, Gazprom has made it 
public, even if  not officially, that it does not intend to renew the agreement with Ukraine, 
which expires in 2019, on the transit of  resources into Europe (Floros, 2016a). 
These considerations do not concern the relationship between political power and 
energy industry alone, but also the centrality of  the energy sector in the economic 
projection of  the Russian State vis-à-vis other economic sectors. Dependence on energy 
exports is two-sided in this specific case: if, on the one hand, the close link between the 
geopolitical project and energy resources is at the core of  the new centrality of  this 
country in the international system, it is also true that the Russian economy, dependent 
on the energy market, is extremely susceptible to the changing prices of  these resources 
in the world market, as well as to the laws of  supply and demand. At the same time, the 
centrality of  energy resources in Russia’s economy, reflected in the orientations of  this 
State on economic and industrial policies, keeps other economic sectors from thriving. 
A piece of  extremely relevant information: data from the World Bank indicate that tax 
revenue equals 11% of  Russian GDP (World Bank, 2016), whereas tax revenue from the 
energy sector corresponds to 51% of  federal taxes (Sabitova and Shavaleyeva, 2015).
Main Aspects in the Development of  the Russian Economy 
between the 2008 Crisis and the Agreement between the OPEC 
and non-OPEC Countries 
It has become clear, so far, that energy resources are one of  the key aspects of  
Russian foreign policy. Not only because they are a weapon in the geopolitical level, but 
also because the power block leading Russia today is formed around the interests of  the 
energy market, and also a crucial part of  the State budget. Therefore, it makes sense to 
try and discern how this political and economic organisation, influencing Moscow’s 
international positioning, reacted before the development of  the international energy 
market.
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(1) In the early 2000s, Russia Appears to be in an Encouraging Economic Situation, 
Owing to the Constant Rise in the Price of  Energy Resources. 
Between 2000 and the first semester of  2008, the Russian economy grows between 
5.1% and 7.2%. The increase in oil prices and the economic reforms, namely 
those concerning the tax system for companies, contribute to this growth. In 
2007, Goldman Sachs publishes, as it does since 1997, the Growth Environment 
Score, a rating of  the emerging economies, and the Russian Federation comes 
first among the BRICS economies considering the positivity of  its economic 
indicators (Banca Intesa, 2008). 
(2) The economic crisis affects the global search for energy. The seriousness of  the 
crisis in Europe has direct impact on Russian economy. 
In May 2008, Gazprom’s market capitalisation was still over $360 billion, although at 
the end of  the year it was only slightly above $5.9 billion, with a loss of  more 
than 74% in the MICEX index for Moscow’s stock exchange (Gazprom, 2011). 
In May 2008 Gazprom came in third place in terms of  its market capitalisation, 
after General Electric and China Mobile. however, that year its shares decreased 
by more than 13%, reaching a value of  just above $100 each. However, number 
one in the company, Aleksei Miller, declared in 2008 that in 7-10 years Gazprom 
would be the first company worldwide in terms of  market capitalization, 
increasing its share value to $1000 billion (Il Sole 24 Ore, 2008). Ten years on, we 
can say that is not how things went and, as indicated by the data published by the 
Russian rating agency RIA, Gazprom has lost its first place among the 100 largest 
Russian companies to Rosneft, going down to third, with a market capitalisation 
of  $59.9 billion (Sputnik, 2017). 
(3) An analysis of  the impact of  sanctions to Russia following the crisis in Ukraine 
and the events in Crimea shows contradictory factors. First of  all, these sanctions 
did not affect the trade of  energy resources, which was much more affected by 
the low prices of  oil. Second, the sanctions mainly affected the Russian food 
sector, largely dependent on imports, which led to an increase in prices (Boaretto, 
2016). As a counter-trend effect, in 2015, Russia overtook the USA’s production 
of  wheat (Rossi, 2016). Third, Russia’s reaction to these sanctions triggered a 
debate within the elite with possible interesting repercussions for the energy 
sector. Not only is data on wheat production of  interest, but also the fact that 
agricultural exports were higher than the exportation of  weapons. The sanctions 
are making part of  the Russian elite change the economic model centred on the 
export of  oil and gas. At least this is the intention of  the CEO of  Sberbank, the 
main Russian bank, who points to the need of  changing the drivers of  the 
economy, concerned as he is with the depletion of  reserves. Countering this view 
is the current Energy Minister, according to whom hydrocarbons will remain the 
basis of  world power during the next three decades, while reserves will be able to 
account for domestic needs and exports for the next 40 years (Rossi, 2016). 
Whether or not there is a substantial change in the Russian economic model, the 
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sanctions will make Russia’s turn to east even more accentuated. however, 
Russia’s problem with the east remains, i.e. to not become dependent on China. 
To this end, Rosneft has sealed agreements with Indian State companies (Reuters, 
2016).
(4) The Russian economic crisis of  2014/2015 and the energy market. The agreement 
between OPEC and non-OPEC countries represents a turning point for the 
global energy market and can revert the Russian economic crisis. As argued, the 
agreement between OPEC and non-OPEC countries is an attempt at international 
cooperation between producers with the aim of  regaining balance in the energy 
market. In this agreement it was decided to cut production by 1.2 million barrels 
a day. Although the rise in prices following the agreement was ambiguous3, we 
are far from a scenario in which oil prices are reaching 30 dollars, as happened in 
the beginning of  2016. Before this scenario, it is important to sum up some of  
the key events happening in the Russian economy during the last two years. The 
low oil prices starting halfway through 2014, in a combined effect with the 
sanctions, weakened the Russian economy tremendously, extending its crisis until 
2016, when an opposite trend can be noticed. An important piece of  data: 
inflation in 2015 was approximately 13% and the national currency depreciated 
to its lowest level, with an exchange value of  84 RUB/USD on 21 January 2016 
(Floros, 2016a). This currency market scenario is even more disastrous when 
compared to that at the end of  2016, when an exchange value of  85RUB/USD 
made the Russian Central Bank, in just one night, raise the interest rates from 
6.5% to 17% as a measure to save its own currency (Scott, 2016). It is a fact: with 
the low prices of  Brent (in January 2016 prices were approximately 30$/b4), 
Russia was faced with the possibility of  making its own economy lose $200 
million a day, $70 billion a year, the equivalent to its national reserve fund (Scott, 
2016). The implications for an economy that gets over 50% of  its revenue from 
the energy sector prefigure a possible default scenario. Let us bear in mind that 
the Russian economy had, in 2015, a negative performance of  3.8%. However, 
this situation was reversed in the second half  of  2016 through a slight increase 
in oil prices. The movement of  the dollar in the stock exchange was also a con- 
tainment factor. The exchange between $/€ stabilised in January 2016 (Florosb, 
2016) and, at the end of  2015, the Federal Reserve made public its decision to 
increase the interest rates in 2016, as it did in fact, which marked the beginning 
of  a strong dollar phase (RT, 2016). This scenario marked by a strong dollar, 
a weak rouble and a low oil price is not necessarily negative for Russia in the 
short term. Russian companies pay their expenses in (weak) roubles and sell oil 
3 On 30 November 2016, Brent crude closed at 50.44 $/b and on 31 January 2017 at 55.70 $/b. At the first 
market session of  2017 it opened at 57.05 $/b, but the markets’ enthusiasm quickly died away, as this did 
not have the expected effect, i.e. a constant rise in prices. 
4 Future Petrolio Brent – Lug 2017 (LCON7), 2017. Available at: https://it.investing.com/commodities/
brent-oil-historical-data [Accessed on 8 March 2017].
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in the global market receiving (strong) dollars. This happened in the first half  
of  2016 and throughout that year the rouble appreciated to an exchange value of  
61 RUB/USD in January 20175. An important turn for the Russian economy and 
the appreciation of  the rouble was the announcement and preparation of  the 
30th of  November OPEC meeting for the reduction of  oil production throughout 
2016. In 2016, the rouble appreciated due to an abatement of  pressure from the 
currency market, Russian inflation decreased, exports increased and the indus- 
trial output increased (World Bank, 2017). These improvements in the Russian 
economy are not stable, since they are dependent on the energy market. however, 
the agreement between OPEC and non-OPEC countries was important not only 
for the global energy market but also geopolitically. The most interesting fact is 
that Saudi Arabia is reversing its own policy of  low oil prices and converging 
with Iran, its historical rival, and that Russia is complying with this agreement. 
The rise in oil prices also helps the sector of  unconventional gas production in 
the USA. Many uncertainties clearly remain, beginning with the relationship 
between the US administration and Iran, which will be an important test rig for 
the relations with Russia.
Russia-EU and Pipeline Geopolitics
Until now, some points are clear: Russia’s international goals are closely linked to the 
energy market, the crisis in the energy market had strong repercussions in the Russian 
economy, Moscow came out of  this crisis in a frail State without, however, having 
changed its policy strongly centred on the oil and gas trade. how, then, has this power 
configuration related to Europe? To answer this question, it is important to reconstruct 
the several stages into which the trade of  energy resources between Russia and the EU is 
organised, considering that this is the sector capable of  sparking more geopolitical 
tensions. 
(1) One of  the goals pursued by Russia is the diversification, not only of  its buyers, 
but also of  its transit routes. The South Stream project, before failing to succeed 
in view of  Bulgaria’s unavailability, had been envisaged with this in mind. 
Promoted and funded by Gazprom, ENI, EDF and Wintershall, crossing the 
Black Sea, it proposed to carry gas directly to the consumers of  southern and 
central Europe, bypassing Ukraine. Although this project was aimed at changing 
the transit routes, it did not solve the question of  diversifying the sources for 
Europe. 
(2) In opposition to the South Stream, a flag project was launched by the EU: 
Nabucco, a pipeline aimed at carrying gas from Azerbaijan to Austria. This would 
have only partially solved European concerns about diversifying its suppliers, 
since it would not have carried enough gas to constitute a greater autonomy in 
5 Grafici XE Currency: USD a RUB, 2016. Available at: http://www.xe.com/it/currencycharts/?from=US
D&to=RUB&view=1y [Accessed on 8 March 2017]
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relation to Russia. Furthermore, extraction and transport from the Shah Deniz 
field in Azerbaijan (led by British Petroleum) does not seem to be financially 
sustainable, a shortfall added by a lack of  immediate capital (Floros, 2012). Then, 
a hypothesis was formulated, according to which the countries involved in this 
project, together with other EU countries, would invest in the Trans-Caspian 
pipeline (TCP), which would ensure the supply to the EU countries of  gas from 
the Caucasian republics. The legal status of  the Caspian Sea, however, is not 
defined and, for a pipeline to be built, all countries bathed by this sea (among 
which, the Russian Federation) would have to give their approval to the project. 
Moreover, quite problematic for the TCP, the only pipeline that made the 
Nabucco project financially sustainable is the role of  Turkmenistan, which has 
signed agreements to make its own gas transit into Russia. 
(3) The Nabucco project failed and the group of  companies operating in the Azeri 
field opted for the TAP (Trans-Adriatic Pipeline) project. This pipeline passes 
through Turkey to get to Greece, Albania and then Italy. however, this pipeline 
does not have a high transport capacity, which contradicts the European strategic 
goal of  diversifying its sources (Rodrigues, L. and Ribeiro, J. F., 2011). Although 
there are many destination countries for the gas transported by the TAP, the 
amount of  transported gas is significantly smaller than what was predicted in the 
Nabucco project. This strengthens the Russian position because it does not 
restrict it to the European market, it deprives Eastern European countries of  
access to alternative suppliers and allows Russia the possibility of  consolidating 
its own relationship with the countries of  Southeast Europe, excluded from the 
Southern Energy Corridor. Looking coldly at the facts, it is not risky to State that 
Russia won the geopolitical struggle between Nabucco and the South Stream, 
since, although both projects did not materialise, the absence of  a concerted 
European policy for diversifying its suppliers is patent. Moreover, the strategic 
lines of  the South Stream are present, within a different geopolitical context, 
with the progress in the planning of  the Turkish Stream. As is the case with every 
pipeline, the Turkish Stream defines industrial and foreign policy relations. This 
project, which had been frozen following Turkey’s shoot-down of  a Russian 
fighter, was resumed due the rapprochement between Moscow and Ankara 
following the attempted coup in Turkey. The Turkish Stream in particular reflects 
the contradiction of  the political and military relations within NATO, between 
Turkey and the USA on the one hand, and the economic and energetic interests 
between Turkey and Russia on the other. This contradiction might extend to the 
European transit countries. however, what is still not clear – and here one of  the 
important futures for the European energy system is at stake – is whether the 
Turkish Stream will take the decision of  Continental Europe or pass through the 
south. The scenario being drawn is the rise in Russian gas exports to Europe, 
with a north axis that includes the expansion of  the North Stream joining 
Germany and Russia, and a south axis – where, nevertheless, Turkey (not Italy, 
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nor any other EU member) will be the main candidate to energy hub. This, 
however, would imply moving the geopolitical barycentre of  Ankara even more 
towards the Kremlin. 
Conclusions
The analysis presented sought to verify the hypothesis put forward in the introduction, 
i.e. that the Russian strategy of  establishing relations with Europe has been based on the 
conviction that European countries are incapable of  carrying out a policy that will 
diversify its energy suppliers. In this sense, it was argued that the geopolitical tensions 
between Europe and Russia derived from issues concerning transit countries and from 
disputes related to the construction of  pipelines aimed at finding alternative geopolitical 
configurations that do not, however, solve the European needs to find other suppliers. 
It follows, from the above, that the economic and power block leading the Russian 
Federation today has invested – over the years, since Putin’s inauguration – in merging the 
energy sector with the interests of  the State, both nationally and internationally: the 
Russian economy depends on this sector, on which its foreign policy also relies as its 
main vector of  force. This choice, however, strongly binding Russian economy, has 
prevented the emergence of  other economic sectors that would make this country’s 
economy more flexible in the face of  unfavourable economic circumstances. A look at 
Russian economy during the last years makes it all the more evident. 
Another aspect made clear by our analysis is that, although Europe still lacks the 
strength to deal with Russia, Russia also continues to depend on its European buyers. 
This means that Russia’s capacity to take advantage of  the contradictions within the EU 
derives from the latter’s absence of  a common energy policy. yet to be explained are the 
reasons for this absence or whether this absence is a result of  the impossibility of  
reaching an agreement among EU members, either for internal reasons or reasons that 
go beyond the energy market. Most probably, a joint European policy aimed, on the one 
hand, at stabilising relations with Russia and, on the other hand, at strongly investing in 
infrastructure capable of  making Europe less dependent on Russian gas, would be a 
solution that would change the terms of  negotiation with Russia, reducing Europe’s 
current disadvantage. At the same time, the crisis in Ukraine speeded up energy relations 
between Russia and China. yet, the threat of  a complete turn to the East does not seem 
very likely since Russia is also not interested in becoming dependent on China, preferring 
instead to diversify its buyers. Nonetheless, although Russia continues to favour its 
relations with Germany, through the expansion of  the Nord Stream, it is also true that, 
in terms of  infrastructural initiatives for the south and southeast regions, Europe is 
paying a price for its indecision and the geopolitical context has made Turkey the potential 
candidate to hub for the distribution of  Russian gas. In this way, besides not being able 
to choose between suppliers, if  the “Turkish option” materialises, Europe will also have 
to negotiate the distribution of  gas with Turkey. An alternative would be to search for 
State companies such as ENI that would be willing to take part in the construction of  
this pipeline and thus remove Turkey from the scenario. 
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 A divided Europe risks not being able to fulfil its attempt to diversify suppliers while 
investing in a surplus production from the USA. As shown, one of  the outcomes of  the 
agreement between OPEC and non-OPEC countries was the creation of  more favourable 
conditions for the unconventional sector. however, an obstacle remains: political under- 
standing as a necessary basis for a policy of  EU investments aimed at the infrastructural 
modernisation of  gas processing and distribution. 
As suggested in the introduction, and analysed within this chapter, we believe that 
Russia on its own is unable to change the international order but, with its foreign policy 
centred on energy resources, it is a major actor for change. hence, it becomes secondary 
to attempt to determine whether Russia is a revisionist power or not. Post-Second 
World War international organisations acknowledge the centrality of  Russia, a member 
of  the United Nations Security Council. however, before a possible change in this 
order may take place, Russia also wants to be a decisive factor. Nevertheless, when com- 
pared to the USA or China, Russia is not a model of  development for other countries. 
This is one of  the aspects that distinguish Russia today from the USSR. Therefore, its 
capacity to be at the centre of  the international order depends much more on a 
deflationist use of  power, i.e. on its capacity to activate different levels of  constriction 
in its relations with other States, as witnessed by its choices of  establishing relations 
with the EU. 
From a theoretical point of  view, it is useful to draw attention to the ‘risks’ and 
‘threats’ categories, as they have much to say about potential critical scenarios for an 
energy relation of  strict energy dependence (Duarte and Fernandes, 2011). Not only 
because Russia represents a direct threat for Europe, but also because strict dependence 
on a single country represents a high risk. An unfavourable economic climate, with worse 
consequences than what happened between 2014 and 2016, can have strong repercussions 
in the Russian economic and energy system, which in turn can have a direct impact on 
European energy security. Likewise, such a strict dependence makes a direct threat to 
Russia an indirect threat to its energy relationship with the EU. 
It can be concluded, then, that the strict dependence between energy sector, domes-
tic economy and State interests that characterises the Russian government elevates the 
Russia-EU relationship to a high level of  constriction. European energy security is, there-
fore, the main field for Moscow and the EU to establish relations. The future of  Euro-
pean energy security depends on the EU’s capacity to create the conditions to implement 
an energy security strategy that is in line with its community goals, in order to reduce this 
dependence. 
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Final Remarks: The Geopolitics of  Energy 
and Energy Security
Maria Raquel Freire
“Geopolitics is the battle for space and power played out in a geographical setting. Just as 
there are military geopolitics, diplomatic geopolitics and economic geopolitics, there is 
also energy geopolitics. For natural resources and the trade routes that bring those 
resources to consumers is central to the study of  geography.” 
Robert D. Kaplan (2014)
This concluding chapter looks at the geopolitics of  energy security bringing to light 
the main arguments and debates this volume puts forward and engages with, and having 
a close look at energy relations between the European Union (EU) and Russia in a volatile 
and fast-changing international environment. The chapter first sets the relevance of  the 
topic and what the geopolitics of  energy dynamics tell us about shifts in traditional 
arrangements as well as on the politicization/securitization of  energy relations. This will 
then constitute the basis for the analysis of  EU and Russia in the complex setting of  
energy relations, including in the last section some reflections on future avenues.
Energy security is a contested concept, as widely acknowledged in the literature. 
The tendency has been to define the concept in terms of  availability of  resources in ade- 
quate formats, quantity and reasonable prices, as various contributors to this volume 
acknowledge. But this understanding varies according to the energy resources, geographic 
location, political systems, economy and external relations of  countries. Also, the diversity 
in actors beyond States should be underlined, as well as the dimensions related to energy 
security in environmental, sustainability-related and public good terms. All these elements 
impact on the way we conceptualize energy security and, thus, on how the concept is 
rendered operational. The contributors to this volume also acknowledge the difficulty in 
finding a shared working definition, but advance with possible ingredients that must be 
part of  any definition. A common element to these attempts is the understanding that 
the concept must be defined in a broad and encompassing way to match the multiplicity 
of  factors it entails, from production to supply, from pipeline routes to political upheavals, 
from the economics of  energy to the securitization of  energy politics. 
Carla Fernandes argues that only a multidimensional understanding might assist in 
grasping a working concept capable of  responding to current challenges and opportunities. 
This multidimensional concept should include four main dimensions: security, foreign 
policy, domestic politics and economics. The first dimension, security, points to the fact 
that increasingly attention is paid to the security of  infrastructures, systems of  information 
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related to production, storage, transport and distribution, as well as diversification of  
suppliers and transit routes. The second dimension, foreign policy, brings attention to 
“energy diplomacy” as a fundamental dimension related to contracts and agreements that 
sustain the overall chain of  energy relations. The third dimension, domestic politics, 
focuses on the internal dynamics associated to energy-logics, including investment on 
energy infrastructures and integration of  energy systems, concerns with the type of  
energy primarily used, and diversification strategies. The fourth and last dimension per- 
tains to economics, and has a strong linkage to shifts arising in the global energy market, 
with the highlight coming from the change in strategy adopted by the United States (US) 
regarding new investments in the production of  shale gas, which clearly has been having 
impact in economic dynamics. These dimensions associated to the concept of  energy 
security clearly point to the fact that in an increasingly interdependent world we also face 
increasingly interdependent energy relations. This (inter)dependence is evident from any 
side of  the chain, be it from the perspective of  suppliers, or from the point of  view of  
consumers, or from that of  transit countries. As energy security is very much built around 
a broad chain of  actors and factors, and the stakeholders are varied, security arrangements 
must be broad enough to encompass this diversified setting. 
This concluding chapter looks at the geopolitics of  energy security bringing to light 
the main arguments and debates this volume puts forward and engages with, and having 
a close look at energy relations between the European Union (EU) and Russia in a volatile 
and fast-changing international environment. The chapter first sets the relevance of  the 
topic and what the geopolitics of  energy dynamics tell us about shifts in traditional 
arrangements as well as on the politicization/securitization of  energy relations. This will 
then constitute the basis for the analysis of  EU and Russia in the complex setting of  
energy relations, including in the last section some reflections on future avenues.
Energy Security: High up on the Political Agendas
The concept of  energy security, as mentioned, is not easy to grasp given the multitude 
of  dimensions it implies and the diverse actors it involves. Very clearly, if  we look at the 
approach of  the EU, Russia or the US towards energy security, the dimensions highlighted 
are different, revealing distinct understandings towards the issue – which are also related 
to the actors’ positioning towards energy, playing the role of  the supplier, consumer or 
both. In the EU, for example, the concept of  energy security is very much linked to the 
regular supply of  oil and gas, with the main goal of  avoiding disruptions that might have 
a huge impact in the normal functioning of  EU countries at all levels, from governmental 
agencies, to industry, as well as at the level of  households. The 1973 oil crisis is usually 
suggested as the situation not to be repeated, as Antonio Costa Silva clearly highlights. 
Also, as mentioned by Licínia Simão, the concept is very much linked to environmental 
sustainability and economic competitiveness. The author adds that this concern with 
disruption has been growing due to the fact that 85% of  oil imports come from Russia, 
the Middle East and Africa, with many areas of  production and/or transit facing political, 
economic and social turmoil. In the case of  the US the concept of  energy security is 
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more encompassing and defined as the ability to ensure access to resources while 
protecting the global economy from the volatility of  prices. The goal is therefore more 
structural in terms of  direct impacts in the international energy market system. As for 
Russia, energy security is very much related to national security, thus clearly at the 
intersection of  foreign and domestic politics. The economic dimension of  energy security 
is fundamental for Moscow, as most revenues come from energy exports, in particular 
gas, as further analyzed in the chapter. 
Energy security is a topical subject, high on the agendas. The relevance of  energy 
supplies and price stability, of  environmental sustainability and de-carbonization of  the 
economy, of  securing energy chains from terrorism and cyber-attacks, for example, is very 
clear, as Antonio Costa Silva and Carla Fernandes underline. Energy is thus of  the utmost 
relevance and a driver for growth and social change, as Filipe Arnaut Moreira claims. The 
control of  energy sources and flows provides strategic advantage in unfavorable contexts, 
particularly when violence is present. In these cases, Arnaut Moreira argues energy security 
draws to a large extent in market dynamics, besides the traditional geopolitical conside- 
rations. In fact, energy might take on different roles, both hindering differences or further 
promoting these and leading to potential clashes. In more concrete terms, the volumes of  
production, of  oil or gas, might put pressure on prices as well as on reliability of  supply. 
If  production is increased we might face a direct impact in energy exporting countries, 
which will see their revenues lowered, whereas finding alternative energy sources might be 
economically impracticable. If  on a reverse trend, production is decreased, prices will 
likely go up, with direct negative impact particularly in consumer countries. This means 
that in contexts of  violence, the use of  energy production as a “weapon” might have 
important consequences in offering leverage, particularly to the richest-producer countries. 
According to Arnaut Moreira three conditions should be met for this effect, namely that 
the production reaches a regional or even global scale, so that the decision to increase or 
decrease production really has an impact in markets; that this actor has a strong economic 
performance in multiple areas, so that it might be immune to external threats and pressure; 
and that this also allows domestic adjustments in face of  a more hostile international 
environment that might result from this kind of  policy-course and which might imply 
economic losses in different areas. 
Ana Campos and Carla Fernandes, also discussing resources’ relations to violent 
conflict highlight in this context that energy might be used also as a “source of  power 
and security”, not necessarily as a weapon, promoting the same kind of  dynamics in 
terms of  internal and external pressure. The conflicts related to energy are varied, and as 
the authors make clear there is a non-linear relationship between resources and conflicts. 
In fact, conflicts related to energy might arise from political disagreement or lack of  
convergence in interests, such as the case of  China-India when they disputed the same 
sources for their energy supplies. This dispute was solved through the signature of  
agreements regulating both countries’ access to downstream, midstream and upstream 
resources. Explaining energy conflicts in military terms only is, thus, clearly insufficient. 
Moreover, the use of  energy in these terms makes clear what might be vulnerabilities and 
136 Geopolitics of enerGy and enerGy security
weaknesses, as well as what might be sources of  power and leverage. Therefore, just as 
much as competition for resources might generate conflict it might also promote coope- 
ration. It is in these two-way dynamics that this volume develops its main contribution on 
the analysis of  energy security and how this has been affecting energy geopolitics. Of  the 
utmost relevance still, is underlining how the concept of  energy geopolitics is dealt with 
in this chapter by Ana Campos and Carla Fernandes, bringing a working definition that 
seeks to offer an advanced tool to deal with the topic – more precisely taking into account 
the influence of  factors such as the location of  energy supplies as well as that of  
consumers, transit routes and/or energy prices. This concept is in fact not very much 
developed in the literature, which has been devoting more attention to analyses of  energy 
relations and scenario-building having geopolitical factors as a focus, leaving therefore 
aside the conceptualization of  energy geopolitics. 
On a more technical note, Arnaut Moreira still draws attention to the difference 
between oil and gas production (fossil) and renewable energy, in face of  discussions 
about switching energy systems towards renewable sources. The author’s conclusion 
points to the fact that despite being more widely available, this does not mean renewable 
sources are evenly contributing to energy production (as solar energy depends on how 
sunny it gets, or wind energy on how the wind blows), and to the fact that renewable 
sources require huge investments in technology and infrastructure, that in many cases 
hampers the prospects for turning this possibility real in the short or even medium-term. 
The argument thus underlines the long-term dependence on energy geopolitics, with the 
prevalence of  oil and gas (fossil sources), rather than a take-off  in renewable energies 
that might lead to a takeover in terms of  production and supply. 
Early this year, it was reported that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – third largest 
oil exporter after Saudi Arabia and Russia – planned to invest $361 billion into renewable 
energy production up to 2050. The same trend has been announced by China and Saudi 
Arabia. However, as clarified, these investments are not understood as offering an 
alternative to main fossil resources. “Investment in renewables is outpacing investments 
in other forms of  electricity generation. (…) ‘A new economic model is emerging’, said 
Suhail Al Mazrouei, Minister of  Energy of  the UAE, who spoke about his country’s new 
energy strategy at the event. (…) As long as renewables are largely confined to the 
electricity sector, oil companies – and oil countries – have little to worry about. Oil plays 
a negligible role in the electricity sector after all. More than half  of  oil’s output goes to 
transport, the rest to industry. (…) The big oil and gas players do embrace renewable 
energy but they view it as something that is complementary to their business, not as a 
possible substitution for oil and gas. For this reason, they do not see that the energy 
transition could have serious geopolitical implications” (Beckman, 2017).
Shifts and Adjustments in the Energy Security Map: Rethinking 
Energy Geopolitics
As Ana Campos and Carla Fernandes make clear, the end of  the Cold War provided 
ground for new developments or at least more visible ones regarding energy-related 
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policies and practices. According to these authors, the new context free from the bipolar 
rivalry constrains offered new opportunities for trading and developing new energy 
relations, Russia opened up its market beyond the post-Soviet space and new technological 
developments were associated to the building of  new infrastructures, providing a wider 
geopolitical ground for energy relations to take place. Currently, and according to 
Antonio Costa Silva, the Arabic Peninsula plus Iran and Iraq are responsible for 70% of  
conventional oil reserves, whereas this is an area in turmoil, where violent conflicts and 
ungoverned spaces raise questions concerning assurances to a safe and regular supply to 
the market. Carla Fernandes discusses in this context the concept of  “resource natio- 
nalisms” as very much relevant to energy dynamics, as they are closely linked to political 
regimes and choices and thus affect supply capacity. 
The current geopolitics of  energy, in an international context marked by deep 
changes and very much dependent on these energy sources, as well as the daily mana- 
gement of  the life of  States and organizations, cannot afford irregular supplies or cuts. 
highly unstable contexts are therefore being downgraded in terms of  market preference. 
Instability in the Middle East is putting pressure on countries to look for more stable 
suppliers, as Carla Fernandes highlights, resulting in a new world strategic map that is 
being redesigned by a different constellation of  actors and factors (or at least by the 
addition of  new factors to the more traditional ones). There have been fundamental 
shifts in the geopolitics of  energy which render energy security more prominent. These 
changes relate to the fact that traditional energy consumers, such as Japan, Europe and 
the US are giving place to fast growing economies in high demand of  energy resources, 
such as China and other emerging economies, as put forward by Antonio Costa Silva. 
This shift has profound implications in the production-supply-distribution chains, 
and inverts the predominant role of  the West in energy relations, downgrading its pre- 
sence among the biggest consumers. This is both due to a diversification of  sources in 
Western countries and a slower pace of  economic and industrial growth. This refocusing 
of  energy dynamics to Asia has been widely discussed. “We are (…) seeing before our 
eyes all energy routes leading to the Indo-Pacific region. The Middle East will be export- 
ing more and more hydrocarbons there. Russia is exporting more and more hydrocarbons 
to the East Asian realm of  the area. And North America will soon be looking more and 
more to the Indo-Pacific region to export its own energy, especially natural gas” (Kaplan, 
2014). As Mustafa Aydin claims in an article in the hurriyet Newspaper, “Energy is 
a highly strategic determinant beyond its commercial and economic aspects. As a result, 
great powers have been competing each other to sustain their strategic interests and 
political gains. While the U.S. has successfully positioned itself  as the guardian of  the free 
flow of  energy since the Arab oil embargo of  1973, Russia has become more aggressive 
in recent years in using its energy card for political leverage” (Aydin, 2016). All these 
shifts in energy geopolitics have implied dynamics of  politicization and/or of  securi- 
tization, as energy becomes both a political instrument and a security matter. Dealing 
with energy dynamics from these perspectives brings an added layer of  complexity to 
energy security. Amongst these changes, the EU has revealed vulnerability, but also 
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willingness to better prepare itself  to the many challenges the new geopolitics of  energy 
imply. As Antonio Costa Silva argues, there is no European energy market revealing the 
current dissonance between political discourse and the functioning of  the economy and 
world energy market. Nevertheless, in February 2015 the Energy Union was adopted, 
seeking to make “energy more secure, affordable and sustainable” (European Commission, 
2017). Building on the “2030 Framework for Climate and Energy” and the “European 
Energy Security Strategy”1, the Energy Union seeks to diversify sources and transport 
routes, better integrate the EU energy market through the building of  new infrastructure 
and eliminating technical and regulatory barriers, promote energy efficiency, the decar- 
bonization of  the economy, and more investment in research and innovation (European 
Commission, 2017). More specifically, the “European Energy Security Strategy” that was 
approved in June 2014 focuses on diversification, modernization of  infrastructure, and 
the need for coordination among EU countries on energy politics, not only for better 
domestic performance, but also to better address international relations, “speaking with 
one voice”, as the European Commission voiced it, and that is addressed in the con- 
tribution by Licínia Simão. These documents and political decisions show determina- 
tion to position the EU in energy-related terms, both regarding internal dynamics and 
towards the outside. It also shows the concern with the new geopolitics of  energy, as well 
as the need to assure reliable supplies, as earlier mentioned. The following section focuses 
on EU-Russia relations as a fundamental relationship in Europe’s energy policies and 
practices.
EU and Russia: in-between Rivalry and Partnership
Several authors in this volume refer to EU-Russia energy relations as an important 
dimension of  their relations. The EU is largely dependent on external supplies despite 
the major effort in developing renewable sources. Broadly, 86% of  its oil comes from 
Russia and 45% of  its gas from both Russia and Algeria. Ana Campos and Carla Fer-
nandes clarify that currently the EU is the biggest market for Russian energy exports, 
whereas Russia is a key supplier for the EU. As the authors put it, this mutual dependence 
represents a major challenge for Russian and EU energy security and both are searching 
for alternatives through diversification strategies. But as much as this interdependence 
can be seen as a challenge it also offers opportunities, as Aleksei Grivach argues. 
Russia’s energy strategy to 2030 defines energy security as a fundamental part of  
national security and evidences the concerns of  an exporting country with instability of  
markets, prices, and the politicization of  energy issues. In this context, both Arnaut 
Moreira and Franco Tomassini remind that the Russian economy suffered a period 
of  recession and that about two thirds of  Russia’s exports are energy products (mainly 
oil and gas). Thus, Franco Tomassoni argues that Russia on its own cannot change 
international balances, but that it can be decisive in helping others do so. The low oil 
prices particularly from mid-2014, in combination with the sanctions weakened the 
1 For further detail on these documents see European Commission (2017).
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Russian economy, which entered a recession period which only by the end of  2016, 
early 2017 was giving signs of  improvement. The overall impact of  the sanctions on 
energy-related products was minimal compared to other areas. The decision by the 
OPEC to reduce the production in 2016 led to an increase in prices which directly had 
an impact in the Russian economic performance, given its very much dependence on 
energy assets in economic terms. But this economic performance is as fluctuating as the 
commodities prices are. 
Therefore, the Kremlin has devised a strategy to gain a dominant role in the gas 
market, mainly through rendering flexible transport and supply conditions. José Félix 
Ribeiro further adds in this regard the yamal and Shtokman projects as good examples. 
The end goal includes further investments in the military-industrial complex seeking to 
assure more technological competitiveness (thus, building an “energy-arms” closer 
relationship). This strategy, put forward in the early 2000s by Vladimir Putin required a 
diminished presence of  foreign investors in energy-related projects as well as a reduced 
influence from private sector groups in Russia. Franco Tomassini draws attention to how 
the Putin administration affected the energy map in Russia by relying mainly on State 
companies, namely in the energy sector, such as Gaznovaya Promyshlennost (Gazprom). In 
the 1990s, Gazprom had to resist the privatisation process, as the author shows, as the 
State needed a strong presence in the energy sector. Gazprom is the largest Russian 
company controlling 95% of  the reserves and 90% of  the production. Adding to this 
domestic strategy of  reinforcing the State presence in energy-relevant companies, Russia 
also sought the diversification of  its supplies beyond Europe, reinforcing linkages with 
the Asia-Pacific region, and in particular China. The potential of  China as a relevant 
buyer of  Russian energy is evident. however, Moscow has been careful not to become 
too dependent on China as a buyer of  its resources, and therefore concluded also an 
agreement with India within this overall framework of  energy-supply-diversification, as 
Franco Tomassini well explains.
“One of  the great questions of  energy geopolitics over the last few years has been 
the nature and extent of  Russia’s shift in export strategy away from Europe. The year 
2014 arguably marked the end of  Gazprom’s multi-decade business model in Europe. In 
May 2014, the State-controlled natural gas producer, inked a deal worth USD 400 billion 
to supply Russian gas to China. In November 2014, through a memorandum of  
understanding, Gazprom pushed the Altai pipeline to service the Asian markets instead 
of  Europe. Finally, in December 2014, it cancelled plans for South Stream – a pipeline 
project once viewed as a key to locking down the European market and, that same month, 
announced Turkish Stream, a pipeline aimed at circumventing the transit country Ukraine, 
and the expansion of  Nord Stream, a Russian-German link, through the Baltic Sea” 
(Skalamera and Goldthau, 2016). This quote shows how energy security has been 
contributing to a diversification strategy and a broader market for Russia’s energy. The 
Ukraine crisis clearly led to a change in strategy with Russia seeking for projects bypassing 
the country, and further concentrating in spaces beyond Europe. This led to a downgrading 
of  Ukraine’s relevance as a transit country, as well as to the EU as the centre-piece of  
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Russian supplies, despite remaining a fundamental partner in energy business, as 
mentioned. 
In a nutshell, by developing these projects, and after the Ukrainian debacle by 
reducing the centrality of  Ukraine as a transit country, Russia is trying to reinforce its 
position regionally (in the post-Soviet area) and globally (where relations with China, 
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Japan and the Persian Gulf  assume relevance). The Nordstream 
and Southstream pipelines are illustrative of  a diminished role for Ukraine as a transit 
country, and the new agreements with China and India, of  the globalized role Russia 
aspires to. Aleksei Grivach reinforces this perspective when considering Ukraine is the 
weak link in EU-Russia relations as it is the single most important transit country for 
Russian gas. The author clarifies that back in 2006, Russia put up a proposal to increase 
energy security based on a comprehensive upstream and downstream cooperation, which 
would have allowed for increasing the level of  confidence and the sharing of  investment 
risks between all market players. however, the EU opted for a unilateral way by leaving 
the risks of  investment and supply at the hands of  suppliers, which led to the use of  
infrastructures becoming politically motivated. This was understood in Moscow as a way 
of  confrontation, since diversification in EU discourse is all about Russian supplies. 
Other contributors to this volume would not fully agree with this view particularly in 
face of  a very unstable Middle East, underlining that the EU’s diversification policy is also 
directed at other actors (despite agreeing Russia has a big share in EU’s supplies and 
therefore is often mentioned; this is more so after Crimea’s annexation and an unders- 
tanding of  Russia as a less reliable partner). Aleksei Grivach argues that there are three 
main sources of  pipeline gas supplies to the EU, namely coming from Russia, Norway and 
North Africa (Algeria and Libya). Looking deeper into these, Russian resources are at 
least eight times higher than those of  Norway and Algeria combined, making of  Russia a 
most relevant energy partner. The author adds that the EU and Russia have enjoyed 50 
years of  cooperation, which is visible in the rising numbers of  cooperation: Russian share 
gas in EU consumption was 23% in 2010 and rose to 31% in 2016. 
However, as argued, Russia lacks sufficient and fully safe infrastructure to meet 
the EU’s growing energy demands for gas, which mainly come from Russia via the 
Nordstream (directly linking to Germany) and the yamal Europe (linked to Poland), and 
indirect pipelines mostly via Ukraine, which is anymore a route Russia considers primary. 
There is yet another direct pipeline that goes to Turkey – the Bluestream. Nevertheless, 
new projects are needed. The geopolitical change of  Ukraine’s central place in the energy 
security grid brought new challenges. Fifteen years ago Ukraine had almost the total 
monopoly over Russian gas transit. In 2008 it held a share of  70%, currently this has been 
reduced to 40%-45%. These numbers, Aleksei Grivach adds, still are high in face of  old 
infrastructure with no investment that cannot assure sustainable and reliable supplies’ 
transit. Franco Tomassini adds in this context that Gazprom has made it public that it 
does not intend to renew the transit agreement with Ukraine, due to expire in 2019. All 
these strategic and political choices carry to a great extent security concerns, rendering 
energy security in Europe a most relevant issue.
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Future Scenarios
In face of  fundamental changes in the energy security landscape and the shifting 
relevance of  different actors, both of  a State and non-State nature, the need to rethink 
energy relations and eventual partnerships is clear. Three main final remarks emerge 
from the contributions to this volume. First, the concept of  energy security in the EU 
should be refined in order to answer the many challenges the EU faces in this regard. 
Antonio Costa Silva advances with the need to rethink sources and avoid excessive 
dependency from Russia by building what the author calls an Atlantic Axis of  supply, 
further reinforced by reduced costs through internal-EU arrangements and the building 
of  cross-border links. In this way conditions for competition and diversification will be 
created, assuring a more reliable network of  partners in energy. Nevertheless, as the 
author underlines, the fragility of  the EU does not only refer to the need for more diver- 
sification, or even investments in alternative energy sources; in fact, the EU’s fragility is 
very much exposed in the fact that Russian State-owned companies hold significant 
shares in European companies. These are the cases of  big European companies such as 
E.on, Ruhr Gas or Gas de France. Félix Ribeiro adds that the take on energy security in 
the EU and in Russia is different, as the EU is looking forward to assure energy security 
especially in terms of  reliable supplies, whereas Russia has a grander design to build stra- 
tegic partnerships on the basis of  energy relations that might allow for more autonomy 
and even influence in the geopolitics of  energy, competing with the US and gaining 
prevalence in markets such as China and India. This means that the EU needs to be 
attentive to the current geopolitical shifts in energy relations to be able to position itself  
in such a way as to assure energy security in its multiple dimensions. 
This points leads to a second inter-related issue raised by the contributions, which 
has to do with the extent of  the EU’s and Russia’s diversification strategy. To some 
authors this strategy might alleviate EU’s reliance on Russian resources, whereas to other 
this might means Russia’s winning a new centrality to the East, clearly diminishing its 
stakes in the EU market. Aleksei Grivach makes the counter argument by claiming that 
when the EU talks about diversification it means essentially diversifying supplies from 
Russia, it is putting forward a one-sided approach. This is clearly very much the inter- 
pretation that has been made within the EU given the interdependence in EU-Russia 
relations, and an understanding of  EU “dependency” on Russian supplies as a problem. 
Licínia Simão further deals with this issue citing Sergei Lavrov as critical of  readings 
about the Ukrainian crisis, and the earlier gas crisis, as contributing to the perception of  
Russia as a non-reliable partner. Energy should not be subject to political readings, but 
instead remain part of  the commercial realm. Franco Tomassini adds Putin’s remarks on 
the fact that politics is politics, and the economy and business are just that, business, thus 
the politicisation of  relations according to the Russian president does not bring benefits 
to any of  the parts. 
“As one of  the leading producers/exporters of  energy, it is integral part of  the 
Russian economy, regime, foreign policy and strategic calculations. Thus Russia is active 
in playing the energy card as a geopolitical tool to extend and/or maintain its influence in 
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its near abroad. With its strategic positioning and infrastructure, Russia controls huge 
natural gas markets across in Europe and Eurasia. Western sanctions following Russian 
occupation of  Crimea and a decline in oil prices negatively affected Russia. Moreover, the 
U.S. outstripped it as producer with its recent discovery of  shale gas, but Russia was still 
markets with recent agreements with China and India, balancing the U.S. in the global 
energy market. No doubt, the increasing demand of  India and China, as well as their 
policies, will be decisive in the future positioning of  Russia and the U.S., in addition to 
shaping the global energy market” (Aydin, 2016). This long quote by Aydin summarizes 
the geopolitics of  energy security and how Russia positions itself  towards the EU and 
other international relevant players, with what this repositioning might imply for the EU 
itself. In all, the idea that these different but inter-connected dimensions of  fostering 
energy integration while assuring autonomy, of  promoting cooperation while making 
interdependence the main line for agreements, and of  assuring supplies and markets 
while pursuing sustainable environmental policies, is always present, even if  not always 
followed. 
This led some contributors to argue that in face of  the negative trends that might 
arise from excessive diversification and misunderstanding in many energy-related areas, 
the finding of  common ground for continued cooperation within diversification and 
reliability should be the way forward. This means the recognition that energy cooperation 
between the EU and Russia is positive. however, as Aleksei Grivach argues, neither 
Russia nor the EU can afford a break-up, meaning that there is a clear need for more 
investment in infrastructures and relations. Licinia Simão draws attention to trends in 
Russian discourse that point to a further detachment from the EU as a preferential 
market and further Russian investment particularly in emerging markets in Asia, as 
previously noted. Also, she notes that if  “dependency” decreases in this relationship, 
the incentives for normalization of  relations after Crimea will clearly diminish. Arnaut 
Moreira and Tomassini add to this discussion that all the scenarios being crafted are 
sustained on the idea of  a strong, cohesive and united EU, which in the case of  energy 
has not really been the case. Finding common agreement to invest in transport, storage, 
infrastructure and integrated policies requires political commitment, which has not been 
evident within the EU. Thus, the future of  European energy security depends to a large 
extent on the EU’s capacity to create the conditions to implement an energy security 
strategy that is in line with its community goals, in order to reduce dependence and pro- 
mote integration, in a forward-looking and collaborative manner. 
The third and last point is a broader one and has to do with the idea that Arnaut 
Moreira makes clear when he argues that security is not a tradable good, but that it is 
essential to the maintenance of  the western values and liberties. In this way, the author 
considers energy security as part of  the security equation, playing a role in assuring a 
more predictable scenario in this increasingly globalized world. Licínia Simão further ads 
that the development of  global energy markets, as a result of  a reduction in costs and 
advanced transport technologies makes it more secure to consumers, but not really to 
suppliers. Thus, again the imbalances in these complex network of  relationships are 
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easier than finding adequate answers. The way forward when looking at energy security 
must clearly be based on a multidimensional approach to the concept and to the practices 
associated to it. The road of  competition is relevant in terms of  providing better and 
wider options, but if  treated in a misleading way – as an absolute alternative to –, might 
in fact lead to negative outcomes for the parties involved. Thus, the need to rethink 
strategies, policies and practices is very much present, in a context where energy security 
is highly politicized and securitized, providing it in many instances with the wrong 
entourage for more collaborative deals. In an increasingly globalized world, rethinking 
energy security in a multifaceted way may provide new avenues for cooperation and for 
a better management of  the many challenges associated to it.
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GEOPOlITICS OF EnERGY anD EnERGY SECURITY
This publication reproduces the communications done at the Workshop held at Portuguese national Defense 
Institute (IDn), in the framework of the project Geo4GER – Geopolitics of Gas and the Future of Euro-Russian 
Relations. This project, funded by FCT and developed by IPRI in partnership with IDn, aims to analyse the 
complex and multidimensional relationship geopolitics of Euro-Russian gas, and develop alternative possible 
scenarios for the next twenty years.
Given the complexity of the vectors to consider in the analyses of this complex issue, the editors invited 
specialists to treat, in a rigorous and synthetic way, some of the aspects which they believe to represent the 
basic points the project aims to develop. In a context of rapid changes, we believe their contribution will assure 
greater and more informed information about one major challenge in the coming decades, that energy security 
and Euro-Russian relations will bring to European societies, namely in what refers to natural gas.
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